APPENDIX TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

THE REGULATIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE IDEAS OF PURE REASON[1]

Before we proceed to deal with this *Appendix* it will be of advantage to consider the section in the *Methodology* on *the Discipline of Pure Reason in regard to Hypotheses.*[2] That section affords a very illuminating introduction to the problems here discussed, and is extremely important for understanding Kant's view of metaphysical science as yielding either complete certainty or else nothing at all. This is a doctrine which he from time to time suggests, to the considerable bewilderment of the modern reader.[3] In discussing it he starts from the obvious objection, that though nothing can be known through Reason in its pure *a priori* employment, metaphysics may yet be possible in an empirical form, as consisting of hypotheses, constructed in conjectural explanation of the facts of experience. Kant replies by defining the conditions under which alone hypotheses can be entertained as such. There must always be something completely certain, and not only invented or merely "opined," namely, the *possibility* of the object to which the hypothesis appeals. Once that is proved, it is allowable, on the basis of experience, to form opinions regarding its reality. Then, and only then, can such opinions be entitled hypotheses. Otherwise we are not employing the understanding to explain; we are simply indulging the imagination in its tendency to dream. Now since the categories of the pure understanding do not enable us to invent *a priori* the concept of a dynamical connection, but only to apprehend it when presented in experience, we cannot by means of these categories invent a single object endowed with a new quality

[1] A 642=B 670.

[2] A 769-82=B 797-810.

[3] A xiv, B xxiii-iv, and *Reflexionen* ii. 1451: "In metaphysics there can be no such thing as uncertainty." Cf. above, pp. 10, 35.

not empirically given; and cannot, therefore, base an hypothesis upon any such conception.

"Thus it is not permissible to invent any new original powers, as, for instance, an understanding capable of intuiting its objects without the aid of senses; or a force of attraction without any contact; or a new kind of substance existing in space and yet not impenetrable. Nor is it legitimate to postulate any other form of communion of substances than that revealed in experience, any presence that is not spatial, any duration that is not temporal. In a word our Reason can employ as conditions of the possibility of things only the conditions of possible experience; it can never, as it were, *create* concepts of things, independently of those conditions. Such concepts, though not self-contradictory, would be without an object." [1]

This does not, however, mean that the concepts of pure Reason can have no valid employment. They are, it is true, Ideas merely, with no object corresponding to them in any experience; but then it is also true that they are not hypotheses, referring to imagined objects, supposed to be possibly real. They are purely problematic. They are heuristic fictions (*heuristische Fiktionen*), the sole function of which is to serve as principles regulative of the understanding in its systematic employment. Used in any other manner they reduce to the level of merely mental entities (*Gedankendinge*) whose very possibility is indemonstrable, and which cannot therefore be employed as hypotheses for the explanation of appearances. Given appearances can be accounted for only in terms of laws known to hold among appearances. To explain natural phenomena by a transcendental hypothesis—mental processes by the assumption of the soul as a substantial, simple, spiritual being, or order and design in nature by the assumption of a Divine Author—is never admissible.

". . . that would be to explain something, which in terms of known empirical principles we do not understand sufficiently, by something which we do not understand at all." [2]

And Kant adds that the wildest hypotheses, if only they are physical, are more tolerable than a hyperphysical one. They at least conform to the conditions under which alone hypothetical explanation as such is allowable. "Outside this field, to form opinions, is merely to play with thoughts. . . ." [3]

A further condition, required to render an hypothesis acceptable, is its adequacy for determining *a priori* all the consequences which are actually given. If for that purpose supplementary hypotheses have to be called in, the force of

[1] A 770-1 = B 798-9. [2] A 772 = B 800. [3] A 775 = B 803.

the main assumption is proportionately weakened. Thus we can easily explain natural order and design, if we are allowed to postulate a Divine Author who is absolutely perfect and all-powerful. But that hypothesis lies open to all the objections suggested by defects and evils in nature, and can only be preserved through new hypotheses which modify the main assumption. Similarly the hypothesis of the human soul as an abiding and purely spiritual being, existing in independence of the body, has to be modified to meet the difficulties which arise from the phenomena of growth and decay. But the new hypotheses, then constructed, derive their whole authority from the main hypothesis which they are themselves defending.

Such is Kant's criticism of metaphysics when its teaching is based on the facts of experience hypothetically interpreted. In regard to transcendent metaphysics, there are, in Kant's view, only two alternatives.[1] Either its propositions must be established independently of all experience in purely *a priori* fashion, and therefore as absolutely certain; or they must consist in hypotheses empirically grounded. The first alternative has in the *Analytic* and *Dialectic* been shown to be impossible; the second alternative he rejects for the above reasons.

But this does not close Kant's treatment of metaphysical hypotheses. He proceeds to develop a doctrine which, in its fearless confidence in the truth of Critical teaching, is the worthy outcome of his abiding belief in the value of a "sceptical method."[2] As Reason is by its very nature dialectical, outside opponents are not those from whom we have most to fear. Their objections are really derived from a source which lies in ourselves, and until these have been traced to their origin, and destroyed from the root upwards, we can expect no lasting peace. Our duty, therefore, is to encourage our doubts, until by the very luxuriance of their growth they enable us to discover the hidden roots from which they derive their perennial vitality.

"External tranquillity is a mere illusion. The germ of these objections, which lies in the nature of human Reason, must be rooted out. But how can we uproot it, unless we give it freedom, nay, nourishment, to send out shoots so that it may discover itself to our eyes, and that we may then destroy it together with its root? Therefore think out objections which have never yet occurred to any opponent; lend him, indeed, your weapons, or grant him the most favourable position which he could possibly desire. You have

[1] Cf. A 781-2=B 809-10.

[2] Cf. above, pp. 481, 501.

nothing to fear in all this, but much to hope for; you may gain for yourselves a possession which can never again be contested."[1]

In this campaign to eradicate doubt by following it out to its furthermost limits, the hypotheses of pure Reason, "leaden weapons though they be, since they are not steeled by any law of experience," are an indispensable part of our equipment. For though hypotheses are useless for the establishment of metaphysical propositions, they are, Kant teaches, both admirable and valuable for their defence. That is to say, their true metaphysical function is not dogmatic, but polemical. They are weapons of war to which we may legitimately resort for the maintenance of beliefs otherwise established. If, for instance, we have been led to postulate the immaterial, self-subsistent nature of the soul, and are met by the difficulty that experience would seem to prove that both the growth and the decay of our mental powers are due to the body, we can weaken this objection by formulating the hypothesis that the body is not the cause of our thinking, but only a restrictive condition of it, peculiar to our present state, and that, though it furthers our sensuous and animal faculties, it acts as an impediment to our spiritual life. Similarly, to meet the many objections against belief in the eternal existence of a finite being whose birth depends upon contingencies of all kinds, such as the food supply, the whims of government, or even vice, we can adduce the transcendental hypothesis that life has neither beginning in birth nor ending in death, the entire world of sense being but an image due to our present mode of knowledge, an image which like a dream has in itself no objective reality. Such hypotheses are not, indeed, even Ideas of Reason, but simply concepts *invented* to show that the objections which are raised depend upon the false assumption that the possibilities have been exhausted, and that the laws of nature comprehend the whole field of possible existences. These hypotheses at least suffice to reveal the uncertain character of the doubts which assail us in our practical beliefs.

"[Transcendental hypotheses] are nothing but private opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot properly dispense with them as weapons against the misgivings which are apt to occur; they are necessary even to secure our inner tranquillity. We must preserve to them this character, carefully guarding against the assumption of their independent authority or absolute validity, since otherwise they would drown Reason in fictions and delusions."[2]

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[1] A 777-8 = B 805-6. [2] A 782 = B 810.

We may now return to A 642-68 = B 670-96. The teaching of this section is extremely self-contradictory, wavering between a subjective and an objective interpretation of the Ideas of Reason. The probable explanation is that Kant is here recasting older material, and leaves standing more of his earlier solutions than is consistent with his final conclusions. We can best approach the discussion by considering Kant's statements in A 645 = B 673 and in A 650 ff. = B 678 ff. They expound, though unfortunately in the briefest terms, a point of view which Idealism has since adopted as fundamental. Kant himself, very strangely, never develops its consequences at any great length.[1] The Idea, which Reason follows in the exercise of its sole true function, the systematising of the knowledge supplied by the understanding, is that of a unity in which the thought of the whole precedes the knowledge of its parts, and contains the conditions according to which the place of every part and its relation to the other parts are determined *a priori*. This Idea specialises itself in various forms, and in all of them directs the understanding to a knowledge that will be that of no mere aggregate but of a genuine system. Such concepts are not derived from nature; we interrogate nature *according to them*, and consider our knowledge defective so long as it fails to embody them. In A 650 = B 678 Kant further points out that this Idea of Reason does not merely direct the understanding to search for such unity, but also claims for itself objective reality. And he adds,

". . . it is difficult to understand how there can be a logical principle by which Reason prescribes the unity of rules, unless we also presuppose a transcendental principle whereby such systematic unity is *a priori* assumed to be necessarily inherent in the objects."

For how could we treat diversity in nature as only disguised unity, if we were also free to regard that unity as contrary to the actual nature of the real?

"Reason would then run counter to its own vocation, proposing as its aim an Idea quite inconsistent with the constitution of nature."[2]

Nor is our knowledge of the principle merely empirical, deduced from the unity which we find in contingent experience. On the contrary, there is an inherent and necessary law of Reason compelling us, antecedently to all specific experience, to look for such unity.

[1] Cf. above, pp. 97-8, 102, 390-1, 426 ff., 447 ff. [2] A 651 = B 679.

". . . without it we should have no Reason at all, and without Reason no coherent employment of the understanding, and *in the absence of this no sufficient criterion of empirical truth.* In order, therefore, to secure an empirical criterion we are absolutely compelled to presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary."[1] "It might be supposed that this is merely an economical contrivance of Reason, seeking to save itself all possible trouble, a hypothetical attempt, which, if it succeeds, will, through the unity thus attained, impart probability to the presumed principle of explanation. But such a selfish purpose can very easily be distinguished from the Idea. For in the latter we presuppose that this unity of Reason is in conformity with nature itself; and that, although we are indeed unable to determine the limits of this unity, Reason does not here beg but command."[2]

This last alternative, that Reason is here propounding a tentative hypothesis, in order by trial to discover how far it can be empirically verified—an alternative which Kant in the above passage rejects as unduly subjective, and as consequently failing to recognise the objective claims and *a priori* authority of the Ideas of Reason,—is yet a view which he himself adopts and indeed develops at considerable length in this same section. This, as already stated, affords evidence of the composite character and varying origins of the material here presented.

The *Dissertation* of 1770 gives a purely subjectivist interpretation of the regulative principles, among which, from its pre-Critical standpoint, it classes the principle of causality and the principle of the conservation of matter.

"[We adopt principles] which delude the intellect into mistaking them for arguments derived from the object, whereas they are commended to us only by the peculiar nature of the intellect, owing to their convenience for its free and ample employment. They therefore . . . rest on *subjective* grounds . . . namely, on the conditions under which it seems easy and expeditious for the intellect to make use of its insight. . . . These rules of judging, to which we freely submit and to which we adhere as if they were axioms, solely for the reason that *were we to depart from them almost no judgment regarding a given object would be permissible to our intellect*, I entitle *principles of convenience*. . . . [One of these is] the popularly received canon, *principia non esse multiplicanda praeter summam necessitatem*, to which we yield our adhesion, not because we have insight into causal unity in the world either by reason or by experience, but because we seek it by an impulse of the intellect, which seems to itself to have advanced in the explanation of phenomena only in the degree in which it is granted to it to descend from a single principle to the greatest number of consequences."[3]

[1] *Loc. cit.* Italics not in text. [2] A 653 = B 681. [3] *Dissertation*, § 30.

This, in essentials, is the view which we find developed in A 646-9 = B 674-8. Reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the general. When the general is admitted only as *problematical*, as a mere idea, while the particular is certain, we determine the universality of the rule by applying it to the particulars, and then upon confirmation of its validity proceed to draw conclusions regarding cases not actually given. This Kant entitles the *hypothetical* use of Reason. Reason must never be employed constitutively. It serves only for the introduction, as far as may be found possible, of unity into the particulars of knowledge. It seeks to make the rule *approximate* to universality.[1] The unity which it demands

". . . is a *projected* unity, to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem only. This unity aids us in discovering a principle for the manifold and special employment of the understanding, drawing its attention to cases which are not given, and thus rendering it more coherent."[2]

The unity is merely logical, or rather methodological.[3] To postulate, in consequence of its serviceableness, real unity in the objects themselves would be to transform it into a transcendental principle of Reason, and to render

". . . the systematic unity necessary, not only subjectively and logically, as method, but objectively also."[4]

The above paragraphs are intercalated between A 645 = B 673 and A 650-63 = B 678-91, in which, as we have already seen, the directly opposite view is propounded, namely, that such principles are *not* merely hypothetical, *nor* merely logical. In all cases they claim reality, and rest upon transcendental principles; they condition the very possibility of experience; and may therefore be asserted to be *a priori* necessary and to be objectively valid. To quote two additional passages:

". . . we can conclude from the universal to the particular, only if universal qualities are ascribed to things as the foundation upon which the particular qualities rest."[5] "The foundation of these laws [cf. below, pp. 550-1] is not due to any secret design of making an experiment by putting them forward as merely tentative suggestions. . . . It is easily seen that they contemplate the parsimony of

[1] The extremely un-Critical reason which Kant here (A 647-B 675) gives for its necessarily remaining hypothetical is the "impossibility of knowing all possible consequences." This use of the term hypothetical is also confusing in view of Kant's criticism of the hypothetical employment of Reason in A 769 ff. = B 797 ff.

[2] A 647 = B 675.

[3] *Loc. cit.* and A 649 = B 677.

[4] A 648 = B 676.

[5] A 652 = B 680.

fundamental causes, the manifoldness of effects, and the consequent affinity of the parts of nature, as being in themselves both rational and natural. Hence these principles carry their recommendation directly in themselves, and not merely as methodological devices."[1]

Thus, in direct opposition to the preceding view of Reason's function as hypothetical, Kant is now prepared to maintain that the maxims of Reason are without meaning and without application save in so far as they can be grounded in a transcendental principle.[2]

Let us follow Kant's detailed exposition of this last thesis. The logical maxim, to seek for systematic unity, rests upon the transcendental principle that the apparently infinite variety of nature does not exclude identity of species, that the various species are varieties of a few genera, and these again of still higher genera. This is the scholastic maxim: *entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda.* Upon this principle rests the possibility of concepts, and therefore of the understanding itself. It is balanced, however, by a second principle, no less necessary, the transcendental law of specification, namely, that there must be manifoldness and diversity in things, that every genus must specify itself in divergent species, and these again in sub-species. Or as it is expressed in its scholastic form: *entium varietates non temere esse minuendas.* This principle is equally transcendental. It expresses a condition no less necessary for the possibility of the understanding, and therefore of experience. As the understanding knows all that it knows by concepts only, however far it may carry the division of genera, it can never know by means of pure intuition, but always again by lower concepts. If, therefore, there were no lower concepts, there could be no higher concepts;[3] the gap existing between individuals and genera could never be bridged; or rather, since neither individuals nor universals could then be apprehended, neither would exist for the mind. As the higher concepts acquire all their content from the lower, they presuppose them for their own existence.

"Every concept may be regarded as a point which, in so far as it represents the standpoint of a spectator, has its own horizon. . . . This horizon must be capable of containing an infinite number of points, each of which again has its own narrower horizon; that is, every species contains sub-species, according to the principle of specification, and the logical horizon consists exclusively of smaller

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[1] A 660-1 = B 688-9. [2] A 656 = B 684. [3] A 656 = B 684.

horizons (sub-species), never of points which possess no extent (individuals)." [1]

Combining these two principles, that of *homogeneity* and that of *specification*, we obtain a third, that of *continuity*. The logical law of the *continuum formarum logicarum* presupposes the transcendental law, *lex continui in natura*. It provides that homogeneity be combined with the greatest possible diversity by prescribing a continuous transition from every species to every other, or in other words by requiring that between any two species or sub-species, however closely related, intermediate species be always regarded as possible. (The paragraph at the end of A 661 = B 689, with its proviso that we cannot make any definite empirical use of this law, is probably of later origin; it connects with the concluding parts of the section.) That this third law is also *a priori* and transcendental, is shown by the fact that it is not derived from the prior discovery of system in nature, but has itself given rise to the systematised character of our knowledge.[2]

The psychological, chemical, and astronomical examples which Kant employs to illustrate these laws call for no special comment. They were taken from contemporary science, and in the advance of our knowledge have become more confusing than helpful. The citation in A 646 = B 674 of the concepts of "pure earth, pure water, pure air" as being "concepts of Reason" is especially bewildering. They are, even in the use which Kant himself ascribes to them, simply empirical hypotheses, formulated for the purposes of purely physical explanation; they are in no genuine sense universal, regulative principles.

In passing to A 663-8 = B 691-6 we find still another variation in the substance of Kant's teaching. He returns, though with a greater maturity of statement, and with a very different and much more satisfactory terminology, to the more sceptical view of A 646-9 = B 674-7.[3] The interest of the above principles, Kant continues to maintain, lies in their transcendentality. Despite the fact that they are mere Ideas for the guidance of understanding, and can only be approached asymptotically, they are synthetic *a priori* judgments, and would seem to have an objective, though indeterminate, validity. So far his statements are in line with the preceding paragraphs. But he proceeds to add that this objective validity consists exclusively in their heuristic function. They differ fundamentally

[1] A 658 = B 686. [2] A 660 = B 688.

[3] The opening paragraphs of the section, A 642 5 = B 670-3, may be of the same date as the concluding paragraphs.

from the dynamical, no less than from the mathematical, principles of understanding, in that no schema of sensibility can be assigned to them. In other words, their object can never be exhibited *in concreto*; it transcends all possible experience. For this reason they are incapable of a transcendental deduction.[1] They are among the conditions indispensably necessary to the possibility, not of each and every experience, but only of experience as systematised *in the interest of Reason*. In place of a schema they can possess only what may be called the *analogon* of a schema, that is, they represent the Idea of a *maximum*, which the understanding in the subjective interest of Reason—or, otherwise expressed,[2] in the interest of a certain possible perfection of our knowledge of objects—is called upon to realise *as much as possible*. Thus they are at once *subjective* in the source from which they arise, and also *indeterminate* as to the conditions under which, and the extent to which, they can obtain empirical embodiment. The fact that in this capacity they represent a *maximum*, does not justify any assertion either as to the degree of unity which experience on detailed investigation will ultimately be found to verify, or as to the noumenal reality by which experience is conditioned.

In A 644-5 = B 672-3 Kant employs certain optical analogies to illustrate the illusion which the Ideas, in the absence of Critical teaching, inevitably generate. When the understanding is regulated by the Idea of a *maximum*, and seeks to view all the lines of experience as converging upon and pointing to it, it necessarily regards it, *focus imaginarius* though it be, as actually existing. The illusion, by which objects are seen behind the surface of a mirror, is indispensably necessary if we are to be able to see what lies behind our backs. The transcendental illusion, which confers reality upon the Ideas of Reason, is similarly incidental to the attempt to view experience in its greatest possible extension.

ON THE FINAL PURPOSE OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN REASON[3]

This section is thoroughly unified and consistent in its teaching. Its repetitious character is doubtless due to Kant's personal difficulty either in definitively accepting or in altogether rejecting the constructive, Idealist interpretation of the function of Reason. He at least succeeds in formulating a view which, while not asserting anything more than is

[1] Cf. *per contra* A 669-70 = B 697-8. [2] A 666 = B 694. [3] A 669 = B 697.

required in the scientific extension of experience, indicates the many possibilities which such experience fails to exclude. As the Ideas of Reason are not merely empty thought-entities (*entia rationis ratiocinantis*[1]), but have a certain kind of objective validity (*i.e.* are *entia rationis ratiocinatae*[2]), they demand a transcendental deduction.[3] What this deduction is, and how it differs from that of the categories, we must now determine. Its discovery will, Kant claims, crown and complete our Critical labours.

Kant begins by drawing a distinction between representing *an object absolutely*, and representing *an object in the Idea.*

> "In the former case our concepts are employed to determine the object, in the latter case there is in truth only a schema for which no object, not even a hypothetical one, is directly given, and which only enables us to represent to ourselves indirectly other objects in their systematic unity, by means of their relation to this Idea."[4]

An Idea is only a schema (Kant in terms of A 655 = B 693 ought rather to have said *analogon* of a schema) whereby we represent to ourselves, as for instance in the concept of a Highest Intelligence, not an objective reality but only such perfection of Reason as will tend to the greatest possible unity in the empirical employment of understanding.

With this introduction, Kant ushers in his famous "*als ob*" doctrine. We must view the things of the world *as if* they derived their existence from a Highest Intelligence. That Idea is heuristic only, not expository. Its purpose is not to enable us to comprehend such a Being, or even to think its existence, but only to show us how we should seek to determine the constitution and connection of the objects of experience. The three transcendental Ideas do not determine an object corresponding to them, but, *under the presupposition of such an object in the Idea,* lead us to systematic unity of *empirical* knowledge. When they are thus strictly interpreted as merely regulative of empirical enquiry, they will always endorse experience and never run counter to it. Reason, which seeks completeness of explanation, must therefore always act in accordance with them. Only thereby can experience acquire its fullest possible extension. This is the transcendental deduction of which we are in search. It establishes the indispensableness of the Ideas of Reason for the completion of experience, and their legitimacy as regulative principles.

We may here interrupt Kant's exposition so far as to

[1] Cf. above, pp. 446-7.
[2] Cf. A 681 = B 709.
[3] Cf. *per contra* A 663-4 = B 691-2.
[4] A 670 = B 698.

point out that this argument does not do justice to the full force of his position. The true Critical contention—and only if we interpret the passage in the light of this contention can the proof be regarded as transcendental in the strict sense—is that the Ideas are necessary to the possibility of each and every experience, involved together with the categories as conditions of the very existence of consciousness. They are not merely regulative, but are regulative of an experience which they also help to make possible.[1] They express the standards in whose light we condemn all knowledge which does not fulfil them; and we have consequently no option save to endeavour to conform to their demands. In other words, they are not derivative concepts obtained by merely omitting the restrictions essential to our empirical consciousness, but represent a presupposition necessarily involved in all consciousness. Some such restatement of the argument is demanded by the position which Kant has himself outlined in A 645 = B 673 and in A 650 ff. = B 678 ff. Unfortunately he does not return to it. The more sceptical view which he has meantime been developing remains dominant. The deduction is left in this semi-Critical form.

A 672-6 = B 700-4 give a fuller statement of the "*als ob*" doctrine. In psychology we must proceed *as if* the mind were a simple substance endowed with personal identity[2] (in this life at least), not in order to derive explanation of its changing states from the soul so conceived, but to derive them from each other in accordance with the Idea. In cosmology and theology (we may observe the straits to which Kant is reduced in his attempt to distinguish them) we ought to consider all phenomena both in their series and in their totality *as if* they were due to a highest and all-sufficient unitary ground. In so doing we shall not derive the order and system in the world from the object of the Idea, but only extract from the Idea the rule whereby the understanding attains the greatest possible satisfaction in the connecting of natural causes and effects.

[1] I may here guard against misunderstanding. Though the Ideas of Reason condition the experience which they regulate, this must not be taken as nullifying Kant's fundamental distinction between the regulative and the constitutive. Even when he is developing his less sceptical view, he adopts, in metaphysics as in ethics, a position which is radically distinct from that of Hegel. Though the moral ideal represents reality of the highest order, it transcends all possible realisation of itself in human life. Though it conditions all our morality, it at the same time condemns it. The Christian virtue of humility defines the only attitude proper to the human soul. In an exactly similar manner, the fact that the Ideas of Reason have to be regarded as conditioning the possibility of sense-experience need not prevent us from also recognising that they likewise make possible our consciousness of its limitations.

[2] Cf. above, pp. 473-7.

In A 676-7 = B 704-5 Kant resorts to still another distinction—between *suppositio relativa* and *suppositio absoluta*. This distinction is suggested by the semi-objectivity of principles that are merely regulative. Though we have to recognise them as necessary, such necessity does not justify the assertion of their independent validity. When we admit a supreme ground as the source of the order and system which the principles demand, we do so only in order to think the universality of the principles with greater definiteness. Such supposition is relative to the needs of Reason in its *empirical* employment: not absolute, as pointing to the existence of such a being in itself.

"This explains why, in relation to what is given to the senses as existing, we require the Idea of a primordial Being necessary in itself, and yet can never form the slightest concept of it or of its absolute necessity."[1]

This last statement leads to the further problem to which Kant here gives his final solution, how if, as has been shown in the *Dialectic*, the concepts of absolute necessity and of unconditionedness are without meaning, the Ideas of Reason can be entertained at all, even mentally. What is their actual content and how is it possible to conceive them? Kant's reply is developed in terms of the semi-Critical subjectivist point of view which dominates this section. The Ideas are mere Ideas. They yield not the slightest concept either of the internal possibility or of the necessity of any object corresponding to them. They only seem to do so, owing to a transcendental illusion. On examination we find that the concepts which we employ in thinking them as independently real, are one and all derived from experience. That is to say, we judge of them after the analogy of reality, substance, causality, and necessity in the sensible world.[2]

"[They are consequently] *analoga* only of real things, not real things in themselves. We remove from the object of the Idea the conditions which limit the concept of the understanding, but which at the same time alone make it possible for us to have a determinate concept of anything. What we then think is, therefore, a something of which, as it is in itself, we have no concept whatsoever, but which we none the less represent to ourselves as standing in a relation to the sum-total of appearances analogous to that in which appearances stand to one another."[3]

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[1] A 679 = B 707. [2] A 678 = B 706.
[3] A 674 = B 702. Cf. A 678-9 = B 706-7.

They do not carry our knowledge beyond the objects of possible experience, but only extend the empirical unity of experience. They are the schemata of regulative principles. In them Reason is concerned with nothing but its own inherent demands; and as their unity is the unity of a system which is to be sought only in experience,[1] qualities derived from the sensible world can quite legitimately be employed in their specific determination. They are not inherently dialectical; their demands have the rationality which we have a right to expect in the Ideals of Reason. When Critically examined, they propound no problem which Reason is not in itself entirely competent to solve.[2] It is to their misemployment that transcendental illusion is due. In the form in which they arise from the natural disposition of our Reason they are good and serviceable.[3]

To the question what is the most adequate form in which the regulative schema can be represented,[4] Kant gives an answer which shows how very far he is from regarding the Leibnizian *Ens realissimum* as the true expression of the Ideal of Reason. It is through the employment of teleological concepts that we can best attain the highest possible form of systematic unity.

"The highest formal unity . . . is the *purposive* unity of things. The *speculative* [*i.e.* theoretical] interest of Reason makes it necessary to regard all order in the world *as if* it had originated in the purpose of a Supreme Reason. Such a principle opens out to our Reason, as applied in the field of experience, altogether new views as to how the things of the world may be connected according to teleological laws, and so enables it to arrive at their greatest systematic unity. The assumption of a Supreme Intelligence, as the one and only cause of the universe, though in the Idea alone, can therefore always benefit Reason and can never injure it."[5]

For so long as this assumption is employed only as a regulative principle, even error cannot be really harmful. The worst that can happen is that where we expected a teleological connection, a merely mechanical or physical one is met with. If, on the other hand, we leave the solid ground of experience, and use the assumption to explain what we are unable to account for in empirical terms, we sacrifice all real insight, and confound Reason by transforming a concept, which is anthropomorphically determined for the

[1] A 680 = B 708.

[2] As above noted (pp. 499 ff.), when we find Kant thus insisting upon the completely soluble character of all problems of pure Reason, the sceptical, subjectivist tendency is dominant.

[3] A 669 = B 697. [4] Cf. above, pp. 536-7, 541-2. [5] A 686-7 = B 714-15.

purposes of empirical orientation, into a means of explaining order as non-natural and as imposed from without on the material basis of things.

This is a point of sufficient importance to call for more detailed statement. Hume in his *Dialogues* points out that the main defect in the teleological proof of God's existence is its assumption that order and design are foreign to the inherent constitution of things, and must be of non-natural origin. The argument is therefore weakened by every advance in the natural sciences. It also runs directly counter to the very phenomena, those of animal life, upon which it is chiefly based, since the main characteristic of the organic in its distinction from the inorganic is its inner wealth of productive and reproductive powers. With these criticisms Kant is in entire agreement. From them, in the passage before us, he derives an argument in support of a strictly regulative interpretation of his "*als ob*" doctrine. The avowed intention of the teleological argument is to prove *from nature* the existence of an intelligent supreme cause. If therefore its standpoint be held to with more consistency than its own defenders have hitherto shown, it will be found to rest upon the regulative principle, that we must study nature as if an *inherent* order were *native* to it, and so seek to approach by degrees, in proportion as such *natural unity* is empirically discovered, the absolute perfection which inspires our researches. But if we transform our Ideal into an instrument of explanation, beginning with what ought properly to be only our goal, we delude ourselves with the belief that what can only be acquired through the slow and tentative labours of empirical enquiry is already in our possession.

"If I begin with a supreme purposive Being as the ground of all things, the unity of nature is really surrendered, as being quite foreign and accidental to the nature of things, and as not to be known from its own general laws. There thus arises a vicious circle: we are assuming just that very point which is mainly in dispute."[1]

Such a method of argument is self-destructive, since if we do not find order and perfection in the nature of things, and *therefore in their general and necessary laws*, we are not in a position to infer such a Being as the source of all causality.

To the question whether we may not interpret natural order, once it has been discovered by empirical investigation, as due to the divine will, Kant replies that such procedure is allowable only on the condition that it is the same to us

[1] A 693=B 721. Cf. above, p. 539.

whether we say that God has wisely willed it or that nature has wisely arranged it. We may admit the Idea of a Supreme Being only in so far as it is required by Reason as the regulative principle of all investigation of *nature*;

"... and we cannot, therefore, without contradicting ourselves, ignore the general laws of nature in view of which the Idea was adopted, and look upon the purposiveness of nature as contingent and hyper-physical in its origin. For we were not justified in assuming above nature a Being of those qualities, but only in adopting the Idea of it in order to be able to view the appearances, according to the analogy of a causal determination, as systematically connected with one another."[1] "Thus pure Reason, which at first seemed to promise nothing less than the extension of knowledge beyond all limits of experience, contains, if properly understood, nothing but regulative principles. . . ."[2]

CONCLUDING COMMENT ON THE DIALECTIC

I may now summarise Kant's answer to the three main questions of the *Dialectic*: (1) Whether, or in what degree, the so-called Ideas of Reason are concepts due to a faculty altogether distinct from the understanding, and how far, as thus originating in pure Reason, they allow of definition; (2) how far they are capable of a transcendental deduction; (3) what kind of objective validity this deduction proves them to possess.

These questions are closely interconnected; the solution of any one determines the kind of solution to be given to all three. Kant, as we have found, develops his final position through a series of very subtle distinctions by which he contrives to justify and retain, though in a highly modified form, the more crudely stated divisions between Ideas and categories, between Reason and understanding, upon which the initial argument of the *Dialectic* is based.

The answer amounts in essentials to the conclusion that understanding, in directing itself by means of Ideals, exercises a function so distinct from that whereby it conditions concrete and specific experience, that it may well receive a separate title; that the Ideas in terms of which it constructs these Ideals, though schematic (*i.e.* sensuous and empirical in content), are not themselves empirical, and so far from being merely extended concepts of understanding, express transcendental conditions upon which all use of the understanding rests.

[1] A 699-700 = B 727-8. [2] A 701 = B 729.

Now if this position is to be justified, Kant ought to show that the fundamental Idea of Reason, that of the unconditioned, is altogether distinct from any concept of the understanding, and in particular that it must not be identified with the category of totality, nor be viewed as being merely the concept of conditioned existence with its various empirical limitations thought away. Needless to say, Kant does not fulfil these requirements in any consistent manner. The *Critique* contains the material for a variety of different solutions; it does not definitively commit itself to any one of them.

If the argument of A 650 ff. = B 678 ff. were developed, we should be in possession of what may be called the Idealist solution. It would proceed somewhat as follows. Consciousness as such is always the awareness of a whole which precedes and conditions its parts. Such consciousness cannot be accounted for on the assumption that we are first conscious of the conditioned, and then proceed to remove limitations and to form for ourselves, by means of the more positive factors involved in this antecedent consciousness, an Idea of the totality within which the given falls. The Idea of the unconditioned, distinct from all concepts of understanding, is one of the *a priori* conditions of possible experience, and is capable of a transcendental deduction of equal validity with, and of the same general nature as, that of the categories. It is presupposed in the possibility of our contingently given experience.

As this Idea conditions all subordinate concepts, it cannot be defined in terms of them. That does not, however, deprive it of all meaning; its significance is of a unique kind; it finds expression in those Ideals which, while guiding the mind in the construction of experience, also serve as the criteria through which experience is condemned as only phenomenal.

But this, as we have found, is not a line of argument which Kant has developed in any detail. The passages which point to it occur chiefly in the introductory portions of the *Dialectic*; in its later sections they are both brief and scanty. When he sets himself, as in the chapter on the *Ideal of Pure Reason* and in the subsequent *Appendix*, to define his conclusions, it is a much more empirical, and indeed sceptical, line that he almost invariably follows. There are, he then declares, strictly no pure, *a priori* Ideas. The supposed Ideas of unconditionedness and of absolute necessity are discovered on examination to be without the least significance for the mind. The Ideas, properly defined, are merely schemata of regulative principles, and their whole content reduces

without remainder to such categories as totality, substance, causality, necessity, transcendently applied. As *Ideas*, they are then without real meaning; but they can be employed by analogy to define an Ideal which serves an indispensable function in the extension of experience. From this point of view, the transcendental deduction of the Ideas is radically distinct from that of the categories. The proof is not that they are necessary for the possibility of experience, but only that they are required for its perfect, or at least more complete, development. And as Kant is unable to prove that such completion is really possible, the objective validity of the Ideas is left open to question. They should be taken only as heuristic principles; the extent of their truth, even in the empirical realm, cannot be determined by the *a priori* method that is alone proper to a *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The first view is inspired by the fundamental teaching of the *Analytic*, and is the only view which will justify Kant in retaining his distinction between appearance and things in themselves. All that is positive in the second view can be combined with the first view; but, on the other hand, the negative implications of the second view are at variance with its own positive teaching. For when the Ideas are regarded as empirical in origin no less than in function, their entire authority is derived from experience, and cannot be regarded as being transcendental in any valid sense of that term. In alternating between these two interpretations of the function of Reason, Kant is wavering between the Idealist and the merely sceptical view of the scope and powers of pure thought. On the Idealist interpretation Reason is a metaphysical faculty, revealing to us the phenomenal character of experience, and outlining possibilities such as may perhaps be established on moral grounds. From the sceptical standpoint, on the other hand, Reason gives expression to what may be only our subjective preference for unity and system in the ordering of experience. According to the one, the criteria of truth and reality are bound up with the Ideas; according to the other, sense-experience is the standard by which the validity even of the Ideas must ultimately be judged. From the fact that Kant should have continued sympathetically to develop two such opposite standpoints, we would seem to be justified in concluding that he discerned, or at least desiderated, some more complete reconciliation of their teaching than he has himself thus far been able to achieve, and that no solution which would either subordinate the Ideal demands of thought, or ignore the gifts of experience, could ever have been definitively accepted by him as satisfactorily meeting the issues at

stake. The Idealist solution is that to which his teaching as a whole most decisively points; but he is as conscious of the difficulties which lie in its path as he is personally convinced of its ultimate truth. His continuing appreciation of the value of sceptical teaching is a tacit admission that the Idealist doctrines, in the form which he has so far been able to give to them, are not really adequate to the complexity of the problems. As further confirmation of the tentative character of Kant's conclusions in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we have his own later writings. In the *Critique of Judgment*, published nine years later, in teaching less sceptical and more constructive, though still delicately balanced between the competing possibilities, and always, therefore, leaving the final decision to moral considerations, Kant ventures upon a restatement of the problems of the *Dialectic*. To this restatement both of the above tendencies contribute valuable elements.

APPENDIX A[1]

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHODS

CHAPTER I

THE DISCIPLINE[2] OF PURE REASON

KANT is neither an intellectualist nor an anti-intellectualist. Reason, the proper duty of which is to prescribe a discipline to all other endeavours, itself requires discipline; and when it is employed in the metaphysical sphere, independently of experience, it demands not merely the correction of single errors, but the eradication of their causes through "a separate negative code," such as a Critical philosophy can alone supply. In the *Transcendental Doctrine of Elements* this demand has been met as regards the *materials* or *contents* of the Critical system; we are now concerned only with its *methods* or *formal conditions*.[3]

This distinction is highly artificial. As already indicated, it is determined by the requirements of Kant's architectonic. The entire teaching of the *Methodology* has already been more or less exhaustively expounded in the earlier divisions of the *Critique*.

SECTION I

THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN ITS DOGMATIC EMPLOYMENT

In dealing with the distinction between mathematical and philosophical knowledge, Kant is here returning to one of the

[1] Nearly all the important points raised in the *Methodology*, and several of its chief sections, I have commented upon in their connection with the earlier parts of the *Critique*. Also, the *Methodology* is extremely diffuse. For these reasons I have found it advisable to give such additional comment as seems necessary in the form of this Appendix.

[2] On Kant's use of the terms 'discipline' and 'canon,' cf. above, pp. 71-2, 170, 174, 438.

[3] Cf. above, p. 438.

main points of his *Introduction* to the *Critique.*[1] His most exhaustive treatment of it is, however, to be found in a treatise which he wrote as early as 1764, his *Enquiry into the Clearness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals.* The continuing influence of the teaching of that early work is obvious throughout this section, and largely accounts for the form in which certain of its tenets are propounded.

"... one can say with Bishop Warburton that nothing has been more injurious to philosophy than mathematics, that is, than the imitation of its method in a sphere where it is impossible of application. . . ."[2]

So far from being identical in general nature, mathematics and philosophy are, Kant declares, fundamentally opposed in all essential features. For it is in their methods, and not merely in their subject-matter, that the essential difference between them is to be found.[3] Philosophical knowledge can be acquired only through *concepts*, mathematical knowledge is gained through the *construction* of concepts.[4] The one is discursive merely; the other is intuitive. Philosophy can consider the particular only in the general; mathematics studies the general in the particular.[5] Philosophical concepts, such as those of substance and causality, are, indeed, capable of application in transcendental synthesis, but in this employment they yield only empirical knowledge of the sensuously given; and from empirical concepts the universal and necessary judgments required for the possibility of metaphysical science can never be obtained.

The exactness of mathematics depends on definitions, axioms, and demonstrations, none of which are obtainable in philosophy. To take each in order.

I. **Definitions.**—To define in the manner prescribed by mathematics is to represent the *complete* concept of a thing. This is never possible in regard to empirical concepts. We are more certain of their denotation than of their connotation; and though they may be *explained*, they cannot be defined. Since new observations add or remove predicates, an empirical concept is always liable to modification.

"What useful purpose could be served by defining an empirical concept, such, for instance, as that of water? When we speak of

[1] A 4-5 = B 8-9.

[2] *Untersuchung: Zweite Betrachtung*, *W.* ii. p. 283.

[3] Kant here disavows the position of the *Untersuchung* in which (*Erste Betrachtung*, § 4) he had asserted that mathematics deals with quantity and philosophy with qualities.

[4] For comment upon this distinction, cf. above, pp. 131-3, 338-9.

[5] *Untersuchung: Erste Betrachtung*, § 2.

water and its properties, we do not stop short at what is thought in the word water, but proceed to experiments. The word, with the few marks which are attached to it, is more properly to be regarded as merely a designation than as a conception. The so-called definition is nothing more than a determining of the word."[1]

Exact definition is equally impossible in regard to *a priori* forms, such as time or causality. Since they are not framed by the mind, but are *given* to it, the completeness of our analysis of them can never be guaranteed. Though they are known, they are known only as problems.

"As Augustine has said, 'I know well what time is, but if any one asks me, I cannot tell.'"[2]

Mathematical definitions *make* concepts; philosophical definitions only explain them.[3] Philosophy cannot, therefore, imitate mathematics by beginning with definitions. In philosophy the incomplete exposition must precede the complete; definitions are the final outcome of our enquiry, and not as in mathematics the only possible beginning of its proofs. Indeed, the mathematical concept may be said to be given by the very process in which it is constructively defined; and, as thus originating in the process of definition, it can never be erroneous.[4] Philosophy, on the other hand, swarms with faulty definitions, which are none the less serviceable.

"In mathematics definition belongs *ad esse*, in philosophy *ad melius esse*. It is desirable to attain it, but often very difficult. Jurists are still without a definition of their concept of Right."[5]

II. **Axioms.**—This paragraph is extremely misleading as a statement of Kant's view regarding the nature of geometrical axioms. In stating that they are self-evident,[6] he does not really mean to assert what that phrase usually involves, namely, absolute *a priori* validity. For Kant the geometrical axioms are merely descriptions of certain *de facto* properties of the given intuition of space. They have the merely hypothetical validity of all propositions that refer to the contingently

[1] A 728 = B 756.

[2] *Untersuchung: Zweite Betrachtung*, *W.* ii. p. 283.

[3] *Untersuchung: Erste Betrachtung*, § 1, *W.* ii. p. 276: "Mathematics proceeds to all its definitions by a *synthetic* procedure, philosophy by an analytic procedure."

[4] In the *Untersuchung* Kant's statements are more cautious, and also more adequate. Cf. *Erste Betrachtung*, § 3, *W.* ii. p. 279: "In mathematics there are only a few but in philosophy there are innumerable irresolvable concepts. . . ."

[5] A 731 *n.* = B 759 *n.*

[6] The phrases which Kant employs (A 732-3 = B 760-1) are: "*unmittelbargewiss*," "*evident*," "*augenscheinlich*." Cf. above, pp. xxxv-vi, 36 ff., 53.

given. For even as a pure intuition, space belongs to the realm of the merely factual.[1] This un-Critical opposition of the self-evidence of geometrical axioms to the synthetic character of such "philosophical" truths as the principle of causality is bound up with Kant's unreasoned conviction that space in order to be space at all, must be Euclidean.[2] Kant's reference in this paragraph to the propositions of arithmetic is equally open to criticism. For though he is more consistent in recognising their synthetic character, he still speaks as if they could be described as self-evident, *i.e.* as immediately certain. The cause of this inconsistency is, of course, to be found in his intuitional theory of mathematical science. Mathematical propositions are obtained through intuition; those of philosophy call for an elaborate and difficult process of transcendental deduction. When modern mathematical theory rejects this intuitional view, it is really extending to mathematical concepts Kant's own interpretation of the function of the categories. Concepts condition the *possibility* of intuitional experience, and find in this conditioning power the ground of their objective validity.[3] Here, as in the *Aesthetic*,[4] Kant fails adequately to distinguish between the problems of pure and applied mathematics.

III. **Demonstrations.**—Kant again introduces his very unsatisfactory doctrine of the construction of concepts:[5] and he even goes so far as to maintain, in complete violation of his own doctrine of transcendental deduction, that where there is no intuition, there can be no demonstration. Apodictic propositions, he declares, are either *dogmata* or *mathemata*; and the former are beyond the competence of the human mind. But no sooner has he made these statements than he virtually withdraws them by adding that, though apodictic propositions cannot be established directly from concepts, they can be indirectly proved by reference to something purely contingent, namely, possible experience. Thus the principle of causality can be apodictically proved as a condition of possible experience. Though it may not be called a *dogma*, it can be entitled a *principle*! In explanation of this distinction, which betrays a lingering regard for the self-evident maxims of rationalistic teaching, Kant adds that the principle of causality, though a principle, has itself to be proved.

> ". . . it has the peculiarity that it first makes possible its own ground of proof, namely, experience. . . ."[6]

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[1] Cf. above, pp. 118, 142, 185-6.
[2] Cf. above, p. 117 ff.
[3] Cf. above, pp. 38-42, 93-4, 118-20, 133.
[4] Cf. above, pp. 111-12, 114-15.
[5] Cf. above, p. 131 ff.
[6] A 737 = B 765.

This, as we have noted,[1] is exactly what mathematical axioms must also be able to do, if they are to establish their objective validity.

SECTION II

THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN ITS POLEMICAL EMPLOYMENT

This section contains an admirable defence of the value of scepticism.

"Even poisons have their use. They serve to counteract other poisons generated in our system, and must have a place in every complete pharmacopeia. The objections against the persuasions and complacency of our purely speculative Reason arise from the very nature of Reason itself, and must therefore have their own good use and purpose, which ought not to be disdained. Why has Providence placed many things which are closely bound up with our highest interests so far beyond our reach, that we are only permitted to apprehend them in a manner lacking in clearness and subject to doubt, in such fashion that our enquiring gaze is more excited than satisfied? It is at least doubtful whether it serves any useful purpose, and whether it is not, indeed, perhaps even harmful to venture upon bold interpretations of such uncertain appearances. But there can be no manner of doubt that it is always best to grant Reason complete liberty, both of enquiry and of criticism, so that it may be without hindrance in attending to its own proper interests. These interests are no less furthered by the limitation than by the extension of its speculations; and they will always suffer when outside influences intervene to divert it from its natural path, and to constrain it by what is irrelevant to its own proper ends."[2] "Whenever I hear that a writer of real ability has demonstrated away the freedom of the human will, the hope of a future life, and the existence of God, I am eager to read the book, for I expect him by his talents to increase my insight into these matters."[3]

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[1] Cf. above, pp. 36 ff., 117 ff., 128 ff., 565-6.

[2] A 743-4 = B 771-2.

[3] A 753 = B 781. In A 745 = B 773 Kant's mention of Hume can hardly refer to Hume's *Dialogues* (cf. above, pp. 539-40 *n.*). Kant probably has in mind Section XI. of the *Enquiry*. The important discussion of Hume's position in A 760 ff. = B 788 ff. has been commented upon above, p. 61 ff. With Priestley's teaching (A 745-6 = B 773-4) Kant probably became acquainted through some indirect source. The first of Priestley's philosophical writings to appear in German was his *History of the Corruptions of Christianity*. The translation was published in 1782. In A 747-8 = B 775-6 Kant quite obviously has Rousseau in mind.

SECTION IV[1]

THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN REGARD TO ITS PROOFS[2]

This section merely restates the general nature and requirements of transcendental proof. The exposition is much less satisfactory than that already given in the *Analytic* and *Dialectic*. The only really new factor is the distinction between apagogical and direct proof. The former may produce conviction, but cannot enable us to comprehend the grounds of the truth of our conviction. Also, outside mathematics, it is extremely dangerous to attempt to establish a thesis by showing its contradictory to be impossible.[3] This is especially true in the sphere of our Critical enquiries, since the chief danger to be guarded against is the confounding of the subjectively necessary with the independently real. In this field of investigation it is never permissible to attempt to justify a synthetic proposition by refuting its opposite. Such seeming proofs can easily be secured, and have been the favourite weapons of dogmatic thinkers.

"Each must defend his position directly, by a legitimate proof that carries with it transcendental deduction of the grounds upon which it is itself made to rest. Only when this has been done, are we in a position to decide how far its claims allow of rational justification. If an opponent relies on subjective grounds, it is an easy matter to refute him. The dogmatist cannot, however, profit by this advantage. His own judgments are, as a rule, no less dependent upon subjective influences; and he can himself in turn be similarly cornered. But if both parties proceed by the direct method, *either* they will soon discover the difficulty, nay, the impossibility, of showing reason for their assertions, and will be left with no resort save to appeal to some form of prescriptive authority; *or* the *Critique* will the more easily discover the illusion to which their dogmatic procedure is due; and pure Reason will be compelled to relinquish its exaggerated pretensions in the realm of speculation, and to withdraw within the limits of its proper territory—that of practical principles."[4]

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[1] Section III., on *The Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to Hypotheses*, has been commented on above, pp. 543-6.

[2] A 782 = B 810.

[3] Even in mathematics the indirect method is not always available. Cf. Russell. *Principles of Mathematics*, i. p. 15.

[4] A 794 = B 822.

CHAPTER II

THE CANON[1] OF PURE REASON

SECTION I

THE ULTIMATE END OF THE PURE USE OF OUR REASON[2]

The problems of the existence of God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul have, Kant declares, little *theoretical* interest. For, as he has already argued, even if we were justified in postulating God, freedom, and immortality, they would not enable us to account for the phenomena of sense-experience, the only objects of possible knowledge. But the three problems are also connected with our *practical* interests, and in that reference they constitute the chief subject of metaphysical enquiry.[3] The practical is whatever is possible through freedom ; and the decision as to *what we ought to do* is the supreme interest of pure Reason in its highest employment.

". . . the ultimate intention of Nature in her wise provision for us has indeed, in the constitution of our Reason, been directed to our moral interests alone."[4]

This is the position which Kant endeavours to establish in his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, and in the *Critique of Practical Reason.* The very brief outline which he here gives of his argument is necessarily incomplete ; and is in consequence somewhat misleading. He first disposes of the problem of freedom ; and does so in a manner which shows that he had not, when this section was composed, developed his Critical views on the nature of moral freedom. He is for the present content to draw a quite un-Critical

[1] Cf. above, p. 563 *n.* 2.

[2] A 797 = B 825.

[3] Cf. *Critique of Judgment*, *W.* v. p. 473 ; Bernard's trans. p. 411 : "*God*, *freedom*, and *immortality* are the problems at the solution of which all the preparations of Metaphysics aim, as their ultimate and unique purpose."

[4] A 800-1 = B 829.

distinction between transcendental and practical freedom.[1] The latter belongs to the will in so far as it is determined by Reason alone, independently of sensuous impulses. Reason prescribes objective *laws of freedom*, and the will under the influence of these laws overcomes the affections of sense. Such practical freedom can, Kant asserts, be proved by experience to be a natural cause. Transcendental freedom,[2] on the other hand, *i.e.* the power of making a new beginning in the series of phenomena, is a problem which can never be empirically solved. It is a purely speculative question with which Reason in its practical employment is not in the least concerned. The canon of pure Reason has therefore to deal only with the two remaining problems, God and immortality. Comment upon these assertions can best be made in connection with the argument of the next section.[3]

SECTION II

THE IDEAL OF THE HIGHEST GOOD, AS A DETERMINING GROUND OF THE ULTIMATE END OF PURE REASON[4]

Reason in its speculative employment transcends experience, but solely for the sake of experience. In other words, speculative Reason has a purely empirical function. (This is the explanation of the somewhat paradoxical contention, to which Kant has already committed himself, that the problems of God and immortality, *though seemingly speculative in character*, really originate in our practical interests.) But pure Reason has also a practical use; and it is in this latter employment that it first discloses the genuinely metaphysical character of its present constitution and ultimate aims. The moral consciousness, in revealing to us an Ideal of absolute value, places in our hands the only available key to the mysteries of existence. As this moral consciousness represents the deepest reality of human life, it may be expected to have greater metaphysical significance than anything else in human experience; and since the ends which it reveals also present themselves as *absolute* in value, and are indeed the only absolute values of which we can form any conception, this conclusion would seem to be confirmed.

Happiness has natural value; morality, *i.e.* the being

[1] The statement in A 801 = B 829 that morals is a subject foreign to transcendental philosophy is in line with that of A 14-15 = B 28, and conflicts with the position later adopted in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Cf. above, p. 77.
[2] A 803 = B 831-2. [3] Cf. below, pp. 571-5. [4] A 804 = B 832.

worthy to be happy, has absolute value. The means of attaining the former obtain expression in prudential or pragmatic laws that are empirically grounded. The conditions of the latter are embodied in a categorical imperative of an *a priori* character. The former *advise* us how best to satisfy our natural desire for happiness; the latter *dictates* to us how we must behave in order to deserve happiness.

Kant's further argument is too condensed to be really clear, and if adequately discussed would carry us quite beyond the legitimate limits of this *Commentary*. I shall therefore confine myself to a brief and free restatement of his general position. The Critical teaching can be described as resulting in a new interpretation of the function of philosophy.[1] The task of the philosopher, properly viewed, does not consist in the solution of *speculative* problems; such problems transcend our human powers. All that philosophy can reasonably attempt is to analyse and define the situations, cognitive and practical, in which, owing to the specific conditions of human existence, we find ourselves to be placed. Upon analysis of the cognitive situation Kant discovers that while all possibilities are open, the theoretical data are never such as to justify ontological assertions.[2] When, however, he passes to the practical situation, wider horizons, definitely outlined, at once present themselves. The moral consciousness is the key to the meaning of the entire universe as well as of human life. Its values are the sole ultimate values, and enable us to interpret in *moral* terms (even though we cannot comprehend in any genuinely *theoretical* fashion) the meaning of the dispensation under which we live. The moral consciousness, like sense-experience, discloses upon examination a systematic unity of presupposed conditions. In the theoretical sphere this unity cannot be proved to be more than a postulated Ideal of *empirical* experience; and it is an Ideal which, even if granted to have absolute validity, is too indefinite to enable us to assert that ultimate reality is spiritual in character, or is teleologically ordered. The underlying conditions, on the other hand, of practical experience have from the start a purely noumenal reference. They have no other function than to define, in terms of the moral consciousness, the ultimate meaning of reality as a whole. They postulate[3] a universe in which the values of spiritual experience are supported and conserved.

[1] Cf. above, p. lvi.

[2] These statements are subject to modification, if the distinction (not clearly recognised by Kant, but really essential to his position) between immanent and transcendent metaphysics is insisted upon. Cf. above, pp. liv-v, 22, 56, 66-70.

[3] Cf. above, p. 541.

But the main difference in Kant's treatment of the two situations, cognitive and practical, only emerges into view when we recognise the differing modes in which the transcendental method of proof is applied in the two cases. The *a priori* forms of sensibility, understanding, and Reason are proved by reference to possible experience, as being its indispensable conditions. In moral matters, however, we must not appeal to experience. The actual is no test of the Ideal; "what is" is no test of what ought to be. And secondly, the moral law, if valid at all, must apply not merely within the limits of experience, but with absolute universality to all rational beings. The moral law, therefore, can neither be given us in experience, nor be proved as one of the conditions necessary to its possibility. Its validity, in other words, can be established neither through experience nor through theoretical reason.

Though such is Kant's own method of formulating the issue, it exaggerates the difference of his procedure in the two *Critiques*, and is very misleading as a statement of his real position. In one passage, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*,[1] Kant does, indeed, assert that the moral law requires no deduction. It is, he claims, a *fact* of which we are *a priori* conscious: so far from itself requiring proof, it enables us to prove the reality of freedom. Yet in the very same section he argues that the deduction of freedom from the moral law is a credential of the latter, and is a sufficient substitute for all *a priori* justification. According to the first statement we have an immediate consciousness of the validity of the moral law; according to the second statement the moral law proves itself indirectly, by serving as a principle for the deduction of freedom. The second form of statement alone harmonises with the argument developed in the third section of the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, and more correctly expresses the intention of Kant's central argument in the *Critique of Practical Reason.* For the difference between the two transcendental proofs in the two *Critiques* does not really consist in any diversity of method, but solely in the differing character of the premisses from which each starts. The ambiguity of Kant's argument in the second *Critique* seems chiefly to be caused by his failure clearly to recognise that the moral law, though a form of pure Reason, exercises, in the process of its transcendental proof, a function which exactly corresponds to that which is discharged by possible experience in the first *Critique.* Our consciousness of the moral law is, like sense-experience, a given fact. It is *de*

[1] *W.* v. pp. 47-8; Abbott's trans. (3rd edition) p. 136.

facto, and cannot be deduced from anything more ultimate than itself.[1] But as given, it enables us to deduce its transcendental conditions. This does not mean that our immediate consciousness of it *as given* guarantees its validity. The nature of its validity is established only in the process whereby it reveals its necessary implications. The objects of sense-experience are assumed by ordinary consciousness to be absolutely real; in the process of establishing the transcendental conditions of such experience they are discovered to be merely phenomenal. The pure principles of understanding thus gain objective validity as the conditions of a given experience which reveals only appearances. Ordinary consciousness similarly starts from the assumption of the absolute validity of the moral law. But in this case the consciousness of the law is discovered on examination to be explicable, *even as a possibility*, only on the assumption that it is due to the autonomous activity of a noumenal being. By its existence it proves the conditions through which alone it is explicable. Its mere existence suffices to prove that its validity is objective in a deeper and truer sense than the principles of understanding. *The notion of freedom, and therefore all the connected Ideas of pure Reason, gain noumenal reality as the conditions of a moral consciousness which is incapable of explanation as illusory or even phenomenal.* Since the consciousness of the moral law is thus noumenally grounded, it has a validity with which nothing in the phenomenal world can possibly compare. It is the one form in which noumenal reality directly discloses itself to the human mind.[2]

Obviously the essential crux of Kant's argument lies in the proof that the moral consciousness *is* only explicable in this manner, as the self-legislation of a noumenal being. Into the merits of his argument we cannot, however, here enter; and I need only draw attention to the manner in which it conflicts with the statement of the preceding section, that the possibility of transcendental freedom is a purely speculative question with which practical Reason is not concerned. The reality of freedom, as a form of noumenal activity, is the cardinal fact of Kant's metaphysics of morals. For though our consciousness

[1] Cf. *Critique of Practical Reason*, *W.* v. pp. 31-7; Abbott's trans. p. 120.

[2] Cf. *Critique of Practical Reason*, *W.* v. p. 43; Abbott's trans. p. 132: "The moral law, although it gives no *view*, yet gives us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the sensible world, or from the whole compass of our theoretical use of reason, a fact which points to a pure world of the understanding, nay, even defines it *positively*, and enables us to know something of it, namely, a law."

of the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom, transcendental freedom is the *ratio essendi* of the moral law.[1]

"With this faculty [of practical Reason], transcendental freedom is also established; freedom, namely, in that absolute sense in which speculative Reason required it, in its use of the concept of causality, in order to escape the antinomy into which it inevitably falls, when in the chain of cause and effect it tries to think the *unconditioned*... Freedom is the only one of all the Ideas of the speculative Reason of which we *know* the possibility *a priori* (without, however, understanding it), because it is the condition of the moral law which we know."[2] "[Freedom] is the only one of all the Ideas of pure Reason whose object is a thing of fact and to be reckoned among the *scibilia*."[3] "It is thus very remarkable that of the three pure rational Ideas, God, freedom, and immortality, that of freedom is the only concept of the supersensible which (by means of the causality that is thought in it) proves its objective reality in nature by means of the effects it can produce there; and thus renders possible the connection of both the others with nature, and of all three with one another so as to form a Religion. . . . The concept of freedom (as fundamental concept of all unconditioned practical laws) can extend Reason beyond those bounds within which every natural (theoretical) concept must inevitably remain confined."[4]

Thus freedom is for Kant a demonstrated fact, and in that respect differs from the Ideas of God and immortality, which are merely problematic conceptions, and which can be postulated only as articles of "practical faith."

This brings us to the final question, upon what grounds Kant ascribes validity to the Ideas of God and immortality. At this point in his argument Kant introduces the conception of the *Summum Bonum*. Reason, in prescribing the moral law, prescribes, as the final and complete end of all our actions, the *Summum Bonum*, *i.e.* happiness proportioned to moral worth. *Owing to the limitations of our faculties*, the complete attainment of this supreme end is conceivable by us only on the assumption of a future life wherein perfect worthiness may be attained, and of an omnipotent Divine Being who will apportion happiness in accordance with merit.

"[This Divine Being] must be omnipotent, in order that the whole of nature and its relation to morality . . . may be subject to his will; omniscient, that he may know our innermost sentiments and their moral worth; omnipresent, that he may be immediately

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[1] Cf. *Critique of Practical Reason*, in note to Preface.

[2] *Op. cit.*, Preface, at the beginning, Abbott's trans. pp. 87-8. Cf. also the concluding pages of Book I., *W.* v. pp. 103-6, Abbott, pp. 197-200.

[3] *Critique of Judgment*, *W.* v. p. 468; Bernard's trans. p. 406.

[4] *Op. cit.* p. 474; Bernard's trans. p. 413.

present for the satisfying of every need which the highest good demands; eternal, that this harmony of nature and freedom may never fail, etc."[1]

The moral ideal thus supplies us with a ground[2] for regarding the universe as systematically ordered according to moral purposes, and also with a principle that enables us to infer the nature and properties of its Supreme Cause. In place of a demonology, which is all that physical theology can establish, we construct upon moral grounds a genuine theology.

The concepts thus obtained are, however, anthropomorphic; and for that reason alone must be denied all speculative value. This is especially evident in regard to the Idea of God. Owing to our incapacity to comprehend how moral merit can condition happiness, we conceive them as *externally* combined through the intervention of a supreme Judge and Ruler. As Kant indicates,[3] we must not assert that this represents the actual situation. He himself seems to have inclined to a more mystical interpretation of the universe, conceiving the relation of happiness to virtue as being grounded in a supersensuous but necessary order that may, indeed, be bodied forth in the inadequate symbols of the deistic creed, but which in its true nature transcends our powers of understanding. So far as the Ideas of God and immortality are necessary to define the moral standpoint, they have genuine validity for all moral beings; but if developed on their own account as speculative dogmas, they acquire a definiteness of formulation which is not essential to their moral function, and which lays them open to suspicion even in their legitimate use.

These considerations also indicate Kant's further reason for entitling the *Summum Bonum*, God and immortality, Ideas of *faith*. Though they can be established as presuppositions of the moral situation in which we find ourselves, such demonstration itself rests upon the acceptance of the moral consciousness as possessing a supersensuous sanction; and that in turn is determined by features in the moral situation not deducible from any higher order of considerations.

[1] A 815 = B 843.

[2] Cf. *Critique of Practical Reason*, *W*. v. pp. 143-4 *n.*; Abbott's trans. p. 242: "It is a duty to realise the *Summum Bonum* to the utmost of our power, therefore it must be possible, consequently it is unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is necessary for its objective possibility. The assumption is as necessary as the moral law, in connexion with which alone it is valid."

[3] Cf. *Critique of Practical Reason*, *W*. v. p. 142 ff.; Abbott's trans. p. 240 ff.; *Critique of Judgment*, *W*. v. pp. 469-70; Bernard's trans. pp. 406-8.

"Belief in matters of faith is a belief in a pure practical point of view, *i.e.* a moral faith, which proves nothing for theoretical, pure, rational cognition, but only for that which is practical and directed to the fulfilment of its duties; it in no way extends speculation. . . . If the supreme principle of all moral laws is a postulate, the possibility of its highest Object . . . is thereby postulated along with it."[1] "So far, as practical Reason has the right to yield us guidance, we shall not look upon actions as obligatory because they are the commands of God, but shall regard them as divine commands because we have an inward obligation to them. . . . Moral theology is thus of immanent use only. It enables us to fulfil our vocation in this present world by showing us how to adapt ourselves to the system of all ends, and by warning us against the fanaticism and indeed the impiety of abandoning the guidance of a morally legislative Reason in the right conduct of our lives, in order to derive guidance directly from the Idea of the Supreme Being. For we should then be making a transcendent employment of moral theology; and that, like a transcendent use of pure speculation, must pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of Reason."[2]

SECTION III

OPINING, KNOWING, AND BELIEVING[3]

Kant first distinguishes between conviction (*Ueberzeugung*) and persuasion (*Ueberredung*). A judgment which is objectively grounded, and which is therefore valid for all other rational beings, is affirmed with conviction. When the affirmation is due only to the peculiar character of the subject, the manner in which it is asserted may be entitled persuasion. Persuasion is therefore "a mere illusion."[4] Conviction exists in three degrees, opinion, belief, and knowledge. In opinion we are conscious that the judgment is insufficiently grounded, and that our conviction is subjectively incomplete. In belief the subjective conviction is complete, but is recognised as lacking in objective justification. In knowledge the objective grounds and the subjective conviction are alike complete.

After pointing out that opinion is not permissible in judg-

[1] *Critique of Judgment*, *W.* v. pp. 369-72; Bernard's trans. pp. 407-10. Cf. note in same section: "It is a trust in the promise of the moral law; not, however, such as is contained in it, but such as I put into it, and that on morally adequate grounds."

[2] A 819 = B 847.

[3] A 820 = B 848.

[4] The distinction is less harshly drawn in Kant's *Logic*, *Einleitung*, ix (Hartenstein), viii. p. 73; Eng. trans. p. 63: "Conviction is opposed to persuasion. Persuasion is an assent from inadequate reasons, in respect to which we do not know whether they are only subjective or are also objective. Persuasion often precedes conviction."

ments of pure Reason,[1] Kant develops the further distinction between *pragmatic or doctrinal belief* and *moral belief.* When a belief is contingent (*i.e.* is affirmed with the consciousness that on fuller knowledge it may turn out to be false), and yet nevertheless supplies a ground for the employment of means to certain desired ends, it may be called *pragmatic* belief. Such belief admits of degree, and can be tested by wager or by oath.[2] What may be called *doctrinal belief* is analogous in character, and is taken by Kant, in somewhat misleading fashion, as describing our mode of accepting such doctrines as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.[3] They are adopted as helpful towards a contingent but important end, the discovery of order in the system of nature. This account of the nature of Ideas is in line with Kant's early view of them as *merely* regulative. Taken in connection with his repeated employment of the term 'moral sentiments' (*moralische Gesinnungen*), it tends to prove that this section is early in date of writing.

In *moral belief* the end, the *Summum Bonum*, is absolutely necessary, and as there is only one condition under which we can conceive it as being realised, namely, on the assumption of the existence of God and of a future life, the belief in God and immortality possesses the same certainty as the moral sentiments.

> "The belief in a God and another world is so interwoven with my moral sentiment that as there is little danger of my losing the latter, there is equally little cause for fear that the former can ever be taken from me."[4]

As I have just suggested, this basing of moral belief upon subjective sentiments, which, as Kant very inconsistently proceeds to suggest, may possibly be lacking in certain men, marks this section as being of early origin. But in concluding the section, in reply to the objection that, in thus tracing such articles of faith to our "natural interest" in morality, philosophy admits its powerlessness to advance beyond the ordinary understanding, Kant propounds one of his abiding convictions, namely, that in matters which concern all men without distinction nature is not guilty of any partial distribution of her gifts, and that in regard to the essential ends of human nature the highest philosophy cannot advance beyond what is

[1] Cf. above, pp. 10, 543. Cf. *Fortschritte*; *Werke* (Hartenstein), viii. p. 561.

[2] Cf. *Logic*, *loc. cit.* Cf. *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, *W.* iv. pp. 416-17: Abbott's trans. pp. 33-34.

[3] Regarding Kant's distinction in A 827 = B 855 between Ideas and hypotheses cf. above, p. 543 ff. Cf. also *Critique of Judgment*, *W.* v. pp. 392 ff., 461 ff.; Bernard's trans. pp. 302 ff., 395 ff.

[4] A 829 = B 857. Cf. Appendix C.

revealed to the common understanding.[1] The reverence which Kant ever cherished for the memory of his parents, and for the religion which was so natural to them, must have predisposed him to a recognition of the widespread sources of the spiritual life. But Kant has himself placed on record his sense of the great debt which in this connection he also owed to the teaching of Rousseau.

"I am by disposition an enquirer. I feel the consuming thirst for knowledge, the eager unrest to advance ever further, and the delights of discovery. There was a time when I believed that this is what confers real dignity upon human life, and I despised the common people who know nothing. Rousseau has set me right. This imagined advantage vanishes. I learn to honor men, and should regard myself as of much less use than the common labourer, if I did not believe that my philosophy will restore to all men the common rights of humanity."[2]

The sublimity of the starry heavens and the imperative of the moral law are ever present influences on the life of man; and they require for their apprehension no previous initiation through science and philosophy. The naked eye reveals the former; of the latter all men are immediately aware.[3] In their universal appeal they are of the very substance of human existence. Philosophy may avail to counteract the hindrances which prevent them from exercising their native influence; it cannot be a substitute for the inspiration which they alone can yield.

[1] Cf. Kant's Preface to the *Critique of Practical Reason*, *W*. v. p. 8 *n.*: Abbott's trans. p. 93 *n.* "A reviewer who wanted to find some fault with this work—[the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*]—has hit the truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he says that no new principle of morality is set forth in it, but only a *new formula*. But who would think of introducing a new principle of all morality, and making himself as it were the first inventor of it, just as if all the world before him were ignorant what duty was, or had been in thorough-going error? But whoever knows of what importance to a mathematician a formula is, which defines accurately what is to be done to work out a problem, will not think that a formula is insignificant and useless which does the same for all duty in general." Cf. *Fortschritte*, *Werke* (Hartenstein), viii. p. 563.

[2] *Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse*, *Werke* (Hartenstein), viii. p. 624, already quoted above, p. lvii. Cf. also *op. cit.* p. 630.

[3] Cf. *Critique of Practical Reason*, Conclusion, *W*. v. pp. 161-2: Abbott's trans. p. 260.

CHAPTER III

THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PURE REASON[1]

Adickes[2] very justly remarks that "this is a section after Kant's own heart, in which there is presented, almost unsought, the opportunity, which he elsewhere so frequently creates for himself, of indulging in his favourite hobby." The section is of slight scientific importance, and is chiefly of interest for the light which it casts upon Kant's personality. Moreover the distinctions which Kant here draws are for the most part not his own philosophical property, but are taken over from the Wolffian system.

The distinctions may be exhibited in tabular form as follows:[3]

[1] A 832 = B 860.   [2] *K.* p. 633 *n.* · Cf. above, p. xxii.

[3] Cf. Adickes, *K.* p. 635 *n.*, and Vaihinger, i. p. 306. In this table *Critique* is distinguished from the *System* of pure Reason (cf. above, pp. 71-2). The transcendental philosophy of pure Reason of this table corresponds to the *Analytic* of the *Critique*, and to "pure natural science" in the absolute sense (cf. above, pp. 66-7). The rational physics of this table corresponds to the *Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science.*

[TABLE

KNOWLEDGE

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">Historical or empirical (cognitio ex datis).</td><td colspan="8">Rational (cognitio ex principiis).</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="7">Empirical physiology.</td><td rowspan="7">Empirical anthropology.</td><td rowspan="7">Mathematics, based on the construction of concepts.</td><td colspan="7">Philosophical[1] (based on pure concepts) :—metaphysics in the widest sense.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="6">Propaedeutic : Critique.</td><td colspan="6">System of pure reason, both practical and speculative : metaphysics in the wider sense.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="5">Metaphysics of morals, i.e. of all that ought to be.</td><td colspan="5">Metaphysics (in a more limited sense) of nature,[2] i.e. of all that is.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="4">Transcendental philosophy of pure reason: ontology.[3]</td><td colspan="4">Physiology of pure reason.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Immanent.</td><td colspan="2">Transcendent.</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Rational physics.</td><td rowspan="2">Rational psychology.</td><td>Cosmology</td><td>Theology</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Metaphysics in the most limited sense.</td></tr>
</table>

[1] When Kant in A 840 = B 868 takes philosophy as including empirical knowledge he contradicts the spirit, though not the letter of his own preceding statements. In his *Introduction to Logic* (Hartenstein, viii. p. 22, Abbott's trans. p. 12) the empirical is identified with the historical.

[2] *Fortschritte, Werke* (Hartenstein), viii. p. 554.

[3] *Op. cit.* p. 520.

Kant further distinguishes between the "scholastic" and the "universal" or traditional meaning of the term philosophy.[1] In the former sense philosophy is viewed from the point of view of its *logical* perfection, and the philosopher appears as an *artist* of Reason.[2] Philosophy in the broader and higher sense is "the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human Reason."[3] The philosopher then appears as the *lawgiver* of human Reason. Of the essential ends, the *ultimate* end is man's moral destiny; to this the other essential ends of human Reason are subordinate means. For though the legislation of human Reason concerns nature as well as freedom, and has therefore to be dealt with by a philosophy of nature, *i.e.* of *all that is*, as well as by a philosophy of morals, *i.e.* of *that which ought to be*, the former is subordinate to the latter in the same degree in which in human life knowledge is subordinate to moral action. Whereas speculative metaphysics serves rather to ward off errors than to extend knowledge,[4] in the metaphysics of morals "all culture [*Kultur*] of human Reason"[5] finds its indispensable completion.

Empirical psychology is excluded from the domain of metaphysics. It is destined to form part of a complete system of anthropology, the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature.[6]

[1] *I.e.* between the conception of philosophy as *Schulbegriff* and as *Weltbegriff* (*conceptus cosmicus*). He explains in a note to A 839 = B 868 that he employs these latter terms as indicating that philosophy in the traditional or humanistic sense is concerned with "that which must necessarily interest every one." I have translated *Weltbegriff* as '*universal* concept.' By *conceptus cosmicus* Kant means 'concept shared by the whole world,' or 'common to all mankind.'

[2] Cf. Kant's *Logic*, *Introduction*, § iii.: Abbott's trans. pp. 14-15: "In this scholastic signification of the word, philosophy aims only at *skill*; in reference to the higher concept common to all mankind, on the contrary, it aims at *utility*. In the former aspect, therefore, it is a doctrine of skill; in the latter a doctrine of wisdom; it is the lawgiver of reason; and hence the philosopher is *not* a *master of the art of reason*, but a *lawgiver*. The master of the art of reason, or as Socrates calls him, the *philodoxus*, strives merely for speculative knowledge, without concerning himself how much this knowledge contributes to the ultimate end of human reason: he gives rules for the use of reason for all kinds of ends. The practical philosopher, the teacher of wisdom by doctrine and example, is the true philosopher. For philosophy is the Ideal of a perfect wisdom, which shows us the ultimate ends of all human reason."

[3] A 839 = B 867. [4] A 851 = B 879. [5] A 850 = B 878.

[6] A 848-9 = B 876-7. Cf. above, pp. 237, 311 *n.*, 312 *n.*, 384-5, 473-7, 554.

CHAPTER IV

THE HISTORY OF PURE REASON[1]

This title, as Kant states, is inserted only to mark the place of the present chapter in a complete system of pure reason. The very cursory outline, which alone Kant here attempts to give, merely repeats the main historical distinctions of which the *Critique* has made use. The contrast between the sensationalism of Epicurus and the intellectualism of Plato has been developed in A 465 ff. = B 493 ff.[2] The contrast between Locke and Leibniz is dwelt upon in A 43 ff. = B 60 ff. and A 270 ff. = B 326 ff. Under the title 'naturalist of pure Reason' Kant is referring to the 'common sense' school, which is typically represented by Beattie.[3] In his *Logic*[4] Kant gives a fuller account of his interpretation of the history of philosophy.

[1] A 852 = B 880.
[2] Cf. A 313 ff. = B 370 ff., above, pp. 498-9.
[3] Cf. above, pp. xxviii-xxix.
[4] *Einleitung*, § iv. : Abbott's trans. pp. 17-23.

APPENDIX B

A MORE DETAILED STATEMENT OF KANT'S RELATIONS TO HIS PHILOSOPHICAL PREDECESSORS[1]

THE development of philosophy, prior to Kant, had rendered two problems especially prominent—the problem of sense-perception and the problem of judgment. In the one we have to deal with the question of the interrelation of mind knowing and objects known; in the other with the connection holding between subject and predicate in the various forms of judgment. In the one we enquire how it is possible to know reality; in the other we seek to determine the criterion of truth. These two problems are, as Kant discovered, inseparable from one another; and the logical is the more fundamental of the two. Indeed it was Hume's analysis of the judgment involved in the causal principle that enabled Kant to formulate his Critical solution of the problem of perception. In this Appendix I propose to follow these problems as they rise into view in the systems of Descartes and his successors.

Galileo's revolutionary teaching regarding the nature of motion was the immediate occasion of Descartes' restatement of the problem of perception. That teaching necessitated an entirely new view of the nature of matter, and consequently of the interrelation of mind and body. Questions never before seriously entertained now became pressing. The solutions had to be as novel as the situation which they were designed to meet.

These new problems arose in the following manner. According to the medieval view, motion may properly be conceived on the analogy of human activity. It comes into being, exhausts itself in exercise, and ceases to be. It is a fleeting activity; only its "material" and "formal" conditions have any permanence of existence. According to Galileo's

[1] Supplementary to pp. xxv-xxxiii. Throughout I shall make use of my *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy*, and may refer the reader to them for further justification of the positions adopted.

teaching, on the other hand, motion is as different from human activity as matter is from mind. It is ingenerable and indestructible. We know it only through the effect which in some incomprehensible fashion it produces in those bodies into which it enters, namely, their translation from one part of space to another. That this translatory motion is called by the same name as the power which generates it, doubtless in some degree accounts for the fact that our understanding of the one tends to conceal from us our entire ignorance of the other.[1] We have only to reflect, however, in order to realise that motion is completely mysterious in its intrinsic dynamical nature. We cannot, for instance, profess to comprehend, even in the least degree, how motion, though incapable of existing apart from matter, should yet be sufficiently independent to be able to pass from one body to another.

Descartes, following out some of the chief consequences of this new teaching, concluded that matter is passive and inert, that it is distinguished neither by positive nor by negative properties from the space which it fills, and that it is to motion that all the articulated organisation of animate and inanimate nature is due. Descartes failed, indeed, to appreciate the dynamical character of motion, and by constantly speaking as if it were reducible to the translatory motion, in which it manifests itself, he represented it as known in all its essential features. None the less, the rôles previously assigned to matter and motion are, in Descartes' system, completely reversed. Matter is subordinated to motion as the instrument to the agency by which it is directed and shaped. On the older view, material bodies had, through the possession of formative and vital forces, all manner of intrinsic powers. By the new view these composite and nondescript existences are resolved into two elements, all the properties of which can be quantitatively defined—into a matter which is uniform and homogeneous, and into motion whose sole effect is the translation of bodies in space. Matter is the passive and inert substance out of which motion, by its mere mechanical powers, can produce the whole range of material forms.

This revolutionary change in the physical standpoint involved restatement of the philosophical issues. But the resulting difficulties were found thoroughly baffling. Though Descartes and his successors were willing to adopt any hypothesis, however paradoxical, which the facts might seem to demand, their theories, however modified and restated, led only deeper into a hopeless *impasse*. The unsolved

[1] For recognition of this distinction, cf. Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i., 3rd ed., pp. 620-3.

problems of the Cartesian systems formed the discouraging heritage to which Kant fell heir. If matter is always purely material, and motion is its sole organising power, there can be no real kinship between body and mind. The formative and vital forces, which in the Scholastic philosophy and in popular thought serve to maintain the appearance of continuity between matter and mind, can no longer be credited. Motion, which alone is left to mediate between the opposites, is purely mechanical, and (on Descartes' view) is entirely lacking in inner or hidden powers. The animal body is exclusively material, and is therefore as incapable of feeling or consciousness as any machine made by human hands. The bodily senses are not 'sensitive'; the brain cannot think. Mental experiences do, of course, accompany the brain-motions. But why a sensation should thus arise when a particular motion is caused in the brain, or how a mental resolution can be followed by a brain state, are questions to which no satisfactory answer can be given. The mental and the material, the spiritual and the mechanical, fall entirely apart.

The difficulties arising out of this incomprehensibility of the causal interrelations of mind and body are not, however, in themselves a valid argument against a dualistic interpretation of the real. The difficulties of accounting for the causal relation are, in essential respects, equally great even when the interaction is between homogeneous existences. The difficulties are due to the nature of causal action as such, not to the character of the bodies between which it holds. This, indeed, was clearly recognised by Descartes, and was insisted upon by his immediate successors. The transference of motion by impact is no less incomprehensible than the interaction of soul and body. If motion can exist only in matter, there is no possible method of conceiving how it can make the transition from one discrete portion of matter to another. Causal action is thus a problem which no philosophy can pretend to solve, and which every philosophy, whether monistic or dualistic, must recognise as transcending the scope of our present knowledge.

It is in another and more special form that Descartes' dualism first reveals its fatal defects, namely, in its bearing upon the problem of sense-perception. Descartes can solve the problem of knowledge only by first postulating the doctrine of representative perception. That doctrine is rendered necessary by his interpretation of the dualism of mind and body. Objects can be known only mediately by means of their action upon the sense-organs, and through the sense-organs upon the brain. The resulting brain states are in themselves merely forms of

motion. They lead, however, in a manner which Descartes never professes to explain,[1] to the appearance of sensations in the mental field. Out of these sensations the mind then constructs mental images of the distant bodies; and it is these mental images alone which are directly apprehended. Material bodies are invisible and intangible; they are knowable only through their mental duplicates. Thus, according to the doctrine of representative perception, each mind is segregated in a world apart. It looks out upon a landscape which is as mental and as truly inward as are its feelings and desires. The apparently ultimate relation of mind knowing and object known is rendered complex and problematic through the distinction between mental objects and real things. Mental objects are in all cases images merely. They exist only so long as they are apprehended; and they are numerically and existentially distinct in each individual mind. Real things are not immediately perceived; they are hypothetically inferred. To ordinary consciousness the body which acts on the sense-organ is the object known; when reflective consciousness is philosophically enlightened, the object immediately known is recognised as a merely mental image, and the external object sinks to the level of an assumed cause.

The paradoxical character of this doctrine is accentuated by Galileo's distinction between primary and secondary qualities.[2] Those physical processes, which are entitled light and heat, bear no resemblance to the sensations through which they become known. The many-coloured world of ordinary consciousness is an illusory appearance which can exist only in the human mind. We must distinguish between the sensible world which, though purely mental, appears, through an unavoidable illusion, to be externally real, and that very different world of matter and motion which reveals its independent nature only to reflective thinking. In the latter world the rich variety of sensuous appearance can find no place. There remain only the quantitative, mechanical properties of extension, figure and motion; and even these have to be interpreted in the revolutionary fashion of physical science.

The doctrine of representative perception cannot, however, defend successfully the positions which it thus involves. It wavers in unstable equilibrium. The facts, physical and physiological, upon which it is based, are in conflict with the conclusions in which it results. This has been very clearly

[1] Cf. *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy*, pp. 80-2, 106-7.

[2] This distinction is due to Galileo, though the terms "primary" and "secondary" were first employed by Locke.

demonstrated by many writers in recent times.[1] The conflict manifested itself in the period between Descartes and Kant only through the uneasy questionings of Locke and Berkeley. The problem, fundamental though it be, is almost completely ignored by Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff.

Stated in modern terms, the inherently contradictory character of the doctrine consists in its unavoidable alternation between the realist attitude to which it owes its origin, and the idealist conclusion in which it issues. Such oscillation is due to the twofold simultaneous relation in which it regards ideas as standing to the objects that they are supposed to represent. The function of sensations is cognitive; their origin is mechanical. As cognitive they stand to objects in a relation of inclusion; they reveal the objects, reduplicating them in image before the mind. Yet in their origin they are effects, mechanically generated by the action of material bodies upon the sense-organs and brain. As they are effects mechanically generated, there is no guarantee that they resemble their causes; and if we may argue from other forms of mechanical causation, there is little likelihood that they do. They stand to their first causes in a relation of exclusion, separated from them by a large number of varying intermediate processes. There is thus a conflict between the function of sensations and their origin. Their origin in the external objects is supposed to confer upon them a representative power; and yet the very nature of this origin invalidates any such claim.

This irreconcilability of the subjectivist consequences of the doctrine with its realist basis was seized upon by Berkeley. To remove the contradiction, he denied the facts from which the doctrine had been developed. That is to say, starting from its results he disproved its premisses. Arguing from the physical and physiological conditions of perception Descartes had concluded that only sensations can be directly apprehended by the mind. Berkeley starts from this conclusion, and virtually adopts it as an assumption which cannot be questioned, and which does not call for proof. Since, he contends, we know only sensations, the assertion that they are due to material causes is mere hypothesis, and is one for which there may be no valid grounds. As Descartes himself had already suggested, there is a second possible method of interpreting the relevant facts. There may exist an all-

[1] I have dealt with Avenarius' criticism in "Avenarius' Philosophy of Pure Experience" (*Mind*, vol. xv. N.S., pp. 13-31, 149-160); with Bergson's criticism in "Subjectivism and Realism in Modern Philosophy" (*Philosophical Review*, vol. xvii. pp. 138-148); and with the general issue as a whole in "The Problem of Knowledge" (*Journal of Philosophy*, vol. ix. pp. 113-128).

powerful Being who produces the sensations in our minds from moment to moment; and provided that they are produced in the same order as now, the whole material world might be annihilated without our being in the least aware that so important an event had taken place. Since we can experience only sensations, any hypothesis which will account for the order of their happening is equally legitimate. The whole question becomes one of relative simplicity in the explanation given. The simpler analysis, other things being equal, must hold the field.

Berkeley reinforces this argument by pointing to the many embarrassing consequences to which Descartes' dualism must lead. We postulate bodies in order to account for the origin of our sensations, and yet are unable to do so by their means. The dualistic theory creates more difficulties than it solves, without a single counter-advantage, save perhaps—so Berkeley argues—that it seems to harmonise better with the traditional prejudices of the philosophic consciousness.

If we grant Berkeley his premisses, the main lines of his argument are fairly cogent, however unconvincing may be his own positive views. The crux, however, of the Berkeleian idealism lies almost exclusively in the establishment of its fundamental assumption, that only ideas (*i.e.* images) can be known by the mind. This assumption Berkeley, almost without argument, takes over from his predecessors. It was currently accepted, and from it, therefore, he believed that he could safely argue. It rests, however, upon the assumption of facts which he himself questions. In rejecting the Cartesian dualism he casts down the ladder by which alone it is possible to climb into his position. For save through the facts of physics and physiology there seems to be no possible method of disproving the belief of ordinary consciousness, that in perception we apprehend independent material bodies. And until that belief can be shown to be false and ungrounded, the Berkeleian idealism is without support. It cannot establish the fundamental assumption upon which its entire argument proceeds. Thus, though Berkeley convincingly demonstrates the internal incoherence of the doctrine of representative perception—the inconsistency of its conclusions with the physical and physiological facts upon which alone it can be based—he cannot himself solve the problem in answer to which that doctrine was propounded. His services, like those of so many other reformers, were such as he did not himself foresee. In simplifying the problem, he prepared the way for the more sceptical treatment of its difficult issues by Hume.

At this point, in the philosophy of Hume, the problem of

perception comes into the closest possible connection with the logical problem, referred to above. The question, how mind knowing is related to the objects known, is found to depend upon the question, how in certain crucial cases predicates may legitimately be referred to their subject. This logical problem arises in two forms, a narrower and a wider. The narrower issue concerns only the principle of causality. With what right do we assert that every event must have a cause? What is the ground which justifies us in thus predicating of events a causal character? Obviously, this logical question is fundamental, and must be answered before we can hope to solve the more special problem, as to our right to interpret sensations as effects of material bodies. Hume was the first to emphasise the vital interconnection of these two lines of enquiry.

The wider issue is the generating problem of Kant's *Critique*: How in a judgment can a predicate be asserted of a subject in which it is not already involved? In other words, what is it that in such a case justifies us in connecting the predicate with the subject? Though this problem was never directly raised by any pre-Kantian thinker, not even by Hume, it is absolutely vital to all the pre-Kantian systems. Thus Descartes' philosophy is based upon a distinction, nowhere explicitly drawn but everywhere silently assumed, between abstract and fruitful ideas. The former contain just so much content and no more; this content may be explicitly unfolded in a series of judgments, but no addition is thereby made to our knowledge. The latter, on the other hand, are endowed with an extraordinary power of inner growth. To the attentive mind they disclose a marvellous variety of inner meaning. The chief problem of scientific method consists, according to Descartes, in the discovery of these fruitful ideas, and in the separation of them from the irrelevant accompaniments which prevent them from unfolding their inner content. Once they are discovered, the steady progress of knowledge is assured. They are the springs of knowledge, and from them we have only to follow down the widening river of truth.

Descartes professed to give a complete list of the possible fruitful ideas. They are, he claimed, better known than any other concepts. They lie at the basis of all experience, and no one can possibly be ignorant of them; though, owing to their simplicity and omnipresence, their philosophical importance has been overlooked. When, however, Descartes proceeded to classify them, he found that while such ideas as space, triangle, number, motion, contain an inexhaustible

content that is progressively unfolded in the mathematical sciences, those ideas, on the other hand, through which we conceive mental existences,—the notions of mind, thought, self—do not by any means prove fruitful upon attentive enquiry. As Malebranche later insisted, we can define mind only in negative terms; its whole meaning is determined through its opposition to the space-world, which alone is truly known. Though it is the function of mind to know, it cannot know itself. And when we remove from our list of ideas those which are not really fruitful, we find that only mathematical concepts remain.[1] They alone have this apparently miraculous property of inexhaustibly developing before the mind. Scientific knowledge is limited to the material world; and even there, the limits of our mathematical insight are the limits of our knowledge.

Malebranche believed no less thoroughly than Descartes in the asserted power and fruitfulness of mathematical concepts. Under the influence of this belief, he developed, as so many other thinkers from Plato onwards have done, a highly mystical theory of scientific knowledge. It is a revelation of eternal truth, and yet is acquired by inner reflection, not laboriously built up by external observation. It comes by searching of the mind, not by exploration of the outer world. But Malebranche was not content, like Descartes, merely to accept this type of knowledge. He proceeded to account for it in metaphysical terms. The fruitfulness of mathematical ideas is due, he claimed, to the fundamental concept of extension in which they all share. This idea, representing, as it does, an infinite existence, is too great to be contained within the finite mind. Through it the mind is widened to the apprehension of something beyond itself; we know it through consciousness of its archetype in the mind of God. It is the one point at which consciousness transcends its subjective limits. Its fruitfulness is due to, and is the manifestation of, this divine source. The reason why we are condemned to remain ignorant of everything beyond the sphere of quantity is that extension alone holds this unique position. It is the only fruitful idea which the mind possesses, and other concepts, such as triangle, circle, or number, are fruitful only in proportion as they share in it. We can acquire no genuine knowledge even of the nature of the self. Being ignorant of mind, we cannot comprehend the self which is one of its modes. It is as if we sought to comprehend the nature of a triangle, in the absence of any conception of space. Were

[1] On Descartes' failure to distinguish between the mathematical and the dynamical aspects of motion, cf. above, p. 584.

we in possession of the archetypal idea of mind, we should not only be able to deduce from it those various feelings and emotions which we have already experienced, and those sensations of the secondary qualities which we falsely ascribe to the influence of external objects, but we should also be able to discover by pure contemplation innumerable other emotions and qualities, which entirely transcend our present powers. And all of these would then be experienced in their ideal nature, and not, as now, merely through feeble and confused feeling. If mathematicians destroy their bodily health through absorption in the progressive clarification of the mysteries of space, what might not happen if the archetypal idea of mind were revealed to us? Could we attend to the preservation of a body which would incessantly distract us from the infinite and overwhelming experiences of our divine destiny?

This romantic conception of the possibilities of rational science reveals more clearly than any other Cartesian doctrine the real bearing and perverse character of the rationalistic preconceptions which underlie the Cartesian systems. The Cartesians would fain make rational science, conceived on the analogy of the mathematical disciplines, coextensive with the entire realm of the real. This grotesque enterprise is conceived as abstractly possible even by so cautious a thinker as John Locke. His reason for condemning the physical sciences as logically imperfect is that they fail to conform to this rationalistic ideal. Hence those sentences which sound so strangely in the mouth of Locke, the sensationalist.

"It is the contemplation of our abstract ideas that alone is able to afford us general knowledge."[1] "The true method of advancing knowledge is by considering our abstract ideas."[2] "[Did we know the real essence of gold] it would be no more necessary that gold should exist, and that we should make experiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing of the properties of a triangle, that a triangle should exist in any matter: the idea in our minds would serve for the one as well as for the other."[3] "In the knowledge of bodies, we must be content to glean what we can from particular experiments, since we cannot, from a discovery of their real essences, grasp at a time whole sheaves, and in bundles comprehend the nature and the properties of whole species together."[4]

Locke's empirical doctrine of knowledge is thus based upon a rationalistic theory of the real. It is not, he holds, the constitution of reality, but the *de facto* limitations of our

[1] *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, IV. vi. 16.
[2] *Op. cit.* IV. xii. 7. [3] *Op. cit.* IV. vi. 11. [4] *Op. cit.* IV. xii. 12.

human faculties which make empirical induction the only practicable mode of discovery in natural science. Indeed, Locke gives more extreme expression than even Descartes does, to the mystically conceived mathematical method. Being ignorant of mathematics, and not over well-informed even in the physical sciences, Locke was not checked by any too close acquaintance with the real character and necessary limits of this method; and he accordingly makes statements in that unqualified fashion which seldom fails to betray the writer who is expounding views which he has not developed for himself by first-hand study of the relevant facts.

But though the unique character of mathematical knowledge thus forced itself upon the attention of all the Cartesian thinkers, and in the above manner led even the most level-headed of Descartes' successors to dream strange dreams, no real attempt was made (save in the neglected writings of Leibniz) to examine, in a sober spirit, the grounds and conditions of its possibility. In the English School, Locke's eulogy of abstract ideas served only to drive his immediate successors to an opposite extreme. Both Berkeley and Hume attempted to explain away, in an impossible manner, those fundamental differences, which, beyond all questioning, profoundly differentiate mathematical from empirical judgments.[1] It is not surprising that Kant, who had no direct acquaintance with Hume's *Treatise*, should have asserted that had Hume realised the bearing of his main teaching upon the theory of mathematical science, he would have hesitated to draw his sceptical conclusions. Such, however, was not the case. Hume's theory of mathematical reasoning undoubtedly forms the least satisfactory part of his philosophy. He did, however, perceive the general bearing of his central teaching. It was in large degree his ignorance of the mathematical disciplines that concealed from him the thorough unsatisfactoriness of his general position, and which prevented him from formulating the logical problem in its full scope—the problem, namely, how judgments which make additions to our previous knowledge, and yet do not rest upon mere sensation, are possible. He treated it only as it presents itself in those judgments which involve the concept of causality.[2] But this analysis of causal judgments awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber, and so ultimately led to the raising of the logical problem in its widest form:—how synthetic *a priori* judgments, whether mathematical, physical, or metaphysical, are possible.

[1] Cf. above, pp. 27-8.

[2] Though the concept of substance is also discussed by Hume, his treatment of it is quite perfunctory.

Hume discussed the causal problem both in regard to the general principle of causality and in its bearing upon our particular judgments of causal relation. The problems concerned in these two discussions are essentially distinct. The first involves immensely wider issues, and so far as can be judged from the existing circumstantial evidence,[1] it was this first discussion, not as has been so often assumed by Kant's commentators the second and more limited problem, which exercised so profound an influence upon Kant at the turning-point of his speculations. In stating it, it will be best to take Hume's own words.

"To begin with the first question concerning the necessity of a cause: 'Tis a general maxim in philosophy, that *whatever begins to exist*, must have a cause of existence. This is commonly taken for granted in all reasonings, without any proof given or demanded. 'Tis supposed to be founded on intuition, and to be one of those maxims, which though they may be deny'd with the lips, 'tis impossible for men in their hearts really to doubt of. But if we examine this maxim by the idea of knowledge above explain'd we shall discover in it no mark of any such intuitive certainty; but on the contrary shall find, that 'tis of a nature quite foreign to that species of conviction."[2]

The principle that every event must have a cause, is neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain. So far from there existing a *necessary* connection between the idea of an event as something happening in time and the idea of a cause, no connection of any kind is discoverable by us. We can conceive an object to be non-existent at this moment, and existent the next, without requiring to conjoin with it the altogether different idea of a productive source.

This had been implicitly recognised by those few philosophers who had attempted to give demonstrations of the principle. By so doing, however, they only reinforce Hume's contention that it possesses no rational basis. When Hobbes argues that as all the points of time and place in which we can suppose an object to begin to exist, are in themselves equal, there must be some cause determining an event to happen at one moment rather than at another, he is assuming the very principle which he professes to prove. There is no greater difficulty in supposing the time and place to be fixed without a cause, than in supposing the existence to be so determined. If the denial of a cause is not intuitively absurd in the one case, it cannot be so in the other. If the first demands a

[1] Cf. above, pp. xxv ff., 61 ff.

[2] *Treatise on Human Nature* (Green and Grose), i. p. 380.

proof, so likewise must the second. Similarly with the arguments advanced by Locke and Clarke. Locke argues that if anything is produced without a cause, it is produced by nothing, and that that is impossible, since nothing can never be a cause any more than it can be something, or equal to two right angles. Clarke's contention that if anything were without a cause, it would produce *itself*, *i.e.* exist before it existed, is of the same character. These arguments assume the only point which is in question.

"When we exclude all causes we really do exclude them, and neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of the existence, and consequently can draw no argument from the absurdity of these suppositions to prove the absurdity of that exclusion." [1]

The remaining argument, that every effect must have a cause, since this is implied in the very idea of an effect, is "still more frivolous."

"Every effect necessarily presupposes a cause; effect being a relative term, of which cause is the correlative. But this does not prove that every being must be preceded by a cause; no more than it follows, because every husband must have a wife, that therefore every man must be married." [2]

The far-reaching conclusion, that the principle of causality has no possible rational basis, Hume extends and reinforces through his other doctrines, viz. that synthetic reason [3] is merely generalised belief, and that belief is in all cases due to the ultimate instincts and propensities which *de facto* constitute our human nature. The synthetic principles which lie at the basis of our experience are non-rational in character. Each is due to a 'blind and powerful instinct,' which, demanding no evidence, and ignoring theoretical inconsistency for the sake of practical convenience, necessitates belief.

"Nature by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel." [4] "All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent." [5]

Reason is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls." [6] It justifies itself by its practical uses,

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 383. [2] *Loc. cit.*
[3] For justification of the phrase "synthetic reason," I must refer to my articles in *Mind*, vol. xiv. N.S. pp. 149-73, 335-47, on "The Naturalism of Hume."
[4] *Treatise* (Green and Grose), i. pp. 474-5.
[5] *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (Green and Grose), p. 40.
[6] *Treatise*, p. 471.

but can afford no standard to which objective reality must conform.

It is from this point of view that Hume states his answer to the problem of perception. Our natural belief in the permanence and identity of objects, as expressed through the principle of substance and attribute, leads us to interpret the objects of sense-perception as independent realities. We interpret our subjective sensations as being qualities of independent substances. Our other natural belief, in the dynamical interdependence of events, as expressed through the principle of causality, leads, however, to the opposite conclusion, that the known objects are merely mental. For by it we are constrained to interpret sensations, not as objective qualities, but only as subjective effects, expressive of the reactions of our psycho-physical organism. The Cartesian problems owe their origin to the mistaken attempt to harmonise, in a theoretical fashion, these two conflicting principles. The conflict is inevitable and the antinomy is insoluble, so long as the two principles are regarded as objectively valid. The only satisfactory solution comes through recognition that reason is unable to account, save in reference to practical ends, even for its own inevitable demands. The principle of substance and attribute and the principle of causality co-operate in rendering possible such organisation of our sense-experience as is required for practical life. But when we carry this organisation further than practical life itself demands, the two principles at once conflict.

Kant shows no interest in this constructive part of Hume's philosophy; and must, indeed, have been almost entirely ignorant of it, since it finds only very imperfect expression in the *Enquiry*, and is ignored in Beattie's *Nature of Truth*. Accordingly, Kant does not regard Hume as offering a positive explanation of knowledge, but rather as representing the point of view of thoroughgoing scepticism. But even had he been acquainted at first hand with Hume's *Treatise*, he would undoubtedly have felt little sympathy with Hume's naturalistic view of the function of reason. His training in the mathematical sciences would have enabled him to detect the inadequacy of Hume's treatment of mathematical knowledge, and his strong moral convictions would have led him to rebel against the naturalistic assumptions which underlie Hume's entire position. The Berkeley-Hume comedy is thus repeated with reversed rôles. Just as Berkeley's anti-materialistic philosophy was mainly influential as a step towards the naturalism of Hume, and as such still survives in the philosophies of

John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Huxley, Mach and Karl Pearson, so in turn Hume's anti-metaphysical theory of knowledge was destined to be one of the chief contributory sources of the German speculative movement.

We may now turn to Hume's treatment of the narrower problem—that of justifying our *particular* causal judgments. Hume's attitude towards this question is predetermined by the more fundamental argument, above stated, which precedes it in the *Treatise*, but which is entirely omitted from the corresponding chapters of the *Enquiry*. As the general principle of causality is of an irrational character, the same must be true of those particular judgments which are based upon it. Much of Hume's argument on this question is, indeed, merely a restatement of what had already been pointed out by his predecessors. There is no necessary connection discoverable between *any* cause and its effect. This is especially evident as regards the connection between brain states and mental experiences. No explanation can be given why a motion in the brain should produce sensations in the mind, or why a mental resolution should produce movements in the body. Such sequences may be empirically verified; they cannot be rationally understood. That this likewise holds, though in less obvious fashion, of the causal interrelations of material bodies, had been emphasised by Geulincx, Malebranche, Locke, and Berkeley. The fact that one billiard ball should communicate motion to another by impact is, when examined, found to be no less incomprehensible than the interaction of mind and body. Hume, in the following passage, is only reinforcing this admitted fact, in terms of his own philosophy.

"We fancy that were we brought on a sudden into this world we could at first have inferred that one billiard ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certainty upon it. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place merely because it is found in the highest degree."[1]

Nor are we conscious of any causal power within the self. When Berkeley claims that mind has the faculty of producing images at will, he is really ascribing to it creative agency. And such creation, as Malebranche had already pointed out, is not even conceivable.

"I deny that my will produces in me my ideas, for I cannot even conceive how it could produce them, since my will, not being able

[1] *Enquiry* (Green and Grose), pp. 25-6.

to act or will without knowledge, presupposes my ideas and does not make them."[1] "Is there not here," Hume asks, "either in a spiritual or material substance, or both, some secret mechanism or structure of parts, upon which the effect depends, and which, being entirely unknown to us, renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and incomprehensible?"[2]

But the fact that Hume thus restates conclusions already emphasised by his predecessors will not justify us in contending (as certain historians of philosophy seem inclined to do) that in his treatment of the causal problem he failed to make any important advance upon the teaching of the Occasionalists. Hume was the first to perceive the essential falsity of the Cartesian, rationalistic view of the causal nexus. For Descartes, an effect is that which can be deduced with logical necessity from the concept of its cause. The Occasionalists similarly argued that because natural events can never be deduced from one another they must in all cases be due to supernatural agency; like Descartes, they one and all failed to comprehend that since by an effect we mean that which follows *in time* upon its cause, and since, therefore, the principle of causality is the law of *change*, the nature of causality cannot be expressed in logical terms. Hume was the first to appreciate the significance of this fundamental fact; and an entirely new set of problems at once came into view. If causal connection is not, as previous thinkers had believed, logical in character, if it does not signify logical dependence of the so-called effect upon its cause, its true connotation must lie elsewhere; and until this has been traced to its hidden source, any attempted solution of metaphysical problems is certain to involve many false assumptions. The answer that is given to the problem of the origin and content of the causal concept must determine our interpretation alike of sense-experience and of pure thought.

The problem presents on examination, however, a most paradoxical aspect. As Hume has already shown, every effect is an event distinct from its cause, and there is never any connection, beyond that of mere sequence, discoverable between them. We observe only sequence; we assert necessary connection. What, then, is in our minds when this latter assertion is made? And how, if the notion of necessitated connection cannot be gained through observation of the external events, is it acquired by us? Hume again propounds

[1] *Éclaircissement* sur chap. iii. pt. ii. liv. vi. *de la Recherche*: tome iv. (1712) p. 381.
[2] *Enquiry*, p. 57.

a naturalistic solution. Causation, *i.e. necessitated* sequence in time, is not in any sense a conception; it is not a comprehended relation between events, but a misunderstood feeling in our minds. We cannot form any, even the most remote, conception of how one event can produce another. Neither imagination nor pure thought, however freely they may act, are capable of inventing any such notion. But nature, by the manner in which it has constituted our minds, deludes us into the belief that we are in actual possession of this idea. The repeated sequence of events, in fixed order, generates in us the feeling of a tendency to pass from the perception or idea of the one to the idea of the other. This feeling, thus generated by custom, and often in somewhat confused fashion combined with the feeling of 'animal nisus,' which is experienced in bodily effort, is mistaken by the mind for a definite concept of force, causality, necessary connection. As mere feeling it can afford no insight into the relation holding between events, and as merely subjective can justify no inference in regard to that relation. The terms force, causality, necessitated sequence in time, have a practical value, as names for our instinctive, natural expectations; but when employed as instruments for the *theoretical* interpretation of experience, they lead us off on a false trail.

This is one of the fundamental points upon which Hume reveals a deeper speculative insight than either Malebranche, Geulincx, or Locke. Though these latter insist upon our ignorance of the relation holding between events, they still assume that causation and natural necessity are concepts which have a quite intelligible meaning; and in consequence they fail to draw the all-important conclusion, that the general principle of causality has neither intuitive nor demonstrative validity. For that is the revolutionary outcome of Hume's analysis of the notion of necessitated connection. The principle of causality is a synthetic judgment in which no connection is discoverable between its subject and its predicate. That is the reason why it is neither self-evident nor capable of being established upon more ultimate grounds.

As has already been stated, the wider problem concerning the *principle* of causality is developed only in the *Treatise*; the problem regarding the *concept* of causality is discussed both in the *Treatise* and in the *Enquiry*. An appreciation of the wider problem is required, however, in order to set this second problem in its true light, for it is only through its connection with the wider issue that Hume's reduction of the concept of causality to a merely instinctive, non-rational expectation acquires its full significance. Hume's analysis then

amounts, as Kant was the first to realise, to an attack upon the objective validity of all constructive thinking. Not only rationalism, but even such metaphysics as may claim to base its conclusions upon the teaching of experience, is thereby rendered altogether impossible. The issue is crucial, and must be honestly faced, before metaphysical conclusions, no matter what their specific character may be, whether *a priori* or empirical, can legitimately be drawn. If we may not assert that an event must have some cause, even the right to enquire for a cause must first be justified. And if so fundamental a principle as that of causality is not self-evident, are there any principles which can make this claim?

The account which we have so far given of Hume's argument covers only that part of it which is directed against the rationalist position, and which was therefore so influential in turning Kant on to the line of his Critical speculations. But Hume attacked with equal vigour the empiricist standpoint; and as this aspect of his teaching, constituting as it did an integral part of Kant's own philosophy, must undoubtedly have helped to confirm Kant in his early rationalist convictions, we may profitably dwell upon it at some length. In opposition to the empiricists, Hume argues that experience is incapable of justifying any inference in regard to matters of fact. It cannot serve as a basis from which we can inductively extend our knowledge of facts beyond what the senses and memory reveal. Inductive inference, when so employed, necessarily involves a *petitio principii*; we assume the very point we profess to have proved.

The argument by which Hume establishes this important contention is as follows. All inductive reasoning from experience presupposes the validity of belief in causal connection. For when we have no knowledge of causes, we have no justification for asserting the continuance of uniformities. Now it has been shown that we have no experience of any necessary relation between so-called causes and their effects. The most that experience can supply are sequences which repeat themselves. In regarding the sequences as causal, and so as universally constant, we make an assertion for which experience gives no support, and to which no amount of repeated experience, recalled in memory, can add one jot of real evidence. To argue that because the sequences have remained constant in a great number of repeated experiences, they are therefore more likely to remain constant, is to assume that constancy in the past is a ground for inferring it in the future; and that is the very point which demands proof. In drawing the conclusion we virtually assume that there is a

necessary connection, *i.e.* an absolutely constant relation, between events. But since no *single* experience of causal sequence affords ground for inferring that the sequence will continue in the future, no number of repeated experiences, recalled in memory, can contribute to the strengthening of the inference. It is meaningless to talk even of likelihood or probability. The fact that the sun has without a single known exception arisen each day in the past does not (if we accept the argument disproving all knowledge of necessary connection) constitute *proof* that it will rise to-morrow.

"None but a fool or a madman will be unaffected in his expectations or natural beliefs by this constancy, but he is no philosopher who accepts this as in the nature of evidence."[1]

Since, for all that we know to the contrary, bodies may change their nature and mode of action at any moment, it is vain to pretend that we are scientifically assured of the future because of the past.

"My practice, you say, refutes my doubts.[2] But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge."[3]

Kant was the first, after thirty years, to take up this challenge. Experience is no source of evidence until the causal postulate has been *independently* proved. Only if the principle of causality can be established prior to all specific experience, only if we can predetermine experience as necessarily conforming to it, are empirical arguments valid at all. Hume's enquiry thus directly leads to the later, no less than to the earlier form of Kant's epoch-making question.[4] In its earlier formulation it referred only to *a priori* judgments; in its wider application it was found to arise with equal cogency in connection with empirical judgments. And as thus extended, it generated the problem: How is sense-experience, regarded as a form of *knowledge*, possible at all?[5] By

[1] *Enquiry*, p. 32.
[2] This is the objection upon which Beattie chiefly insists.
[3] *Op. cit.* pp. 33-4.
[4] Cf. above, pp. 39 ff., 54, 222 ff., 241, 286-9.
[5] How far Hume's criticism of empiricism really influenced Kant in his appreciation of this deeper problem, it seems impossible to decide. Very prob-

showing that the principle of causality has neither intuitive nor demonstrative validity, Hume cuts the ground from under the rationalists; by showing that sense-experience cannot by itself yield conclusions which are objectively valid, he at the same time destroys the empiricist position. In this latter contention Kant stands in complete agreement with Hume. That the sensuously given is incapable of grounding even probable inferences, is a fundamental presupposition (never discussed, but always explicitly assumed) of the Critical philosophy. It was by challenging the sufficiency of Hume's other line of argument, that which is directed against the rationalists, that Kant discovered a way of escape from the sceptical dilemma. The conditions of experience can be proved by a transcendental method, which, though *a priori* in character, does not lie open to Hume's sceptical objections. Each single experience involves rational principles, and consequently even a single empirical observation may suffice to justify an inductive inference. Experience conforms to the demands of pure *a priori* thought; and can legitimately be construed in accordance with them.

We may now pass to the philosophy in which Kant was educated. It gave to his thinking that rationalist trend, to which, in spite of all counter-influences, he never ceased to remain true.[1] It also contributed to his philosophy several of its constructive principles. Only two rationalist systems need be considered, those of Leibniz and of Wolff. Kant, by his own admission,[2] had been baffled in his attempts (probably not very persevering) to master Spinoza's philosophy. It was with Wolff's system that he was most familiar; but both directly and indirectly, both in his early years and in the 'seventies, the incomparably deeper teaching of Leibniz must have exercised upon him a profoundly formative influence. In defining the points of agreement and of difference between Hume and Leibniz,[3] we have already outlined Leibniz's general view of the nature and powers of pure thought, and may therefore at once proceed to the relevant detail of his main tenets.

Upon two fundamental points Leibniz stands in opposition to Spinoza. He seeks to maintain the reality of the contingent

ably Kant proceeded to it by independent development of his own standpoint, after the initial impulse received on the more strictly logical issue.

[1] The assertion, by Kuno Fischer and Paulsen, of an empirical period in Kant's development, has been challenged by Adickes, B. Erdmann, Riehl, and Vaihinger.

[2] Cf. B. Erdmann's *Kriticismus*, p. 147; *Critique of Judgment*, *W.* v. p. 391 (Bernard's trans. p. 301).

[3] Above, pp. xxx-iii.

or accidental. These terms are indeed, as he conceives them, synonymous with the actual. Necessity rules only in the sphere of the possible. Contingency or freedom is the differentiating characteristic of the real. This point of view is bound up with his second contention, namely, that the real is a kingdom of ends. It is through divine choice of the best among the possible worlds that the actual present order has arisen. There are thus two principles which determine the real: the principle of contradiction which legislates with absolute universality, and the principle of the best, or, otherwise formulated, of sufficient reason, which differentiates reality from truth, limiting thought, in order that, without violating logic, it may freely satisfy the moral needs. Leibniz thus vindicates against Spinoza the reality of freedom and the existence of ends.

Though Leibniz agrees with Spinoza that the philosophically perfect method would be to start from an adequate concept of the Divine Being, and to deduce from His attributes the whole nature of finite reality, he regards our concept of God as being too imperfect to allow of such procedure. We are compelled to resort to experience, and by analysis to search out the various concepts which it involves. By the study of these concepts and their interrelations, we determine, in obedience to the law of contradiction, the nature of the possible. The real, in contradistinction from the possible, involves, however, the notion of ends. The existence of these ends can never be determined by logical, but only by moral considerations. The chief problem of philosophical method is, therefore, to discover the exact relation in which the logical and the teleological, the necessary and the contingent, stand to one another.

The absence of contradiction is in itself a sufficient guarantee of possibility, *i.e.* even of the possibility of real existence. How very far Leibniz is willing to go on this line is shown by his acceptance of the ontological argument. The whole weight of his system rests, indeed, upon this proof. The notion of God is, he maintains, the sole concept which can determine itself in a purely logical manner not only as possible but also as real. If we are to avoid violating the principle of contradiction, the *Ens perfectissimum* must be regarded as possessing the perfection of real existence. And since God is perfect in moral as in all other attributes, His actions must be in conformity with moral demands. In creating the natural order God must therefore have chosen that combination of possibilities which constitutes the best of all possible worlds. By means of this conceptual bridge we are

enabled to pass by pure *a priori* thinking from the logically possible to the factually real.

Pure logical thinking is thus an instrument whereby ultimate reality can be defined in a valid manner. *Pure thought is speculative and metaphysical in its very essence.* It uncovers to us what no experience can reveal, the wider universe which exists eternally in the mind of God. Every concept (whether mathematical, dynamical, or moral), provided only that it is not self-contradictory, is an eternal essence, with the intrinsic nature of which even God must reckon in the creation of things. When, therefore, we are determining the unchanging nature of the eternally possible, there is no necessary reference to Divine existence. The purely logical criterion suffices as a test of truth. Every judgment which is made in regard to such concepts must express only what their content involves. All such judgments must be analytic in order to be true.

When, however, we proceed from the possible to the real, that is to say, from the necessary to the contingent, the logical test is no longer sufficient; and only by appeal to the second principle, that of sufficient reason, can judgments about reality be logically justified. Whether or not the principle of sufficient reason is deducible, as Wolff sought to maintain, from the principle of contradiction, is a point of quite secondary importance. That is a question which does not deserve the emphasis which has been laid upon it. What is chiefly important is that for Leibniz, as for Wolff, both principles are principles of analysis. The principle of sufficient reason is not an instrument for determining necessary relations between independent substances. The sufficient ground of a valid predicate must in all cases be found in the concept of the subject to which it is referred. The difference between the two principles lies elsewhere, namely, in the character of the connection established between subject and predicate. In the one case the denial of the proposition involves a direct self-contradiction. In the other the opposite of the judgment is perfectly conceivable; our reason for asserting it is a moral (employing the term in the eighteenth-century sense), not a logical ground. The subject is so constituted, that in the choice of ends, in pursuit of the good, it must by its very nature so behave. The principle of sufficient reason, which represents in our finite knowledge the divine principle of the best, compels us to recognise the predicate as involved in the subject—as involved through a ground which inclines without necessitating. Often the analysis cannot be carried sufficiently far to enable us thus to transform a

judgment empirically given into one which is adequately grounded. None the less, in recognising it as true, we postulate that the predicate is related to the subject in this way. There are not for Leibniz two methods of establishing truth, sense-perception to reveal contingent fact, and general reasoning to establish necessary truth. A proposition can be accepted as true only in so far as we can at least *postulate*, through absence of contradiction and through sufficient reason, its analytic character. It must express some form of identity. The proposition, Caesar crossed the Rubicon, is given us as historical fact. The more complete our knowledge of Caesar and of his time, the further we can carry the analysis; and that analysis if completely executed would displace the merely factual validity of the judgment by insight into its metaphysical truth. Thus experience, with its assertions of the here and now about particulars inexhaustibly concrete, sets to rational science an inexhaustible task. We can proceed in our analysis indefinitely, pushing out the frontiers of thought further and further into the empirical realm. Only by the Divine Mind can the task be completed, and all things seen as ordered in complete obedience to the two principles of thought.

Leibniz, in propounding this view, develops a genuinely original conception of the relation holding between appearance and reality. Only monads, that is, spiritual beings, exist. Apart from the representative activity of the monads there are no such existences as space and time, as matter and motion. The mathematical and physical sciences, in their present forms, therefore, cannot be interpreted as revealing absolute existences. But if ideally developed, they would emancipate themselves from mechanical and sensuous notions; and would consist of a body of truths, which, as thus perfected, would be discovered to constitute the very being of thought. Pure thought or reason consists in the apprehension of such truths. To discover and to prove them thought does not require to issue out beyond itself. It creates this conceptual world in the very act of apprehending it; and as this realm of truth thus expresses the necessary character of all thought, whether divine or human, it is universal and unchanging. Each mind apprehends the same eternal truth; but owing to imperfection each finite being apprehends it with some degree of obscurity and confusion, fragmentarily, in terms of sense, and so falls prey to the illusion that the self stands in mechanical relations to a spatial and temporal world of matter and motion.

Leibniz supports this doctrine by his theory of sense-

experience as originating spontaneously from within the individual mind. Thereby he is only repeating that pure thought generates its whole content from within itself. Sense-experience, in its intrinsic nature, is nothing but pure thought. Such thought, owing to the inexhaustible wealth of its conceptual significance, so confuses the mind which thus generates it, that only by prolonged analysis can larger and larger portions of it be construed into the conceptual judgments which have all along constituted its sole content. And in the process, space, time, and motion lose all sensuous character, appearing in their true nature as orders of relation which can be adequately apprehended only in conceptual terms. They remain absolutely real as objects of thought, though as sensible existences they are reduced to the level of mere appearance. Such is the view of thought which is unfolded in Leibniz's writings, in startling contrast to the naturalistic teaching of his Scotch antagonist.

As already indicated, Kant's first-hand knowledge of Leibniz's teaching was very limited. He was acquainted with it chiefly through the inadequate channel of Wolff's somewhat commonplace exposition of its principles. But even from such a source he could derive what was most essential, namely, Leibniz's view of thought as absolute in its powers and unlimited in its claims. How closely Wolff holds to the main tenet of Leibniz's system appears from his definition of philosophy as "the science of possible things, so far as they are possible." He thus retains, though without the deeper suggestiveness of Leibniz's speculative insight, the view that thought precedes reality and legislates for it. By the possible is not meant the existentially or psychologically possible, but the conceptually necessary, that which, prior to all existence, has objective validity, sharing in the universal and necessary character of thought itself.

As Riehl has very justly pointed out,[1] Wolff's philosophy had, prior even to the period of Kant's earliest writings, been displaced by empirical, psychological enquiries and by eclectic, popular philosophy. Owing to the prevailing lack of thoroughness in philosophical thinking, "Problemlosigkeit" characterised the whole period. The two exclusively alternative views of the function of thought stood alongside one another within each of the competing systems, quite unreconciled and in their mutual conflict absolutely destructive of all real consistency and thoroughness of thought. It was Kant who restored rationalism to its rightful place. He reinvigorated the flaccid tone of his day by adopting in his writings, both

[1] *Philosophischer Kriticismus*, 2nd ed. p. 209.

early and late, the strict method of rational science, and by insisting that the really crucial issues be boldly faced. In essentials Kant holds to Wolff's definition of philosophy as "the science of possible things, so far as they are possible." As I have just remarked, the possible is taken in an objective sense, and the definition consequently gives expression to the view of philosophy upon which Kant so frequently insists, as lying wholly in the sphere of pure *a priori* thought. Its function is to determine prior to specific experience what experience must be; and obviously that is only possible by means of an *a priori*, purely conceptual method. His *Critique*, as its title indicates, is a criticism of pure reason by pure reason. Nothing which escapes definition through pure *a priori* thinking can come within its sphere. The problem of the "possibility of experience" is the problem of discovering the conditions which *necessarily* determine experience to be what it is. Kant, of course, radically transforms the whole problem, in method of treatment as well as in results, when in defining the subject-matter of enquiry he substitutes experience for things absolutely existent. This modification is primarily due to the influence of Hume. But the constant occurrence in Kant's philosophy of the term "possibility" marks his continued belief in the Idealist view of thought. Though pure thought never by itself amounts to knowledge—therein Kant departs from the extreme rationalist position—only through it is any knowledge, empirical or *a priori*, possible at all. Philosophy, in order to exist, must be a system of *a priori* rational principles. Nothing empirical or hypothetical can find any place in it.[1] Yet at the same time it is the system of the *a priori* conditions only of experience, not of ultimate reality. Such is the twofold relation of agreement and difference in which Kant stands to his rationalist predecessors.

[1] Cf. above, pp. lv-vi, lxi, 543 ff.

APPENDIX C

KANT'S "OPUS POSTUMUM"

UNTIL the appearance in 1920 of Adickes' elaborate and careful study[1] of the manuscripts which compose what is now usually entitled Kant's *Opus Postumum*,[2] students of Kant have been dependent upon the sections published by Reicke in the *Altpreussische Monatsschrift* (1882–1884). Not only, however, are these latter incomplete, but the parts omitted have frequently been those which are most important. Also, the sections reproduced have been altered and added to in a very arbitrary manner. Reicke's part in the work consisted in copying, partly with his own hand and partly with the co-operation of others, the selected portions. After a single collation with the originals, the copies were edited by E. Arnoldt,[3] whose method of procedure was as follows:

"Arnoldt then prepared the sheets for the press, and did so—it is unbelievable but true!—without acquainting himself with the manuscripts which were available in his immediate neighbourhood. In the editing he left out much,—in its place (at least in great part) inserting dashes. Further he extended the punctuation and altered the text through numerous conjectures, without in any way indicating, either through a general note or by special indication, where these changes have been made. His intention was, on the one hand to have Kant appear before the public in as worthy a manner as [to himself] seemed possible, and yet on the other to allow the character of the manuscripts to show itself, *i.e.* through the retention of misguided statements."[4]

[1] Erich Adickes, *Kants Opus Postumum, dargestellt und beurteilt* (Berlin, 1920).

[2] Following Reicke, I have above (pp. 275 *n.*, 283 *n.*, 482 *n.*, 514 *n.*) entitled it the *Transition from the Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science to Physics*. Kant so entitles it in his letter to Garve (September 21, 1798; *W.* xii. p. 257). This, however, is only one among the many other titles to which he inclined, according as this or that part of the work was most preoccupying his attention. Cf. below, pp. 608 *n.* 2, 610 *n.* 2.

[3] Arnoldt, at his own request, was not named as co-editor, as he regarded the copying as being the most exacting part of the work!

[4] Adickes, pp. 13-14.

In the reprinted passages the omissions amount to more than 13,800 words; and these occur, Adickes tells us, just in those very sections which are the most important, and for the proper understanding of which every clause and every word is more or less significant. We have to bear in mind that the manuscripts were not intended for immediate publication, but are Kant's private notes, in which, with frequent failure and at best with only comparative success, constantly restating and modifying, with words and sentences crossed out, and with notes added on the margins, as suggestions occurred to him, he endeavoured to arrive at a satisfactory formulation of certain new positions to which he was tentatively feeling his way. Considering that Arnoldt, while making his own interpolations, alterations, and omissions, was ignorant of the originals, it is perhaps surprising that Reicke's text is not even less reliable than it proves to be. As Adickes testifies:

"I have several times found that passages which, in Reicke's text are insoluble riddles, lost their terrors, and became clear and intelligible, immediately I was in position to peruse them in the manuscript."[1]

Adickes has succeeded in dating the twelve main sections as begun not later than 1797. His dating of the various sections as relatively earlier or later, and of the earliest of them as belonging to the years 1797–1798, is important for several reasons. In the first place, it finally disposes of the view, rashly sponsored by Kuno Fischer,[2] and repeated by others, that the *Opus Postumum* is a work of Kant's senility, revealing in painful fashion, amidst endless repetitions, and with only occasional flashes of genuine insight, his failing efforts to follow out a continuous train of thought. This, indeed, is in some degree true, though much less so than appears on superficial study, of what are usually numbered the seventh and the first sections. These sections were, as Adickes quite conclusively demonstrates, the last to be written, the seventh falling within the year 1800, and the first in the period between December 1800 and Kant's death in 1804—the major part probably being written in 1801 and its last passages in 1803. Even in these sections increasing age shows itself

[1] Adickes, p. 3.

[2] Shortly after Reicke's publication of selections from the *Opus Postumum*, Pastor C. E. A. Krause of Hamburg purchased the original manuscripts from Kant's heirs; and while upholding their value against Kuno Fischer's ill-informed attacks, himself took an almost equally exaggerated view, eulogising the *Opus Postumum* as being "Kant's greatest work"! In 1884 Krause published his *Immanuel Kant wider Kuno Fischer*, in reply to Kuno Fischer's *Das Streber- und Gründertum in der Litteratur* (1884).

mainly in Kant's failure to co-ordinate his more complex lines of thought. Since all the remainder of the twelve sections can, however, be assigned to the years between 1797 and the early months of 1800, when Kant was publishing his *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*, his *Streit der Fakultäten*, and his *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, and composing letters which show no sign of weakening mental powers, whatever defects these sections may exhibit must be otherwise explained than by any alleged senility in their author. As a matter of fact, the repetitions, and the extremely disjointed character of the text, are more or less such as we find in the already published *Lose Blätter*, dating from Kant's most active period. They represent his usual method of composition; and the most that can be said is that with the passage of years Kant came more and more to depend, for the development of his thoughts, upon the processes of actual writing—passing, almost momentary conjectures finding their way on to paper, as well as those formulations to which he could give his more deliberate approval.[1] Also, just as in his earlier works—most notably in the *Critique of Pure Reason*—he still, even in these last years, alternates between competing methods of developing his thought, seeking, as he has himself said,[2] to test his doctrines by trial of their opposites. Frequently, too, as we shall have occasion to observe, he states the particular point to which he is at the moment directing attention with all possible emphasis, leaving the necessary qualifications temporarily aside. This indeed explains how Vaihinger[3]—to whom students of Kant owe so great a debt—has been able to allege that Kant in his last years, as represented by the *Opus Postumum*, had so far departed from his earlier views, or, as Vaihinger maintains, so successfully clarified them, as to become a pupil of Zoroaster, and—much in the manner of Nietzsche, who was writing his *Also sprach Zarathustra* in the very years in which parts of Kant's *Opus Postumum* first saw the light—to hold that all our concepts of noumenal being, including that of Divine Existence, are but fictions, and that they are justified only as they inspire human effort in the realising of its self-prescribed ideals.

If this interpretation of Kant's final teaching were correct, it would, in the view of most of Kant's readers, indicate a mental and moral instability, to account for which the

[1] Their editing, to be satisfactory, would demand an exact reprint, with all the alterations and marginal notes, including the words and sentences which Kant has crossed out: his first thoughts are at times more illuminating, as a clue to his meaning, than the more cautious, less self-revealing terms which he substitutes.

[2] Cf. above, p. xxiii.

[3] *Die Philosophie des als ob* (2nd edition, 1913), p. 721 ff.

enfeeblement of age might reasonably be postulated. The evidence, however, carefully studied, points to very different conclusions. Kant's newly acquired interest in Zoroaster[1] was indeed so great that in 1802 he contemplated including that name in the title of his work.[2] But, as we should have expected, the sources of his interest are hardly those of Nietzsche. Kant in his eighties, as he appears in the *Opus Postumum*, is quite capable of revising, and on evidence shown of modifying, his older teaching. He remains astonishingly flexible in all save his most fundamental philosophical convictions, concentrating his attention on those features of his teaching which had been most called in question by his pupils and younger contemporaries; and in regard to them developing very novel views, fittingly, though not always successfully, expressed by means of certain newly devised terms. Thus he discusses the fundamental and very far-reaching issues which underlie his much-challenged and, considering his other doctrines, very difficult and obscure *Refutation of Idealism*. That refutation, as involving a realist view of the world both of science and of ordinary experience, can, as he now explicitly recognises, only be defended through a doctrine of double affection; and this doctrine he proceeds to develop in great detail. Secondly, Kant restates that part of his teaching which, more than any other, had been questioned and very generally rejected by his contemporaries and by the more independent among his own pupils—his doctrines in regard to the existence and nature of things in themselves. In this connection he also discusses the Idea of God, and in so doing acknowledges the inadequacy of his professedly practical, but really theoretical, proof of God's existence, advocating in its place a proof of a more consistently moral character.

But I have still to mention the chief item in the programme which Kant sets before himself. The *Opus Postumum* is designed to serve as a *Transition from the Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science to Physics*.[3] In order that this transition be made in accordance with Critical principles, Kant now proposes to extend the sphere of those tran-

[1] Due presumably to the appearance of Kleuker's translation (1st edition, 1776; 2nd edition, 1786) of Anquetil Du Perron's work: "*Zend-Avesta, Zoroaster's lebendiges Wort, worin die Lehren und Meinungen von Gott, Welt, Natur und Menschen, imgleichen die Zeremonien des heiligen Dienstes der Persen usf. aufbehalten sind.*"

[2] Two of the titles thus suggested by Kant are: "*Zoroaster: oder die Philosophie im Ganzen ihres Inbegriffs unter einem Prinzip zusammengefasst*"; "*Zoroaster: das Ideal der physisch und zugleich moralisch praktischen Vernunft in Einem Sinnen-Objekt vereinigt.*"

[3] Cf. above, p. 607 *n.* 2.

scendental considerations whereby in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* the constitution of physical nature has been determined in a strictly *a priori* manner. That is to say, Kant has meantime, since the publication of the latter treatise in 1786, come to believe that the transcendental method is capable of a much wider application than he had then thought feasible. Not merely the general form of nature but the possible types both of physical energy and of secondary qualities can, he now maintains, be anticipated and systematised in accordance with the *a priori* principles of understanding. Accordingly the table of categories is again brought into action, affording Kant in his last years yet another opportunity of indulging in his favourite pastime, the elaboration of new and ingenious applications of his architectonic.

These attempts to anticipate, on *a priori* grounds, the outcome of sense perception and of scientific enquiry are, it need hardly be said, from the start doomed to failure. If the table of categories, as we have to recognise, cannot justify even the more moderate demands of Kant's formal requirements in the *Critique*, it is still less fitted to predetermine the possible modes of energy or the possible types of secondary qualities. But the mere fact that Kant should even attempt to do so is highly significant of his altered perspective at this period; and, in passing, I may indicate the general lines upon which this new deduction is made to proceed.

The deduction opens with an analysis of the concept of motion or moving force. In respect of *origin*, motion is either inherent (congenital) or communicated (impressed); in respect of *direction* either attractive or repulsive; in respect of *place* either progressive or oscillatory; and finally, in respect of the *filling* of space, it must either fill empty pores in a body and so be coercible, or penetrate throughout it and so be incoercible. This fourfold division, in order to establish its claim to be at once necessary and exhaustive, must rest on an *a priori* principle; and what higher sanction could it have than the fourfold division of the table of categories! No satisfactory method of establishing connection between the fourfold division of the categories and the above four pairs of alternatives can, indeed, be devised; and even supposing that could be done, the four pairs of alternatives cannot be shown to be exhaustive of the types of physical force with which the natural sciences deal. Belief in the adequacy of his architectonic tides Kant, however, over all such difficulties; and while he describes the pairs of opposites ever anew, in the most varying terms, the fourfold division

remains a constant feature in all his lists.[1] The difficulties become yet more patently insuperable and the enterprise even more grotesquely ill-devised—to extract from formal categories a reason for our having five, and only five, senses![2] —when Kant proceeds by similar methods to prove on strictly *a priori* grounds that only six types of secondary qualities are empirically possible. Though this part of Kant's new teaching is developed in the *Opus Postumum* with remarkable patience and ingenuity, it is, as Adickes justly concludes, entirely worthless.[3]

But this being so, why, it may be asked, even allowing for Kant's unreasoning affection for his logical architectonic, does he set himself so impossible a task? Why does he persist in an endeavour which, however the material be recast, ends only in failure? The answer to this question supplies what would seem to be the key to the understanding of the *Opus Postumum* as a whole. Taken in its entirety, it deals with three apparently unconnected problems: the doctrine of double affection, the principles of natural science, the nature and extent of our knowledge of noumenal realities. The first-named problem, however, when properly appreciated, by itself—the other contributory factors will be noted later—largely accounts for Kant's preoccupation with the other two; and it likewise explains how Kant came to depart from his earlier position in regard to the strictly formal character of the legislation which the understanding prescribes to the phenomenal world in space and time. Why the doctrine of double affection is so fundamental in Kant's system,[4] and why, while being so, it had yet to wait until Kant's last years for any precise and explicit formulation, are the two main questions to which I shall endeavour to give an answer.[5]

The fact that Kant's doctrine of double affection, though not formulated in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, has all along been fundamental in his theory of knowledge, goes far to account for the very strange circumstance that competent students of Kant have hitherto ranged themselves in opposing camps:

"Fischer and Krause[6] are representatives of the two opposed ways

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[1] Kant enumerates, in these lists, at least thirteen different pairs of opposites, and his professed reduction of the thirteen to four is nowhere shown.

[2] Kant sometimes counts the senses as six in number, taking heat as a vital sense.

[3] Cf. Adickes, p. 343 ff. [4] Cf. above, pp. 270 ff., 312 ff., 373-4, 415-17.

[5] The publication of Adickes' promised work, "*Kants Lehre von der doppelten Affektion unseres Ich als Schlüssel zu seiner Erkenntnistheorie*," has, unfortunately, been delayed by war-conditions.

[6] Pastor C. E. A. Krause, not the better-known K. C. F. Krause. Cf. above, p. 608 *n.* 2.

of interpreting the Kantian Philosophy which from the nineties of the eighteenth century up to our own time have challenged one another ever anew. The one party, to which Johann Schulze (recognised by Kant himself as the best interpreter of his works[1]) and many other Kantians of the eighteenth century, and in recent times Kuno Fischer, Paulsen, B. Erdmann, and Riehl—to name only a few—belong, allows that Kant, in accordance with the indubitable wording of his writings, postulated things in themselves as existing independently of us and as affecting us, but on the other hand is for the most part inclined to deny the possibility of an affection through phenomenal objects.

"The other party, from Maimon and Fichte to Krause and the Marburg School,[2] desires to free Kant from the alleged contradiction and absurdity of regarding things in themselves as self-subsisting and as acting upon us, and appealing from the letter of his writings to their supposed spirit, leaves to him only an affection through phenomenal objects, and in these objects finds the immediate and last cause of the sensations. But while it frees Kant from certain contradictions, it either involves him in others yet more grievous, or must place a very forced interpretation upon his words.

"There is only one way of escape from this dilemma: in accordance with Kant's express assertions, we must hold with Vaihinger that Kant intended to assert an affection of the self through things in themselves, as well as its affection through phenomenal objects. Only from this standpoint can the inconsistencies and contradictions with which the two parties mutually make play against one another be shown to vanish."[3]

Kant's *Opus Postumum* gives welcome confirmation of the correctness of Vaihinger's view, which has been followed in the body of this *Commentary*. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, when arguing on phenomenalist lines, Kant has maintained that on the basis of transcendental idealism an empirical realism can be established; but nowhere does he face the difficulties which such a position involves. In one set of passages[4] he refers us to things in themselves as the primary, external conditions of sense-experience; in yet another set of passages[5] it is physical stimuli which are cited as the causes of our sensations. Nowhere does he explain how, if objects be appearances, conditioned by mental processes, they can also be causes, initiating and yielding material for these processes. The latter assertions are extorted from

[1] Cf. above, p. 129 *n.* 5.

[2] The School of Cohen and the Neo-Kantians, among whom may be counted Windelband and Rickert. Green, Caird, and the Hegelians generally, belong to this second group.

[3] Adickes, p. 18.

[4] Cf. above, pp. 217-18, 275 ff., 314 ff., 373-4.

[5] *Ibid.*

him, in part by the empirical evidence, very difficult to question or otherwise interpret, supplied by the physical and physiological sciences, and in part by the exigencies of his own method of refuting idealism of the Berkeleian and Cartesian types. That refutation, in the form in which it is stated in the second edition of the *Critique*, demands the drawing of a distinction between our representations and the objects which they disclose; and as he quite evidently means us to conclude, the allowing of independent existence to the latter. That these independent existences have causal efficacy is likewise, for similar reasons, postulated in certain other sections of the *Critique*.[1] All of these admissions, however, appear more by way of implication than by explicit avowal and defence; their compatibility with his other doctrines he does not even attempt to discuss, save in the most general manner as bearing on the question of subjective idealism *versus* empirical realism; and even in this connection, the latter position is developed, not in terms of itself, but mainly by refutation of its supposedly sole alternative. Now however, in the *Opus Postumum*, the situation is dramatically altered: the difficulties which have hitherto been kept in the obscurer background occupy the centre of the stage. The two-level doctrine, which in the *Critique* emerges as the distinction between empirical and noumenal reality, reappears in a much more definite form as the distinction between a quite literal interpretation of the teaching of the natural sciences on the one hand and the transcendental idealism which yields the key to the generating problem of the Critical philosophy on the other; and as a consequence the doctrine of double affection becomes the main subject of argument and exposition. Even when it is not itself under consideration, it is, as we shall find, all-determining, in deciding the kind of hypotheses and conclusions which, on other, at first sight seemingly unconnected issues, are being propounded.

Kant's treatment of the doctrine of double affection is lengthy and elaborate, but only his main points immediately concern us; and of these I shall give first a more general and then a more detailed statement. In Kant's view the ultimate source of all spontaneity and agency lies in things in themselves. As regards the self in itself, this spontaneity is shown in its production *out of itself* of forms which are peculiar to itself, namely, time, space, and the categories. Through these forms, by means of its synthetic activities, it posits the phenomenal world. Even the very notion of the thing in itself as object is formed by it on the analogy of the unity of apperception, as

[1] Cf. above, pp. 313-21, 373-4.

prescribing to the mind the task of so unifying the contents of its knowledge that all existences in space, including thereunder the empirical self, can be conceived as constituting a single unitary system. The self has thus set itself into the given, and has quite literally "made itself its own object." It is the "possessor and originator" (*Inhaber und Urheber*[1]) of the entire phenomenal world.

Things in themselves are likewise a source of spontaneity and agency. They affect the self in itself, and thereby generate the material (*Stoff*), the noumenal manifold, so to speak, upon which the self stamps its own very specific imprint. How much has to be allowed to the subjective factors remains, however, somewhat uncertain. Kant quite obviously halts indecisively between alternative views. Sometimes he seems to imply that the internal, timeless relations in which things in themselves stand to one another are translated by the self into time and space, and so have still to be thought as being the source of the causal, dynamical capacities which, in terms of the subjective categories, we ascribe to all physical existences. Just as the known, empirical self is not a second existence, separate from the transcendental self, but, on the contrary, has to be viewed as retaining the spontaneity, the active capacity for self-expression, which is the fundamental feature of its noumenal counterpart, the self in itself, so empirical objects in their interactions will mirror the potencies which they phenomenally represent. At other times, and more usually, things in themselves, in the course of Kant's exposition, pass entirely into the background; the co-existences and sequences, *i.e.* this and that happening as here and now, rather than elsewhere or at some other time, are presumably still to be regarded as determined by the unknown things in themselves—as to this Kant, for obvious reasons, maintains a discreet silence—but in all other respects the system of physical nature is viewed as being determined by the inherent constitution and self-imposed demands of the transcendental self. If we take the phenomenal world as comprising the empirical self in its psychical as well as in its physical aspect, Kant's ultimate position is indeed a curiously inconsistent blending of the two views. The empirical self and the physical entities with which it stands in dynamical interaction in space are treated as meeting, so to speak, on a level of equality. They have the same relative degree of independent existence, and the same relative capacity of initiating change. But when their relation to their noumenal conditions comes up for consideration, this equality is no longer upheld. The

[1] Cited by Adickes, p. 662.

empirical self continues to be regarded as the representative of the transcendental self, and as capable of exercising identically the same synthetic functions, and so as reconstructing out of the given sensuous manifold a world identical in its physical, non-sensuous features with that which has been already constructed by the noumenal self. On the other hand, all the fundamental characteristics of the physical entities—their having this and that fundamental type of moving energy—no less than their strictly formal features, are traced to the noumenal self. Kant's phenomenalism thus becomes markedly lopsided; and this not through any inadvertence or arbitrary choice, but for reasons which, however unsatisfactory, are quite unavoidable.

In my ignorance of Kant's actual methods of argument in the unpublished sections of the *Opus Postumum*, I ventured, in this *Commentary*,[1] to conjecture that his doctrine of double affection would lead him to conclude that on the phenomenal level "the problem of knowledge proper, namely, how it is possible to have or acquire knowledge, whether of a motion in space or of a sensation in time does not arise"; and that in treating this latter problem, in which we are referred to noumenal conditions, the negative consequences of his *Objective Deduction*, as drawn in the section on the *Paralogisms*, would receive fuller recognition. These conjectures prove to be mistaken.[2] Kant proceeds on quite other lines. In the first place—I may perhaps be pardoned for expecting the contrary—he equips the empirical self not only with consciousness, but with a complete transcendental outfit of mental forms and synthetic processes, and by these means proceeds to supply an answer to the question how the empirical self, by means of its given sensations, can acquire knowledge of the independent existences to which these sensations are due. And secondly, so far is Kant from hesitating to conceive the noumenal conditions of experience as consisting in a noumenal self, that on the contrary all other noumenal conditions withdraw into the background, and the self, virtually conceived as an all-powerful creator, originates from its own internal resources the world which it is then (we must not say subsequently) in position to contemplate. Things in themselves are indeed

[1] Above, p. 275. For reasons indicated below (pp. 633-4), I have left my original statements unaltered.

[2] On the other hand, the views above adopted (pp. 204-19) in regard to Kant's early doctrine of the transcendental object seem to be confirmed by the *Opus Postumum*. Though Adickes has employed the phrase "transcendental object" in the heading of one of his sections (pp. 669-89), in none of the passages cited is it used by Kant himself. It is quite obviously incompatible with his recognition, so very explicit in the *Opus Postumum*, of the *threefold* distinction between representation, the empirical object, and the thing in itself.

assumed to affect the noumenal self, and thereby to supply, or perhaps alternately to stimulate the self to supply, a noumenal manifold; but this manifold is so subserviently plastic to the self's requirements that nothing really precise and specific[1] is thereby determined. Consequently, the phenomenal world thus generated is, to all intents and purposes, viewed as an emanation from the self, creatively produced, but modelled on no previously existent pattern, ideal or real. Kant's old-time watchwords—that all order and system in nature are due to the mind, that transcendental idealism, especially the doctrine of the ideality, *i.e.* subjectivity, of time and space, is the key to the solution of the Critical problems, that the mind can only anticipate what it has itself predetermined—are not only held to, but receive even more emphatic endorsement throughout the *Opus Postumum* than in those sections of the *Critique* which are earliest in date of writing.

Yet this need not be taken as signifying that Kant has at last ceased to oscillate between subjectivism and phenomenalism, and has definitely decided in favour of the former. What it does apparently mean is that Kant has succumbed to the malign influence of his own unfortunate manner of distinguishing between appearance and reality by the method of antagonism, as contrasted types of existence.[2] He is now maintaining that between the self in itself and things in themselves knowledge, as a form of contemplation, is impossible. Noumenally regarded, knowledge is only possible as a relation holding between the mind and that which stands related to it as a creature to its creator.[3] Hence Kant's insistence that physical nature, even on its material side, as regards its possible types of moving forces, is predetermined by the intrinsic constitution of the self. On the other hand, phenomenally regarded, the knowledge which the empirical self acquires of physical entities in space is knowledge in the strictest sense of the term; it is the apprehension by the self of actual, independent existences. The world thus known is a phenomenal world, but the knowledge that we have of it is knowledge which allows of a genuinely realistic attitude in the explanation both of its coming about and of its validity once it has been acquired. Further, the first view of experience is, Kant maintains, necessary in order to establish the second: the only method of justifying our knowledge of

[1] As above noted, Kant's teaching in this regard is somewhat uncertain: we can hardly avoid regarding it as intentionally obscure.

[2] Cf. above, pp. liv, 416-17, 558-61.

[3] This, as above noted (p. 160), is a view which is also found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

physical entities is to show that their existence is pre-conditioned by those very *a priori* forms through which alone they can be apprehended. Short of such demonstration, we cannot bridge the gulf which lies between the sensations, which alone are immediately experienced by the empirical self, and the independent existences which its empirical judgments profess to define.

Thus, in regard to Kant's final positions, as revealed in the *Opus Postumum*, whatever else be doubtful, two points at least are abundantly clear: first, that he definitely commits himself to a realist view of the physical system in space and time, and of the manner in which we acquire knowledge of it; and secondly, that he is willing to go almost any lengths in the way of speculative hypotheses regarding the noumenal conditions of our sense-experience, if only thereby the difficulties which stand in the way of this empirical realism can be successfully dealt with. The one requirement upon which he insists is that the hypotheses adopted be compatible with the solution given to the generating problem of the Critical philosophy, how synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible. In the *Opus Postumum*, as in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, transcendental idealism is the ultimate foundation upon which his realist account of the natural world is based. Neither his subjectivist principles nor his realist inclinations are sacrificed: the two are segregated on different levels. But ultimately it is still subjectivist principles, working on the deeper (or obscurer) level, which supply Kant with his answer to the fundamental problem: how the self-transcendence involved in knowledge, realistically interpreted, can be possible. The self can be a knower only if it be a creator. An untenable method of distinguishing appearance and reality, backed by a subjectivism of the most extreme type, are the foundations upon which Kant is attempting to erect a realist view of the natural world! His phenomenalism, that is to say, is in direct conflict with many of the purposes which have inspired it.[1]

With these somewhat general, introductory remarks, I may now pass to a more detailed statement of Kant's doctrines. Since the nature of noumenal affection can be determined only by way of speculative hypotheses, and since these hypotheses are devised exclusively in order to account for the possibility of our sense experience and of the scientific knowledge which

[1] Beyond the corrections above indicated (p. 616), I have not found reason to alter in any essential way the criticisms passed in the first edition of this *Commentary* (above, pp. 281-4, 316-17) upon the defects of Kant's phenomenalism. Study of the *Opus Postumum* serves only to underline these defects, and would seem to show that when the path by which he has himself sought to remedy these defects is followed to the end, it turns out to be an *impasse*.

is based thereon, they can best be understood when approached by way of these latter. If, therefore, we first consider Kant's doctrine of empirical affection, and note the points at which, taken in and by itself, it fails to account for the knowledge which experience does actually yield, we shall be in a position to define quite precisely the requirements which the doctrine of noumenal affection must be made to satisfy.

Kant's doctrine of empirical affection, *i.e.* affection of the empirical self, is as follows. The empirical self, like the empirical object, is conceived as exercising a certain spontaneity, whereby it reacts, and that in a twofold manner, when affected by physical stimuli. Kant seems to have begun by distinguishing between the self in its physical and the self in its psychical aspect. In a few passages, all of which Adickes dates as among the earliest to be written, the self in its physical aspect, in so far as it is equivalent to the brain, is taken as being an integral part of the unitary system of reciprocally acting bodies, and therefore as responding with counter-movements. These brain-motions are of a purely material character, and do not in their mode of origin differ from the reactions of other physical bodies.[1] Secondly, the self responds to the mechanical stimulus in a purely psychical manner; in the exercise of its moving forces (*bewegende Kräfte*) it affects itself, and in so doing posits, and in positing apprehends, sensations characterised by this and that secondary quality. Each sensation is an "*Aktus der Autonomie.*" The empirical self, in being affected, has affected itself.

This initial theory Kant proceeded to modify in one important respect, namely, in his manner of conceiving the origin of the brain-motions.[2] He seems almost at once to have concluded that the empirical self cannot be regarded in a dual manner, as being psychical and yet also the physical brain. He therefore distinguished between the self and the brain, and set the latter in subordination to the former. Consequently, his more deliberate teaching, as represented by all the later passages, is that the physical stimulus, taken as completing itself in and through certain brain-processes, exhausts itself in its psychical effect upon the self, and that the self thereupon responds in a twofold manner, by bringing into existence certain other brain-motions, and by positing its

[1] Kant conceived (cf. above, pp. 351, 373-4, 379-80) physical entities as centres of force, not in the Cartesian manner as externally endowed with motion. The empirical self is, however, more than physical; and among its moving forces Kant in the *Opus Postumum* enumerates "understanding and desire" (*Verstand und Begehren*).

[2] Cf. Adickes, p. 257 ff.

sensations. Kant, we may presume, conceived that in the former precisely those amounts of energy are produced anew which have been expended in generating the self-affection. On this view the empirical self, as a self and not merely as a name for the body, acquires the same relative independence and autonomy as physical entities. It has its own "moving forces," and among these Kant enumerates understanding and desire (*Verstand und Begehren*). It acts upon the body, and not merely the body upon it; and such control of the body it manifests no less in sense-perception than in voluntary movements.

But in addition to these two sets of activities Kant endows the empirical self with a third set, namely, those synthetic activities whereby sensations are interpreted into perceived objects. In these activities likewise, the self affects itself; they are involved in the positing of "sensations *with consciousness*." To them is due the sensuous apprehension of the independent world within which the physical stimuli fall.

"The perception of the object is the consciousness of the moving force of the subject itself, not in so far as it is affected, but in so far as it affects itself, *i.e.* by means of the understanding brings the manifold of appearance under a principle of its combination,—a principle which is the ground of the possibility of experience, *i.e.* of the systematic connection of the perceptions."[1]

The existences defined by the natural sciences are not, Kant is here maintaining, endowed, as are the objects of our immediate experience, with the secondary qualities. That only comes about through their action upon the empirical self, and so through the resulting apprehension of them in sensuous terms. Acting upon the bodily sense organs, they give rise to a purely sensuous manifold; and it is out of this manifold, not in itself spatially or temporally ordered, that the empirical self, through its intuitional forms and intellectual categories, elaborates those sense-experiences which form the sole basis of any possible, further knowledge. Only later, by reflection upon the world thus apprehended, in the light of evidence obtained through the more indirect processes of scientific enquiry, does the empirical self learn to discount the secondary qualities and to define the physical existences in their true, independent nature.

Clearly, Kant is no longer regarding the empirical self, in the manner of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as the known and embodied; it is here represented as both active and conscious; and we are left wondering what rôle, if any, is left for the

[1] Cited by Adickes, p. 269.

transcendental self and for its affection by things in themselves. Has not Kant, on the basis of a scientific realism, worked his way round to a position which must render him sceptical as to the need for assuming either a transcendental self (viewed, that is, in any *ontological* fashion) or things in themselves? That such was by no means Kant's intention, and that this is not in the least how he interpreted the outcome of these novel doctrines, becomes at once clear when we recognise, as we must, that if only the empirical self and its activities could be appealed to in explanation of experience, Kant's answer to his fundamental problem—how synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible—would be undermined. He would be maintaining that the self, in interpreting its sensations through space, time, and the categories, acquires knowledge of independent existences; and yet how this should be possible would only be explicable on the assumption of a pre-established harmony between mental forms and that which is known by their means. Now, as hitherto, Kant rejects such a solution as unphilosophical. He continues to maintain, indeed with increased emphasis, that only on a basis of transcendental *idealism* can any such *realistic* interpretation of empirical existence be upheld. Should the above explanation of our sense-experience be capable of no supplementation, and so have to justify itself in terms of itself, not realism, but scepticism, would be the inevitable outcome. If sensations alone are immediately apprehended, and if all else be apprehensible only through the additions which the mind itself makes thereto, then, in the absence of all transcendental justification of the latter, there can be no assured knowledge of the independently real. The independently real will have to be recognised as equivalent to the realm of things in themselves, and therefore as not accessible by any possible experience or by any inference based thereon.

This is obvious, immediately we recognise how thoroughgoing (in its own strange way) is the realism which Kant is professing to establish. Empirical selves and empirical objects have, he is teaching, such completeness of reality that by their interactions they can bring into existence a set of further phenomena, which, save for their interactions, would never come about, namely, the sensations of the secondary qualities.[1] And, on Kant's view, only these

[1] "Metaphysically considered," material bodies are appearances; "for physics they are the things in themselves (*die Sachen an sich selbst*) which affect the senses (*den Sinn*)." (Cited by Adickes, p. 239.) Kant varies greatly in his use of the phrases *Erscheinung von der Erscheinung*, *indirekte*, *mittelbare Erscheinung*, *Erscheinung der zweiten Ordnung*, *Erscheinung vom zweiten Range* (cf. above, p. 283 *n.* 2, and Adickes, p. 298 ff.). In the main they are defined

sensations are immediately present (so to speak) to the mind; all else is added in the process of their apprehension. The empirical self, interpreting the sensations in accordance with forms determined by its own intrinsic nature, sets them into space and time, and uniting them in terms of the categories, thereby acquires experience of the dynamical, space-time world to which they are due. In other words, starting from the empirically given sensations, it is through synthetic *a priori* judgments that we transcend them, and in transcending them apprehend their independently existing physical causes. How such apprehension, as a form of reliable experience, should be possible, calls for that type of deduction, *i.e.* justification, which, as Kant believed, only a transcendental idealism, resting on his "Copernican hypothesis," can supply. As he therefore argues, a realist doctrine of empirical affection requires, as its necessary supplement, an idealist doctrine of noumenal affection. Only through the self's timeless conditioning of its time-space world can sense-experience—the sole source of scientific knowledge—itself rank as a comprehensible occurrence.

Now so long as Kant was occupied, in the period 1770–1796, in the absorbing and strenuous task of finding an answer to the question, how experience, theoretical, moral, and aesthetic, is possible, we can understand why he should be content to justify our scientific judgments by maintaining that they apply only to appearances which are mind-dependent, no distinction being yet drawn between dependence on the empirical and dependence on the noumenal self. Since objects must conform to the conditions under which alone experience is possible, knowledge is not of independently existing realities, but only of appearances; the objects can be known only in so far as they have been *made* in the process of their apprehension. When, however, this task

in terms of the contrast between the physical and the metaphysical view of reality. What from the physical standpoint is thing in itself (*Sache an sich selbst*) is from the metaphysical standpoint only appearance. Both the material existences themselves, as complexes of moving forces, and their systematic ordering rest on the self-affection of the self, and are therefore appearances. The appearances of these appearances are the sensations, *i.e.* the secondary sense-qualities. In those other passages, however, in which Kant confines his view to the standpoint of the empirical self, the above phrases are employed in a very bewildering manner, in at least two quite distinct senses. As a rule the term appearance then denotes the sensations, *i.e.* the *a posteriori*, secondary sense-qualities. They are viewed as *direct* appearances, *i.e.* as being the sense-data beyond which the empirical self advances to the corresponding, underlying physical agents. The latter are the indirect or mediate appearances arrived at as the outcome of the ordering, objectivising activities of the empirical self. But the terms are also occasionally employed in the reverse manner, and therefore more in harmony with the meaning assigned to them from the metaphysical standpoint.

was completed, and Kant's mind, at greater leisure, could play more freely upon the situation thus disclosed, he very soon came to appreciate that this solution fails to do justice to certain of the facts for which it professes to account, and especially to the body of empirical knowledge accumulated in the physical and physiological sciences. That in his own thinking Kant gave a quite literal interpretation to the teaching of these sciences is shown by his abiding interest in all speculations regarding the infra-microscopic structure of physical happenings. I need only refer in this connection to his speculations regarding the constitution of matter, as developed in the *Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science*, and to his elaboration of an "aether" theory of gravitation, cohesion, etc., in the *Opus Postumum*. That when not plainly interdicted by any supposed consequences of his metaphysical doctrines he gave an equally literal interpretation to the teaching of the physiological sciences is shown by the statement made in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*,[1] that our sensations are due to physical stimuli acting on the sense organs and brain, and by his appreciation of Sömmering's theory[2] that the brain-processes corresponding to the analytic and synthetic activities of the mind consist in the resolution of the water in the brain cavities into its chemical components upon the impact of sense stimuli and their recombination when the stimuli cease. Clearly, Kant felt himself to be quite definitely committed to some interpretation of physical nature which would enable him to accept the results of the natural sciences more or less at their face value, without any such high-handed restatement as Berkeleian subjectivism is constrained to adopt. And presumably it is because Kant thus finds himself proceeding on genuinely realist lines that he feels constrained in the *Opus Postumum* to ask that very question which he has so tantalisingly refused to raise in the *Critique* itself—to the consequent ranging, as above noted,[3] of his bewildered commentators into two opposed camps—how if, as he argues in his *Refutation of Idealism*, objects are distinct existences from the representations through which they are known, the principles of a transcendental idealism can still be upheld. Kant's method of reply, as already noted, is to establish his subjectivist principles so securely in their noumenal

[1] A 28-9. In the second edition Kant substituted for the paragraph in which this statement occurs a briefer passage of a non-committal character. As to Kant's probable reason for making this change, cf. above, pp. 120-2. Cf. also p. 275.

[2] *Werke* (Hartenstein), vi. p. 457 ff.

[3] Above, pp. 612-13.

functioning that in relation to the phenomenal order they enjoy all rights of eminent domain. Briefly outlined, the resulting doctrine of noumenal affection is as follows:

The self in itself, Kant now unequivocally teaches, "makes" its object by a "self-positing of itself as object."

"Space and time are not things but only modes of representation. . . . Their positing contains only that which is *made* (*gemacht*), not anything that is *given*."[1] "Space and time are not indirect, mediate, derivate, but direct, immediate, primitive intuitions, through which the subject affects itself as appearance, and therefore represent their object as limitless. The complex of the representations which are contained in this intuition is the progress *in infinitum*. The object [of that complex] is neither ideal (*idealistisch*) nor real (*realistisch*); for it is not in any way *given*, but only *thought* (*non dari, sed intelligi potest*)."[2] "That a space *is* cannot be perceived. I *posit* a space. . . ."[3] "The subject which makes itself the *sense*-representation of space and time, is itself in this act likewise object. Self-intuition."[4] "The subject posits itself in the pure intuition and makes itself its object (*macht sich zum Objekt*)."[5] "Space and time are not objects, but determinations of the subject through itself, whereby it affects itself as object in the appearance, and as thing [*i.e.* self] in itself $= x$ is determining ground of itself."[6] "All my faculty of representation (*facultas repraesentativa*), which consists of intuition and conception, begins with the consciousness of itself. . . . Our sense-intuition is not, in the first place, perception; for a [metaphysical] principle precedes . . . the positing of itself and the being conscious of this positing (*Position*). The form[s] of this positing of the manifold as connected throughout are the pure intuitions which are entitled space and time."[7] "Space and time are not things which exist outside the representation, and which as apprehensible are given; they are that which the faculty of representation makes for itself."[8]

These are a selection from the passages of like tenor cited by Adickes. They illustrate Kant's fundamental contention that

". . . the principle of the ideality of space and of time is the key to the Transcendental Philosophy, according to which synthetic and *a priori* knowledge can be extended only in so far as the objects of the senses are represented as appearances, and according to which the thing itself is no existing being but as $= x$ is merely a principle."[9] "According to the principle of Transcendental Philosophy [*i.e.* of] the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments, [what comes first] is

[1] Cited by Adickes, p. 635.
[2] Cited by Adickes, p. 618 *n*. [3] Cited by Adickes, p. 635. [4] *Loc. cit.*
[5] Cited by Adickes, p. 636. [6] Cited by Adickes, p. 638.
[7] *Loc. cit.* [8] Cited by Adickes, p. 639.
[9] Cited by Adickes, pp. 673-4.

not the act of the apprehension of the manifold given in intuition (*apprehensio simplex*), but the principle of the autonomy whereby the self makes itself its object as given in appearance, [*i.e.* as] phenomenal object."[1] "The principle of the ideality of intuition underlies all our knowledge of things outside us, *i.e.* we do not apprehend objects as in themselves given (*apprehensio simplex*), but the subject makes for itself (invents)[2] the manifold of the object of the senses, so far as its form is concerned. . . ."[3]

In line with the use of the very strong term "*fingit*" Kant likewise speaks of space and time as original and primitive products of the *imagination*.

"[The representation of space and time] is an act of the subject itself and a product of the faculty of imagination (*Einbildungskraft*), which however is not derived (*repraesentatio derivativa*), but is original"[4] "Space and time are products (but primitive products) of our own faculty of imagination, and therefore are self-made intuitions since the subject affects itself, and thereby is appearance, not thing in itself."[5]

This general point of view Kant extends to the categories.

". . . the categories are not existing things [meaning, presumably, not inherent to them], but acts (*Actus*) through which the subject, for the sake of possible experience, posits itself *a priori* and constitutes itself as an object." "The subject posits itself through synthetic propositions *a priori* [and] through the forms of sensuous intuition, space and time, since the subject exercises forces (*Kräfte*) whereby [as thing in itself] it affects itself and determines itself to appearances."[6]

Thirdly, Kant extends this standpoint to include the concept of the thing in itself.

"The object in itself or noumenon is a mere *Gedankending* (*ens rationis*), in the representation of which the subject posits itself" (*Theätet*).[7] "Space and time are products, but primitive products, of our own faculty of imagination, and therefore are self-made intuitions, since the subject [the self in itself] affects itself, and the appearance is not therefore thing in itself. The material (*Das Materiale*), the thing in itself $= x$, is the mere representation of the self's own activity,"[8] *i.e.* the thought of its own unity, represented as that which has to be sought in the unity of the experienced. The thing in itself $= x$, in its distinction from appearance, is "not itself a separate object, but only a special relation (*respectus*), for the

[1] Cited by Adickes, p. 641.
[2] *Schafft sich selbst* (*fingit*).
[3] Cited by Adickes, p. 645.
[4] Cited by Adickes, p. 639.
[5] Cited by Adickes, p. 654.
[6] Cited by Adickes, p. 645.
[7] Cited by Adickes, p. 654. For the reference to *Theätet* cf. below, p. 632.
[8] *Loc. cit.*

constituting of the self as object," *i.e.* (as Adickes interprets this and similar passages) in order to set its transcendental unity of apperception over against itself in objective form in the unity of the single objects and of the whole of nature.[1]

Lastly, in order to complete the doctrine of noumenal affection, Kant ought to have advanced yet one stage further, and to have extended the process of self-positing so as to derive from the inherent constitution of the self the possible types of moving forces in nature, and the possible types of secondary qualities which the empirical self can experience in reaction upon these forces. Only so can Kant hope to establish his view of nature as being an emanation, due in all its features to the creative activities of the noumenal self; and only so can he succeed in offering transcendental justification of the synthetic processes whereby the empirical self, working on the basis of its given sensations, proceeds to a knowledge of the moving forces to which they are due. This latter type of knowledge—such is Kant's thesis in the *Opus Postumum*—can be possible only if, and in so far as, the empirical self repeats upon the sense-data, in the way of interpretation, *a priori* synthetic activities, identical in type with those which, in their creative character, have brought the world of moving forces into being. This thesis is, however, developed in any detail only in those sections of Kant's manuscript in which, working on the empirical level, and with the results of the physical sciences in view, he endeavours to establish some kind of necessary connection between the table of categories and the various types of moving forces; and, as we have already noted,[2] all Kant's many and persevering attempts to carry out this programme prove abortive. But clearly, if on the empirical level no connection can be discerned between the factors in our sense-experience which are admittedly *a priori* and those more specific factors for which *a priori* justification is sought, there can be no hope of doing so when the discussion is transferred to the much more conjectural realm of noumenal existence. We need not therefore be surprised that this aspect of Kant's doctrine of noumenal affection receives at his hands but scanty attention, and that he propounds it in such obscure and quite general terms as the following:

"That [*i.e.* The thought that] there is something outside myself [in space or as the thing in itself], is a product of myself. I make myself. Space cannot be perceived. Nor can even the moving force in space be perceived, since it cannot be represented as actual

[1] *Loc. cit.*

[2] Above, pp. 611-12.

unless there be a body which exercises it [and that body too must be posited by the self]. We make everything ourselves."[1]

In thus continuing to *postulate* that the *a priori* in nature is coextensive with all the main structural features of the natural order, and that it even extends to the secondary qualities, Kant is falling back upon mere assertion, and is leaving a gap in the argument just at the very point at which further explanation is most required.

Two further points of general interest regarding the *Opus Postumum* call for notice—(1) the nature of Kant's secondary motives in expounding his new doctrines in the above terms, and (2) his discussion of the nature and validity of the Idea of God.

(1) The many passages in which Kant deals with the concept of the thing in itself, one and all agree in their strong subjectivist colouring. It is a *Gedankending*, an *ens rationis*. In its representation, the self posits, not any independent reality, but only itself. It is entertained for the sake of experience, and is not known to exist either as its object or as its ground.

"The thing in itself is not another object, but another mode whereby [the self] makes itself its own object." "Not *objectum noumenon*, but the act of the understanding which makes the sense-intuition as mere phenomenon, is the intelligible object" [meaning, as Adickes suggests, takes over, for transcendental philosophy, the rôle of the intelligible object].[2] "The thing in itself is a *Gedankending* (*ens rationis*) of the connection of this manifold whole into the unity to which the self constitutes itself."[3] "The object in itself $= x$ is the sense-object in itself, not, however, as another object, but as another mode of representation."[4] "The correlate of the thing in appearance is the thing in itself, is the subject which I make into the object" [*i.e.* whereby the subject makes itself its own object, by reading its own unity into the given].[5]

This attitude, together with Kant's new phrases, *sich selbst setzen*, *sich selbst bestimmen*, *sich selbst aufstellen*, *sich selbst schaffen*, *sich selbst konstituieren*, *sich selbst afficieren*, and especially the frequently recurring variations in the phrase *sich selbst machen*, are in line with, and give expression to, his insistence upon the spontaneity and, as it were, self-creative character of the noumenal self; and constantly they suggest the somewhat similar teaching which in these very years, 1796–1803, was being upheld by Beck and by Fichte.

[1] Cited by Adickes, p. 648; cf. also pp. 755-7.
[2] Cited by Adickes, p. 651.
[3] Cited by Adickes, pp. 651-2.
[4] Cited by Adickes, p. 653.
[5] Cited by Adickes, p. 652.

Jacob Sigismund Beck, one of Kant's ablest pupils, in fulfilment of his ambition to give, in a manner compatible with the expression of his own personal views, a systematic exposition of his Master's teaching, published in 1793–1794 the two volumes of his *Erläuternder Auszug aus den kritischen Schriften des H. Prof. Kant.* After this preliminary, more purely expository work, Beck proceeded to recast Kant's teaching in a yet more independent manner. His *Einzig-möglicher Standpunkt, aus welchem die kritische Philosophie beurteilt werden muss* appeared in 1796, and in it many of those very questions with which Kant occupies himself in the *Opus Postumum*, especially those which bear on the doctrine of double affection, are very explicitly discussed. How remarkably he anticipated some of Kant's later views can best be shown by quotation of the following passage:[1]

"If I be asked, how I have come to the representation of the object which I see before me, I reply that the object affects me. The object which I see or touch produces a sensation in me by means of the light or of its impenetrability. Yet at the same time I can also say that the understanding synthesises originatively (*synthesiert ursprünglich*) in the generation of the originative-synthetic objective unity; that in this originative representing I posit a permanent, wherein I represent to myself the time itself, that I posit a something (cause), through which the change of my own subjective state, namely, that I was without this representation and that I had this representation, receives its time-determination. In these statements we are very far from contradicting ourselves. What has to be noted is this: the transcendental thesis, that the understanding originatively posits a something, first gives significance and meaning to the empirical thesis, that the object affects me. For the former is the concept of the originative representing, wherein all the meaning of our concepts must be grounded. Indeed the concept of my understanding, as a faculty in me, even the concept of the 'I' first acquires significance and meaning from this originative positing."

But even more significant of Beck's influence in concentrating Kant's attention upon these particular problems, and incidentally upon the problem as to the extent and character of our apprehension of things in themselves, is Beck's remarkably interesting letter of 20th June 1797,[2] a date, it will be observed, within the period of the *Opus Postumum.* He draws Kant's attention to the now famous passage in Jacobi's dialogue, *David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus*:[3]

[1] Cited by Adickes, p. 611.

[2] *W.* xii. pp. 162-71.

[3] Published 1787. The passage occurs in an Appendix to the dialogue, vol. ii. of Jacobi's *Werke* (1815), p. 304.

"I must confess that this circumstance [viz. that objects make impressions on the senses] has been a stone of stumbling to me (*mich nicht wenig aufgehalten hat*) in my study of the Kantian Philosophy, so that time and again I have been compelled to retrace my steps and to restart the *Critique of Pure Reason* ever anew, since I was always finding myself bewildered in that without this presupposition I could not make entry into the system, and that with this presupposition I could not remain in it."

What, Beck asks Kant, is his reply to this criticism? Beck himself, for reasons which he assigns, definitely holds to the doctrine of empirical affection. The only objects which are known in terms of the categories are physical existences, and they alone, therefore, can be viewed as the causes of our sensations. When an absolute employment is made of the categories, we delude ourselves with the belief that we have concepts of things in themselves, and so fall into error. The concept of the thing in itself is not, he declares, accessible to theoretical philosophy; it belongs exclusively to the moral domain.

Though, unhappily, Kant's reply to this letter has not survived, in the immediately following year similar criticisms were pressed upon him, even more pointedly, by another correspondent, a friend of Beck's, J. H. Tieftrunk. Whence, Tieftrunk enquires,[1] the manifold of sensation?

"Apperception gives only the *degree* (*Grad*), *i.e.* the unity of the synthesis of the perception, and so rests on spontaneity, and is determination of the material of sensibility in accordance with a rule of apperception. Whence then the material? From sensibility? But whence does sensibility have it? From the objects which affect it? But what is that which affects it? What are the objects? Are they things in themselves or—[*sic*]?"

Though spontaneity and receptivity are, Tieftrunk proceeds, two distinct sources of knowledge, they are faculties of one and the same mind, and therefore in correspondence with one another.

"If it be further asked, what affects the mind?—I reply that it affects itself, since it is at once receptivity and spontaneity. . . . But whence is that which sensibility gives out of its own depths, out of itself? Whence has arisen the material and empirical, as such, when I abstract from that which it has become through the influence of spontaneity in accordance with the forms of sensibility? Does sensibility supply it purely out of its own depths, or do things in themselves, which are separate and distinct from the sensibility, give rise to it? I reply: *everything* which sensibility gives—both matter and form—is determined by its nature to be just that for us which

[1] *W.* xii. pp. 215-16; the letter is of the date 5th November 1797.

it is for us. . . . Apart from sensibility and understanding there is neither inner nor outer. . . . But since we cannot avoid asking: what then, independently of all conditions of our sensibility (as regards both form and matter) and of apperception, is the final ground of representations, the answer is: this last ground is for our understanding nothing but a thought of negative character, *i.e.* one to which no object corresponds, but which as a mere thought is not only admissible but necessary, since theoretical reason does not in thinking find itself absolutely limited to what is for us possible experience, and since practical reason can yield grounds for allowing reality to such a thought, though only in its practical bearing. In regard to things in themselves, of which we have only a negative concept, we cannot say: they *affect*, because the concept of affection expresses a real relation between *knowable* beings (*Wesen*), and for its employment it is required that the things so related be given and positively determined. Nor consequently can we say: things in themselves introduce representations of themselves into the mind; for the problematic concept of them is itself only a relating point of representations of the mind, a *Gedankending*. We can know nothing at all save appearances, but in recognising this we at the same time in the thought posit a something which is not appearance, and so through mere logical position leave as it were an empty space for practical knowledge." [1]

We have Kant's reply to this letter; but again, unfortunately, Kant under pressure, as he states, of manifold engagements, does not deal with all of Tieftrunk's questions, and passes over just that question to which we should most wish to have his answer, viz. regarding the source of the material of sensibility. He does indeed speak of the subject as being affected by the object in accordance with its own special constitution, and of the object as therefore being apprehended as it *appears* to us, indirectly, not as it is in itself. This, however, is merely an evasion of Tieftrunk's main question, and does not take us beyond the letter of the *Critique*. Tieftrunk has stated the question so pointedly that Kant cannot have failed to appreciate its importance; and his omission to give a more explicit answer may be taken as signifying that he had none ready; but since this is a problem with which, as the manuscripts of his *Opus Postumum* show, he was in this very year occupying himself, we may reasonably conjecture that Beck's and Tieftrunk's criticisms have contributed thereto. For the present, Kant contents himself with the following statement of his general position:

" . . . objects of the senses (of the outer as well as of the inner sense) can never be known by us save as they appear to us, not as

[1] *W.* xii. pp. 216-17.

they are in themselves. It likewise follows that supersensible objects are not for us objects of our theoretical knowledge. But the Idea of them cannot be dispensed with, at least as problematic (*quaestionis instar*). For the sensible would then be without its counterpart, the supersensible, and that would point to a logical defect in the division. The latter must be regarded as being transcendent for theoretical knowledge, and as belonging to pure, practical knowledge, freed from all empirical conditions, and its place (*Stelle*) as not, therefore, being entirely empty."[1]

Fichte adopted a position very similar to that of Beck, but expounded it in a manner which involved a much more pronounced divergence from orthodox Critical teaching. His *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* appeared in 1794, and his supplementary expositions in the immediately following years. So that already, in the period during which Kant was preparing his *Opus Postumum*, Fichte's Philosophy was the dominant philosophical influence throughout Germany.[2] Though Kant never professed to have studied Fichte's writings with any thoroughness or care, he was more or less conversant with their tendency and main watchwords through intercourse with friends and through the literary journals.[3] When, therefore, we observe how Kant proceeded to transform his old-time doctrine of noumenal affection into a doctrine of self-positing, and to employ a new set of phrases which one and all suggest a type of position closely akin to that for which Beck and Fichte were standing, it is difficult to avoid drawing the conclusion that his choice of terminology was in part determined by his desire to show, in opposition to Beck's theoretical scepticism and to Fichte's absolute idealism, that though the principles of transcendental idealism, when consistently developed, allow of, and indeed demand, some such type of teaching, they do not require, and cannot justify, any departure from the strict letter of the Critical Philosophy —at least not when the teaching of the first *Critique* is supplemented, as he now professes to supplement it, by a more adequate *a priori* deduction of the order of nature, and by more explicit recognition of the two-fold source of "sensory" affection.

There are three other contemporary writers whose influence is discernible in the *Opus Postumum*—G. E. Schulze, D. Tiedemann, and Lichtenberg. Schulze published anonymously in 1792 his *Änesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten*

[1] *W.* xii. p. 224.
[2] Cf. Adamson, *Fichte* (Blackwood Philosophical Series), p. 52.
[3] Cf. *W.* xii. p. 241.

Elementarphilosophie.[1] In this work Schulze attacks Kant's teaching in regard to things in themselves, dwelling upon the inconsistency of combining the assertion of their unknowableness with a doctrine of noumenal affection. He himself holds that hitherto no proof either of the existence or of the non-existence of things in themselves, and no professedly final delimitation of human knowledge has been successfully achieved. Yet his position is not definitely sceptical. He refuses so to anticipate the future as to class these problems as ultimately insoluble.

Tiedemann, on the other hand, upholds a pre-Kantian type of dogmatism. His philosophy, as expounded in his *Theätet oder über das menschliche Wissen: ein Beitrag zur Vernunftkritik* (1794), is eclectic; it combines, in a quite naïve manner, empirical and rationalist elements. He propounds a new conceptual proof of the substantiality and simplicity of the soul, and maintains that things in themselves are knowable—acting upon our organisation, they give rise to sensations which in their extension, figure, motion, force, etc., reveal the actual, independent nature of things in themselves. Kant's idealism he denounces as being indistinguishable from the most extreme subjectivism.

Kant's numerous references, in the *Opus Postumum*, to these two writers show a very strange twofold characteristic. In the first place, as so often happens in his criticisms of other thinkers, he adopts a very external and for the most part quite unjustifiable interpretation of their teaching. He represents both as doubting, and even as denying, the reality of the corporeal world, and so as standing for an idealism of the most extreme "egoistic" and sceptical type. In the second place, in the passages in which he challenges their teaching, the subjectivism of his own doctrine of noumenal self-positing receives the most emphatic expression.

"The object in itself, noumenon, is a mere *Gedankending*, *ens rationis*, in whose representation the subject posits itself. Theätet [*sic*]."[2] "Space is not a *Begriff* (*conceptus*) but *Anschauung* (*intuitus*). As such it is something inhering in the subject not existing outside the subject, and is a whole of a special kind in that it can be represented only as part of a yet greater whole, and therefore as infinite. It is a characteristic of the object which can belong to it only as appearance (quality of the subject) wherein the thinking subject posits itself, and neither an Anesidem nor a Theätet (idealist or egoist) can say anything contrary thereto. . . ."[3] "The first act of thinking contains a principle of the ideality of the object

[1] It was reviewed by Fichte in 1794.

[2] Cited by Adickes, p. 616.

[3] Cited by Adickes, pp. 617-18.

in me and outside me as appearance, *i.e.* of the self-affecting subject in a system of the Ideas which contain merely the formal [factors] of the advance to experience in general (Ănesidem), *i.e.* the transcendental philosophy is an idealism."[1]

The only satisfactory explanation of this very strange combination of unsympathetic criticism with elaboration of a position so remarkably similar to that criticised would seem to be the explanation given above, in regard to Kant's adoption of the terminology of Beck and Fichte. Kant is not, as might at first sight appear, retreating in face of the attacks. He is stealing the enemy's thunder before assaulting their positions. Either, as Adickes suggests, he is entertaining the hope, by a more careful restatement of his fundamental Critical tenets, to bring about reunion of the diverging groups of his disciples, or else he is striving to show that within the scope of his own system even the most extreme assertions urged against it find their place and relative justification, or at least that the new terminology allows of being so interpreted. He could also point out that this terminology is simply a variation upon that which he has himself employed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and especially of the assertion there made, though not developed in any detail, that: "The 'I think' expresses the *actus* whereby I determine my existence."[2] As Adickes persuasively argues: "Had Kant succeeded in completing the *Opus Postumum* and in publishing it in or about 1800, it would without doubt have made an altogether different impression than in 1884 or to-day. Though it could not have reversed what had meantime happened, and could hardly have directed the further developments into other channels, yet it is highly probable that it would have ushered in a surprisingly rich renaissance of his School. Precisely that which nowadays repels us in the *Opus Postumum*, the extravagance of its apriorism and formalism, the extension of the transcendental method over to the content of experience, would probably have then had the contrary effect.[3]

If, on the other hand, we endeavour to estimate the intrinsic philosophical value of the *Opus Postumum*, the verdict must be of a very different character. Under pressure, or as we may perhaps more correctly say, under sanction, of the prevailing tendencies of the time, especially as expressed through the dominating influence of Fichte, Kant in these last years has allowed his *Privat-meinungen* regarding the

[1] Cited by Adickes, p. 625.

[2] B 157 *n.* In this passage we find the term "*setzen*" as well as the term "*bestimmen*," and the sentence: "*Doch macht diese Spontaneität, dass ich mich Intelligenz nenne.*"

[3] Adickes, p. 669.

noumenal activities of the self, as a free and active agent, to obtain expression in a manner out of harmony with the more carefully defined positions of his own best period. For there are certain fairly obvious, and indeed unanswerable, criticisms to which his new teaching lies exposed. How can Kant, while insisting, as he does, that the concept of the thing in itself is a self-posited *ens rationis*, and *not* the thought of any independently existing object, still continue to supplement his doctrine of empirical affection by a doctrine of noumenal affection? How, if all the categories—he is even more explicit as to this in the *Opus Postumum* than in the *Critique of Pure Reason*—be purely formal functions of unity, and therefore meaningless save in their application to an intuitively given material, can they be used to define things in themselves as affecting the self in itself?

Here I find difficulty in accepting Adickes' contention that Kant was able to follow his recalcitrant disciples in their denial of any theoretical knowledge of things in themselves just because he had himself come to assign so large a rôle to the empirical self. If my interpretation, as above given, of Kant's new teaching be correct—it is based upon the evidence which Adickes himself supplies—the doctrine of empirical affection rests upon, and indispensably presupposes, the supplementary doctrine of noumenal affection. The empirical self can empirically apprehend only what the transcendental self has itself determined. We must therefore have the right to postulate, not only that things in themselves affect the self in itself, but also—a much more definite and precise assumption—that the self in itself is capable of creatively producing, out of a manifold which though given is also sufficiently plastic, that phenomenal world wherein the empirical self and physical entities subsist and interact. As I have emphasised, the doctrine of empirical affection by itself, when not thus supported, so far from affording a solution of the problems of knowledge, would have to fall back upon a pre-established harmony wherein the *a priori* additions would be supposed to have been so adjusted that they can be relied upon to reconstruct what is independently real.

Adickes is indeed able, in support of his view, to point to Kant's frequent references, in passages written in the years 1801–1803, to Lichtenberg,[1] whom Kant speaks of as a well-informed though independent disciple, and who did thus combine an empirical realism with denial of all theoretical

[1] G. C. Lichtenberg (1742-1799), physicist and satirical writer. Kant's references are all to the second volume of his *Vermischte Schriften* (edited in nine volumes, 1800–1805, by L. Chr. Lichtenberg and Fr. Fries), which was published in 1801. Cf. Adickes, pp. 149-50, 833.

apprehension of things in themselves. Under the influence of Lichtenberg's enthusiastic references to Spinoza, Kant even goes so far as to depict Spinoza, Schelling, and Lichtenberg as typifying three stages in the development of his own transcendental philosophy: "System of transcendental idealism through Schelling, Spinoza, Lichtenberg—as it were three dimensions: the present, the past, and the future."[1] But these references occurring in that part of Kant's manuscript which fall within the years 1802–1803 are part of the evidence pointing to his increased mental enfeeblement, and are of little weight. If we may judge by the lengthy quotations which Adickes gives[2] from Lichtenberg's work, the latter can have had no real appreciation of what was really fundamental in Kant's system. He was a physicist by profession, and as his attempt to combine, in a confused, eclectic manner, the teachings of Spinoza and of Kant would seem to show, he was really only an amateur in the field of philosophy. His doctrine of knowledge is merely a very usual type of subjectivism, backed by a belief in the existence of unknowable things in themselves. He has no more really genuine understanding of what is fundamental in Kant's Critical teaching than had, say, Schopenhauer, who, some years later, in making his own independent contribution, also laid claim to unpartisan discipleship.[3]

That Kant unwaveringly held to a belief in the existence of things in themselves, and yet likewise denied all possibility of theoretical knowledge[4] of them, cannot be questioned by any student of the *Critique of Pure Reason*; and it is no less clearly the teaching of the *Opus Postumum*. There is, indeed, in the latter work, not only a still greater insistence upon the merely problematic character of the concept of the thing in itself, but also, what is very noticeable, a *complete* absence of any suggestion of what I have entitled the Idealist, or absolutist, view of the nature and function of the Ideas of Reason, and therefore of what is now universally recognised as the only feasible method of justifying the distinction, if it is to be tenable at all, between reality and its appearances, namely, not by way of opposition and contrast, but as a distinction between a whole and the subordinate existences which it conditions.[5] Kant's failure in the *Critique* to show how his distinction between Ideas and categories bears upon

[1] Cited by Adickes, p. 764.
[2] Adickes, pp. 834-9.
[3] Cf. above, pp. 366 *n.*, 407 *n.*
[4] Allowing, that is, for the very definite meaning which he assigns to the term "knowledge," and also for his absolutist view of the function of Reason. Cf. above, pp. lv-lvi, 416, 430.
[5] Cf. above, pp. liv, 414-17, 429-31, 520-1, 558-61.

the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves is, as I have argued, in the body of the *Commentary*,[1] largely due to the predominance throughout the *Dialectic* of his sceptical view of Reason. This sceptical view prevails throughout the *Opus Postumum*, so much so that the contrasting absolutist view—so far as Adickes' quotations disclose —is never, even once, directly stated, though it continues, of course, to be implied in some of the terms employed. But obviously, if the absolutist view of Reason is to be eliminated, the doctrines of noumenal self-positing and of noumenal affection are, *a fortiori*, still less tenable. When, therefore, in the *Opus Postumum* Kant professes, as regards the self in itself, to have knowledge beyond what his Critical principles justify, and so to be able to extend the jurisdiction of his architectonic to the content as well as to the form of experience, the effect is merely to underline the abiding deficiencies of his general teaching. So far as its treatment of these particular problems is concerned, the *Opus Postumum* is mainly valuable as showing how dissatisfied Kant had become with much that is fundamental in his theory of knowledge.

As regards the nature and grounds of his distinction between things in themselves and appearances, the attitude from which Kant never departed, and beyond which — his Idealist view of Reason notwithstanding—he never succeeded in advancing, is adequately presented in the passage already quoted.[2]

"[On the mental origin of the forms of intuition] is grounded the central proposition: objects of the senses (of the outer as well as of the inner) can never be known by us save as they appear to us, not as they are in themselves. It likewise follows that supersensible objects are not for us objects of our theoretical knowledge. But the Idea of them cannot be dispensed with, at least as problematic (*quaestionis instar*). For the sensible would then be left without its counterpart, the supersensible, and that would point to a logical defect in the division. The latter must be regarded as being transcendent for theoretical knowledge, and as belonging to pure, practical knowledge, freed from all empirical conditions, and its place (*Stelle*) as not, therefore, being entirely empty."

(2) The passages dealing with the Idea of God occur almost exclusively[3] in the section which dates from the years 1800–1803, and like the other passages to which I have just been referring, show the extent to which Kant's mind was then preoccupied with Lichtenberg's teaching as expounded in the second volume of his *Vermischte Schriften*. As already

[1] Above, pp. 560-1. [2] Above, pp. 630-1.
[3] For the few references which occur in other sections, cf. Adickes, p. 843.

stated,[1] this volume appeared in 1801. Kant's advance copy, received quite possibly in 1800, is still extant, with his marginal notes.

Kant adopts towards the Idea of God the same attitude as towards the concept of things in themselves, namely, that God undeniably exists, but that in the theoretical domain nothing whatsoever can be established in regard to His reality. These are also Lichtenberg's two main theses. In addition, Lichtenberg dwells at length upon the favourite theme of the Eighteenth Century Deists, that man has no special duties towards God. This Deism is indeed partially modified by Lichtenberg's Spinozistic leanings; but what it thereby gains in depth, it loses in clarity. The following passages are cited by Adickes[2] from Lichtenberg's work:

"There is absolutely no other way of worshipping God than by fulfilling those duties, and by acting in accordance with those laws which reason has prescribed. That there is a God can, in my view, signify only that I feel myself, the freedom of my will notwithstanding, constrained to do right. What further need have we for a God? That He exist [?]. When this further need is made explicit, we are brought, I believe, to Kant's contention: our *heart* does indeed recognise a God, but to make this comprehensible to reason is indeed difficult, if not altogether impossible." "The belief in a God is instinct; it is as natural to men as going upon two legs, but in many men suffers modification, and in others is entirely suppressed. Ordinarily, however, it is there, and is indispensable to the inward completion of the faculty of knowledge." "Religion is really the art whereby, through the thought of God, without any other aid, we provide ourselves with comfort and courage in all our evils, and with strength to stand out against them."

That Kant must already, of his own accord, and in analogy with his treatment of the Idea of the thing in itself, have been inclining to similar teaching is shown by three passages[3] in the earlier, so-called tenth and eleventh, sections which were written (August 1799 to April 1800) prior to Kant's reading of Lichtenberg's work. But these tendencies were quite evidently reinforced, and the methods of statement in part determined, by Lichtenberg's teaching, as is shown by the following passages, all of which are taken from manuscripts of the years 1800–1803:

"The mere idea of God is at the same time a postulate of His existence. To think the Idea and to believe is an identical act."[4]

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[1] Above, p. 634 *n*.

[2] Pp. 837-8.

[3] Cited by Adickes, pp. 828-9. Only the following need be quoted: "God over us, God beside us, God in us. 1. Power and fear. 2. Presence and worship (innermost adoration). 3. Following of his duty as shadow to the light."

[4] Cited by Adickes, p. 776.

The thought of Him is at the same time the belief in Him and in His personality."[1] On the other hand, the concept of God "is not that of a substance, *i.e.* of a thing which exists independently of my thinking, but the Idea (*Selbstgeschöpf*, *Gedankending*, *ens rationis*) of a Reason that constitutes itself into a *Gedankending*, and which propounds synthetic *a priori* judgments in accordance with the principles of Transcendental Philosophy. It is an Ideal of which, since the concept is transcendent, we do not and cannot ask whether such an object exists."[2] "The question: Is there a God? We cannot prove such an object of thought to be a substance outside the subject."[3] God is "the product of our own Reason," "the Ideal of a substance which we ourselves make." To this extent, we are "subjective self-creators."[4] "The proposition: there is a God (for Himself), can be established neither through pure reason nor from empirical sources of knowledge." "It is not Nature in the world that leads to God, *e.g.* through its beautiful ordering, but reversewise." "If we should represent God in accordance with His works, how should we judge Him? *Homo homini lupus*. He reveals His infinite understanding, but not in moral fashion."[5] "God is not a thing subsisting outside me; but my own thought. It is absurd to ask whether a God exists."[6] But Kant, as if to guard himself against misunderstanding, adds that the thought of God is "no invention, *i.e.* no arbitrarily made concept (*conceptus factitius*) but necessarily given (*datus*) to Reason."[7]

In extension of this position, Kant now rejects as being untenable, and as being illegitimately theoretical, the proof of God's existence upon which he has relied in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, namely, by reference to the *Summum Bonum*. Though Kant nowhere, in explicit terms, avows this change of standpoint, or at least does not do so in any passage quoted by Adickes, the whole tenor of his argument is towards substituting a proof of a more strictly moral character, all the emphasis being laid upon the direct relation in which the Idea of God stands to the moral imperative. This new proof Kant tentatively formulates in at least three distinguishable forms.[8]

(1) In one set of passages Kant maintains that the religious interpretation of all duties as divine commands is not a supplementary, later interpretation, but is, for every moral being, immediately and necessarily given together with the apprehension of the duties, *i.e.* the categorical imperative leads directly to God, and affords surety of His reality.

[1] *Loc. cit.*
[2] Cited by Adickes, p. 786.
[3] Cited by Adickes, p. 791.
[4] Cited by Adickes, p. 793.
[5] Cited by Adickes, p. 791.
[6] Cited by Adickes, p. 789.
[7] Cited by Adickes, p. 800.
[8] Adickes, drawing a further distinction within the first formulation, distinguishes four forms. Cf. p. 802 ff.

"In the morally practical Reason lies the categorical imperative, to regard all human duties as divine commands."[1] "The realism of the Idea of God can be proved only through the duty-imperative."[2] "Beings must be thought which, although they exist only in the thoughts of the philosopher, yet in these have morally practical reality. These are God, the world-all, and man as subjected in the world to the duty-concept according to the categorical imperative, which as categorical is also a principle of freedom."[3] "A being which is capable of holding sway over all rational beings in accordance with laws of duty (the categorical imperative), and is justified in so doing, is God. But the existence of such a being can be *postulated* only in a practical reference, namely [in view of] the necessity of so acting as if in the knowledge of all my duties as divine commands (*tanquam non ceu*) I stood under this awful but also at the same time salutary guidance and surety. Accordingly the *existence* of such a being is not postulated in this formula; such postulating would be self-contradictory."[4]

The concluding sentence is far from clear; comparison of it with other passages[5] shows that Kant intends to signify that the certainty obtained of God's existence is a certainty of practical belief, not of theoretical demonstration.

(2) In a second set of passages, Kant makes no reference to the existence of God but only to the Idea of God. But in these passages also, duties are alleged to be apprehensible only as divine commands.

"The categorical imperative of the command of duty is grounded in the Idea of an *imperantis*, who is all-powerful and holds universal sway (formal). This is the Idea of God."[6] "What constrains us to the Idea of God? No empirical concept; no metaphysic. What presents this *a priori* concept is Transcendental Philosophy, the concept of duty."[7] "The imperative of duty proves to men their freedom, and at the same time conducts them to the Idea of God."[8]

(3) In yet another set of passages Kant suggests that God Himself, and not merely the Idea of God as a trans-subjective Being, is immanent in the human spirit.

"God is not a being outside me, but merely a thought in me. God is the morally practical self-legislative Reason. Therefore only

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[1] Cited by Adickes, p. 802. [2] *Loc. cit.*

[3] Cited by Adickes, pp. 788-9.

[4] Cited by Adickes, pp. 802-3. This is one of the passages which Vaihinger (*Philosophie des als ob*, 2nd ed., p. 726) cites in justification of his equating Kant with Nietzsche (cf. above, p. 609). As Adickes points out (p. 803), Vaihinger mistranslates the last sentence by taking the last clause as referring, not to the postulating, but to existence.

[5] Cf. those cited by Adickes, p. 803 ff.

[6] Cited by Adickes, p. 808. [7] *Loc. cit.* [8] *Loc. cit.*

a God in me, about me, and over me."[1]) "The proposition: There is a God says nothing more than: There is in the human morally self-determining Reason a highest principle which determines itself, and finds itself compelled unremittingly to act in accordance with such a principle."[2] "God can be sought only in us."[3] "There is a God, namely, in the Idea of the morally practical Reason which [determines] itself to a continuous oversight as well as guidance of the actions according to *one* principle, like to a Zoroaster."[4]

Kant's reading of the *Zend-Avesta*,[5] and also his reading of Lichtenberg's eulogies of Spinoza, are here in evidence.

"Similarly to the Zoroastrian principle of intuiting all things in God, and of dictating how they should be (like Lichtenberg) and the capacity of thought as inner intuition to develop *out of itself*."[6]

Many of the passages are directed against the view of God as a substance.

"Cosmotheology. It is an object of the morally practical Reason, which contains the principle of all human duties as being divine commands, and yet does not require us to assume a special substance existing outside man."[7] "There is a Being (*Wesen*) in me, which though distinct from me stands to me in relations of causal efficacy, and which, itself free, *i.e.* not dependent upon the law of nature in space and time, inwardly directs me (justifies or condemns), and I, as man, am myself this Being. It is not a substance outside me; and what is strangest of all, the causality is a determination to action in freedom, and not as a necessity of nature."[8] "God must be represented not as substance outside me, but as [the] highest moral principle in me. But indirectly as a power in me (gods do not exist) [it] is the Ideal of power and wisdom in *one* concept; if it is [represented as the Ideal ?] outside me, it is the determining ground of my [? its] omnipresence."[9] "The Idea (not concept) of God is not the concept of a substance. The personality which we ascribe to it, which is also bound up with the singleness of its object (not a plurality of gods" [passage ends abruptly].[10] "The Idea of that which human Reason itself makes out of the World-All is the active representation of God. Not as a special personality, *substance outside me* but as a thought in me."[11]

Clearly Kant's views have undergone considerable change since the writing of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. God is no longer viewed as a Being who must be postulated in order

[1] Cited by Adickes, p. 819.
[2] *Loc. cit.* [3] *Loc. cit.* [4] Cited by Adickes, p. 730.
[5] Cf. above, pp. 609-10. [6] Cited by Adickes, p. 730.
[7] Cited by Adickes, p. 824. [8] Cited by Adickes, pp. 824-5.
[9] Cited by Adickes, p. 826. [10] Cited by Adickes, pp. 826-7.
[11] Cited by Adickes, p. 827.

to make possible the coincidence of virtue with happiness. God speaks with the voice of the categorical imperative, and thereby reveals Himself in a direct manner. But as the passages above quoted also show, this new point of view is suggested merely; it is nowhere developed in a systematic manner; and even as thus suggested, it is formulated in at least three diverse ways.

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