A Commentary
to
Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'

A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'

by
Norman Kemp Smith
Sometime Professor of Logic and Metaphysics
University of Edinburgh

with a new introduction by
Sebastian Gardner
Department of Philosophy
University College London

palgrave
macmillan



Introduction © Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 2003
Remaining material © The Estate of Norman Kemp Smith 1918, 1923, 2003

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First edition published in 1918 by The Macmillan Press Ltd.
Second revised and enlarged edition 1923
Reprinted 1979
This edition 2003
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
Companies and representatives throughout the world

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin 's Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-4039-1504-7 ISBN 978-0-230-59596-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230595965

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Smith, Norman Kemp, 1872–1958.
A commentary to Kant's Critique of pure reason / by Norman Kemp Smith ; with a new introduction by Sebastian Gardner.—2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1–4039–1504–0 (pbk.)
1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724–1804. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. I. Title.

B2779.S5 2003
121—dc21

2003051780

TO THE MEMORY

OF

ROBERT ADAMSON

WISE IN COUNSEL, IN FRIENDSHIP UNFAILING

GRATEFULLY DEDICATED

CONTENTS

[1] Headings not in Kant's Table of Contents are printed in italics.

NOTE

In all references to the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* I have given the original pagings of both the first and second editions. References to Kant's other works are, whenever possible, to the volumes thus far issued in the new Berlin edition. As the *Reflexionen Kant's zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft* had not been published in this edition at the time when the *Commentary* was completed, the numbering given is that of B. Erdmann's edition of 1884.

ABBREVIATIONS

Berlin edition of Kant's works	*W*
Pagings in the first edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*	A
Pagings in the second edition	B
Adickes' edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1889)	*K*

KEMP SMITH'S READING OF KANT'S *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*

Norman Kemp Smith's *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* appeared in 1918, eleven years before his translation of Kant's philosophical masterpiece, and it provided the essential context out of which the translation emerged. Just as the translation has endured, so the *Commentary* belongs, alongside H. J. Paton's equally detailed *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience* (2 vols, 1936) and A. C. Ewing's succinct *A Short Commentary on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (1938), to a small number of English-language works on the *Critique of Pure Reason* written in the first half of the twentieth century that have stood the test of time and become classics of Kant scholarship. The historical period to which Kemp Smith belongs, and which is reflected in his approach to Kant, is of course distinguished from our own in many important respects, but the historical distance has done nothing to dissociate the questions that Kemp Smith raises about Kant from the ones that are raised now, and it remains standard practice to consult Kemp Smith for his view of the matters debated by contemporary Kant commentators.

It goes without saying that a short discussion can hope to give an idea of, but not to do justice to, the richness and fineness of the *Commentary*. What I wish to show here is that the distance at which the contemporary reader stands from the philosophical world in which Kemp Smith composed his *Commentary*, far from reducing the work's relevance, gives it a special value, over and above that which it possesses intrinsically by virtue of its detailed and acute scholarship, and the striking clarity and elegance of Kemp Smith's prose.

British philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century, when Kemp Smith began his philosophical studies, was characterised by the predominance of various forms of idealism that bore a Hegelian stamp: the varied but ultimately unified outlook defended by T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, J. M. McTaggart and Bernard Bosanquet was at the height of its influence.[1] North American philosophy also included important proponents of idealism, such as Josiah Royce. Despite this circumstance of idealism's predominance, Kemp Smith did not find himself in a context of well-developed knowledge and discussion of Kant. Kant's ideas had not at any time settled in a stable form in Britain: throughout

the nineteenth century the native tradition of empiricism had offered strong resistance, and from the days of its initial reception[2] right up to the era of British idealism, Kant's philosophy had been prone to appear through the lenses of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, either subject to their criticisms or partially merged with their doctrines, and no movement comparable to neo-Kantianism in Germany had attempted to retrieve Kant's philosophy by disentangling it from the arguable disfigurements to which his successors had subjected it. To take two important instances: the extensive study of Kant published by Edward Caird in 1889, which comprehensively exposits and reviews the entire Critical system, concludes that Kant's 'fundamental error' was to misunderstand his own philosophical method, which 'is already in itself the dialectical method of Fichte and Hegel', as a consequence of which Kant fails to see that by way of the unity of self-consciousness 'we can go beyond phenomena to their noumenal reality'.[3] Similarly, John Watson's defence of Kant against his nineteenth-century empiricist rivals and detractors, published in the same decade, declares that the *Critique*'s distinction of a 'given manifold' and 'originated forms' is incoherent: it 'has not only no proper justification' but is 'inconsistent with the spirit of the Critical philosophy itself', yields merely 'relative knowledge' and so 'no knowledge at all', 'the great imperfection' in Kant's theory being ultimately 'his want of the idea of development' as it is found in Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.[4]

It is also relevant for an appreciation of the originality of Kemp Smith's undertaking, that the motive for historical study had in any case waned. Although one of the most important steps in the formation of British idealism had consisted in a study of Hegel – James Stirling's *The Secret of Hegel* (1865) – by the late nineteenth century British idealism had become sufficiently established and well developed for its historical origins in Hegel, let alone Kant, to have faded from view: Bradley, McTaggart *et al.* offered their own proofs of idealism; it was not felt, as it surely is now, that the case for absolute idealism is best made through an examination of its great historical proponents.

Thus, although a tradition of study of Kant did exist in the Scottish universities[5] where, excepting a period at Princeton and some visits to Germany, Kemp Smith spent all of his professional life – he studied at St Andrews, held a position at Glasgow and occupied the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in Edinburgh from 1919 to 1945 – no body of English-language Kant scholarship remotely comparable in quantity or complexity to that which now surrounds us had yet been produced, a fact reflected in Kemp Smith's multiple references in his *Commentary* to German secondary literature, in place of sources in English. The *Commentary*, if it did not quite inaugurate systematic scholarship on Kant in the English-speaking world, had little precedent. The Appendix on Kant's *Opus Postumum*, added in the second edition of 1923, on posthumous writings of Kant's that have begun to receive thorough attention in the anglophone world only very recently, again showed Kemp Smith to be a pioneer.

Kemp Smith did not himself subscribe to any of the prevalent 'absolute', Hegelian forms of idealism; he wrote articles on the nature of universals in which he criticised the strongly holistic and monistic idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet.[6] The effect of his contemporary philosophical climate was nonetheless to impress upon him the deep explanatory power of idealist thinking, and to make it possible for him to endorse Kant's claim to have effected an irreversible revolution in metaphysics and philosophical method, and to identify the core of this revolution with idealism. Though well aware of the reaction against idealism represented by his contemporaries Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, and acquainted with the developments gathering pace in early analytic philosophy, Kemp Smith did not recognise in this new movement a serious rival, either substantial or methodological, to the idealist position. Russell and Moore's reasons for rejecting Hegelian idealism, which reflected a general opposition to, or at any rate a minimalist orientation in metaphysics, had little in common with Kemp Smith's criticisms of that position. The contemporaries who engaged Kemp Smith's interest and admiration were instead A. N. Whitehead, Henri Bergson and William James, philosophers who, though not in any sense adherents of German idealism, remained in key respects attuned to its philosophical programme. The exact form of the idealism that should be regarded as issuing from Kant's revolution was in Kemp Smith's view a matter of uncertainty and open to enquiry, and in pursuing his study of Kant, Kemp Smith's aim was twofold: it was in part to rediscover and clarify through historical labour the rationale for the contemporary idealist outlook which he regarded as fundamentally correct, but also and more importantly, he sought to determine precisely what form of idealism should be accepted.[7]

Separating Kemp Smith from the situation of contemporary anglophone Kant commentators is therefore the fact that Kemp Smith had not undergone the sequence of historical experiences that analytic philosophy passed through in the course of the twentieth century, the net effect of which has been, while allowing some aspects of Kant to be highlighted, to reduce the accessibility of Kant's transcendental idealism. Kemp Smith did not have to negotiate his way past the obstacles supplied by positivism's attack on metaphysical propositions, the linguistic turn, and the powerful American-led, pragmatically-orientated forms of philosophical naturalism, in order to take a fundamentally sympathetic view of Kant: for better or worse, he was not under pressure to incorporate into his defence of Kant's achievement an account of how Kant might be read as having anticipated the criticisms implied by logical positivism, linguistic philosophy and pragmatist naturalism. Kemp Smith's historical relation to Kant was in short, in the respects mentioned, more direct than our own.

Kemp Smith's interpretation of Kant is embedded in, and inseparable from, a broader view that he takes of the development of modern philosophy. Kemp Smith made detailed historical studies of Descartes,

Locke, Hume and other modern figures as well as of Kant,[8] and his view of Kant's early modern ancestry is – as the plethora of references to these figures in the *Commentary* shows – essential for understanding why he interprets Kant as he does.

Philosophy made, Kemp Smith believes, a new start with Descartes, by virtue of the fact that the doctrine of the heterogeneity of mind and matter created a new problem of knowledge:[9] How can mind, which is essentially unextended, stand in a cognitive relation to matter, which is essentially extended? This problem was in fact, Kemp Smith holds, a product of a long historical development running up from the Greek stoics' inward turn and discovery of subjectivity, and their institution of an antagonism of man and nature. Augustine had already formulated the doctrine of representative perception propounded by Descartes – the notion that our immediate awareness is restricted to ideas in our minds, which must then, in order for other knowledge to be possible, be determined to bear some appropriate relation, of causality or similitude, to independently existing objects. But the problem had changed between Augustine and Descartes, on account of the new view of matter implied by the results of modern natural science: once matter had been wholly despiritualised and dehumanised, and reduced to a single substance exhibiting only diversified events of motion, it had ceased to be intelligible that we should receive from matter even mere sensations, let alone full-fledged perceptions. The problematic doctrine of representative perception is at the centre of early modern philosophy, on Kemp Smith's interpretation: it is this problem, and not the cogito, which on his view provides the starting point for Descartes' philosophical system. Descartes' solution had however, according to Kemp Smith, aggravated the problem, by fallaciously treating thoughts as, along with perceptions, further *objects* of awareness. Kant does not make this mistake: he accords a quite different role to thought, in the context of a radical recasting of the problem of knowledge.

What Kant's revolution amounts to, in Kemp Smith's view, will be considered shortly. Its effect in any case, Kemp Smith considers, has been to establish the supremacy of idealism over the other two perennial types of philosophy, naturalism and scepticism.[10] Idealism is not therefore, on Kemp Smith's view, a specifically modern invention: he in fact regards idealism – which he defines as a concern to show 'spiritual values' transcend the natural environment, 'have a more than merely human significance' and 'stand on the same plane of objectivity' as empirical truths – as having changed less since classical times than naturalism and scepticism, and as the standpoint that emerges more naturally from philosophical reflection. Though idealism has achieved supremacy, it has not done so independently of its competitors: interaction with naturalism and scepticism has been highly fruitful for the development of idealism, as the case of Kant demonstrates. Nor, Kemp Smith allows, has idealism quite displaced its rivals. Scepticism, after enjoying a period where it flourished in the nineteenth century, in the

positivism of Comte and his successors, has either retired or passed into naturalism, but naturalism has, Kemp Smith concedes, received a new impetus: developments in the human sciences since the nineteenth century have allowed the sphere of values, which was previously accorded due recognition only by idealism, to fall potentially into the orbit of naturalism, which now presents itself as explaining our 'idealistic tendencies' in terms of our 'instinctive equipment' and suchlike, and which may now even grant a degree of validity to human values. Though willing to recognise the existence in *some* sense of values of several sorts, naturalism claims that 'the intellectual values stand apart by themselves': that is to say, in Kantian terms, that naturalism claims the greater and more fundamental reality of theoretical reason in its empirical employment. What finally allows idealism to meet this challenge and to nevertheless maintain its edge over naturalism is, Kemp Smith supposes, here invoking Kant's argument in the *Critique* for the dependence of empirical knowledge on *a priori* conditions, '*the fact that science exists at all*': the fact of scientific knowledge, and that of knowledge in general, is unaccountable naturalistically. This consideration, '*when taken with the other achievements of the human spirit*, in the arts, in the moral, social and religious life', 'outweighs in philosophical significance' the conclusions of naturalistic enquiry, and is enough 'to render intelligible the objective claims of aesthetics and morals': their possession of 'absoluteness' is no more or less mysterious than the fact of theoretical knowledge. On this basis the idealist is justified in retorting that naturalists ultimately 'keep their eyes off the human values': because they 'approach them only through the study of our natural and economic setting', the result is that 'they do not study them at all'.[11]

What this brief summary of Kemp Smith's broader historical and philosophical view shows – revealing a substantial difference from many contemporary anglophone approaches to Kant's theoretical philosophy – is the manner in which Kemp Smith regards idealism, not essentially as a position in theoretical philosophy that may be argued to have axiological pay-offs, but as a position formed essentially by axiological concerns. The motivation for Kant's transcendental analysis of knowledge is bound up from the start with consciousness of value.[12]

The present situation in philosophy being, in Kemp Smith's view, the one described above, the question arises how the *Critique* manages to secure idealism's hegemony. What does Kant's revolution in theoretical philosophy consist in?

One position which may, according to Kemp Smith, be found in the *Critique*, remains within the basic methodological and doctrinal bounds set by Descartes: knowledge is to be accounted for in terms of the subjective contents of individual consciousness, where the criterion for the individuation of subjects is that of an ordinary empirical judgement of personal identity, and the contents in question are prised apart from the existence of the objects which they purport to represent. This

position (summarised on pp. 272–3) accepts the dogmatic assumption that the materials of knowledge are atomic sensations. It infers that space and time, and the categories, since they are not derivable from such data, are supplied by the mind. Mind remains conceived in Cartesian manner as a separate, object-independent entity which precedes knowledge and renders it possible.

This position improves on Cartesian rationalism, Kemp Smith thinks, at least to the extent of substituting for innate ideas the merely empty forms of thought, and of treating the distinction of sense and thought as two elements of, rather than as two modes of, knowledge. Otherwise Kant's position resembles the subjective idealism of Berkeley: each individual creates empirical reality afresh by construction out of sensation, the criterion for objectivity being intersubjective sameness, in a merely qualitative sense of 'same'. The subjectivist outlook is reflected in statements of Kant's such as that 'all objects with which we can occupy ourselves, are one and all in me, that is, are determinations of my identical self' (A129).

There is however also present in the *Critique*, Kemp Smith argues, a quite different position, which contradicts subjectivism by locating the grounds for knowledge outside the consciousness of individual subjects. Kemp Smith calls this – perhaps not altogether felicitously, in view of the reductionist connotation that the term has (now, at any rate) in the philosophy of perception – phenomenalism.[13] Kant's phenomenalism is most clearly located, and distinguished from his subjectivism, in the Transcendental Deduction, especially in its second edition version, and it also comes to the fore in the Refutation of Idealism. The essence of this position is that:

> the generative conditions of experience [...] must fall outside the field of consciousness, and as activities dynamically creative cannot be of the nature of ideas or contents. They are not subconscious ideas but non-conscious processes. They are not the submerged content of experience, but its conditioning grounds. Their most significant characteristic has still, however, to be mentioned. They must no longer be interpreted in subjectivist terms, as originating in the separate existence of an individual self. In conditioning experience they generate the only self for which experience can vouch [...]. (p. 273)

On this view, subject and object are correlative, mutually necessary elements in the unity of experience, from which it follows, Kemp Smith argues, that the self can exist only as an immediately object-conscious being, thereby undermining the doctrine of representative perception. Since it is then as true to assert that nature makes the self possible as that the self creates nature, both mentalistic and materialistic explanations of experience are ruled out. We are thus left with an attitude towards experience that is in one sense purely analytical – we find it to be composed of qualitatively distinct, necessarily interconnected formal

and contentual elements – but *not* in another: Kemp Smith goes beyond the analytic thesis of Strawson's descriptive metaphysics by affirming that what the latter calls our 'conceptual scheme' – for Kemp Smith, the form 'fixed for all experience' (p. xli) – has 'generative', synthetic, trans-phenomenal grounds which in some sense explain it.[14] Our knowledge of these grounds is however circumscribed: Kant's phenomenalism denies, importantly, that philosophical reason is able to penetrate cognition so far as to uncover its complete explanation (that being the thesis of absolute idealism). The conditions of experience are 'in their real nature unknowable by us': we cannot affirm that the transcendental unity of apperception is the source of synthetic processes, nor that these processes are the activities of a noumenal self, and their very characterisation as mental rests on an analogy that may, for all we know, reflect the limitation of our cognitive power (pp. 277–8). Kant's rationalism is thus highly moderate, in comparison with either his Leibnizian predecessors or his idealist successors: he holds that the only grounds of knowledge determinable by us are 'brute conditions' that cannot be shown to possess 'intrinsic necessity' (p. xlii).

The result is a set of double doctrines and systematic ambiguities: the *Critique* contains a 'twofold view' (p. 272) of many central topics, including inner sense, causality, apperception, the scope of the categories, the existence of things in themselves, the status of appearance, and the relation of objects to representations (which the subjectivist Kant identifies and the phenomenalist Kant distinguishes).

It is not entirely clear whether Kemp Smith regards the subjectivist position as free from contradiction or as answering the sceptic. What is certain in any case is that Kant's subjectivism is in Kemp Smith's view inferior to his phenomenalism, in which lies the genuine Copernican revolution: the subjectivist position is not strictly pre-Critical – it is a progressive development within Descartes' framework and it amounts to one 'development of the Critical standpoint' (p. 263) – but it leaves that framework intact, whereas the phenomenalist position reconceptualises human knowledge in a way that places us beyond it.

Why should the *Critique* have this dual character? Kemp Smith explains it, in part, in terms of 'the tentative and experimental character of Kant's own final solutions':

> The arguments of the deduction are only intelligible if viewed as an expression of the conflicting tendencies to which Kant's thought remained subject. He sought to allow due weight to each of the divergent aspects of the experience which he was analysing; and in so doing proceeded, as it would seem, simultaneously along the parallel lines of what appeared to be the possible, alternative methods of explanation. (p. 272)

There is no doubt that Kemp Smith's discernment of phenomenalism as a position present in the *Critique*, and his perception of a sharp and crucial contrast between it and Kant's subjectivism, were enabled and conditioned by his intimate knowledge of the post-Kantian idealist position and his intention to challenge the prevalent Hegelian view, exemplified by Caird and Watson, that Kant's philosophy is an altogether one-sided subjective idealism to which the *only* alternative is absolute idealism. As he writes in *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge* (p. 8):

> Since the time of Kant, and largely through his influence, the uncompromising Berkeleian thesis, that 'material' Nature is mind-dependent, has, indeed, been displaced by what, initially at least, is the more modest, though also usually much less definite, claim that Mind and Nature stand in relations of mutual implication. But even this claim has frequently been urged, especially by thinkers of the Hegelian type, in forms much more ambitious than the needs of an idealist orientation towards life and towards the Universe would seem to demand.

The position located between subjective and absolute idealism which Kemp Smith claims to find in the *Critique*, raises of course many questions, and Kemp Smith does not pretend that Kant gave it final or definitive form (pp. 283–4). One question is whether the position ascribed by Kemp Smith to Kant is not better described as a form of realism.[15] The issue here, of whether idealism once rendered non-subjective ceases to count as idealism, is one that recurs again and again in the interpretation – and self-interpretation – of the post-Kantian idealists: a sign not that Kemp Smith has collapsed the distinction between Kantian and post-Kantian idealism, but an indication of how little further bearing is provided by the labels 'idealist' and 'realist' once the basic Copernican move has established idealism in a basic, foundational sense.

Kemp Smith's characterisation of Kant's method in the *Critique* deserves clarificatory comment, for it may seem to combine two different ways of construing his argument which are often regarded as exclusive. The 'transcendental method', Kemp Smith says, 'is really identical in general character with the hypothetical method of the natural sciences' (p. xliv): we begin by taking knowledge to be something actual, and ask what conditions can account for it; philosophical reflection takes the fact of knowledge as an explanandum and looks for its best explanation. This suggests that Kemp Smith interprets Kant, as some have done, as reaching only *conditional* conclusions, to the effect that, *if* certain (ordinary empirical and/or scientific) knowledge claims are accorded objective validity, *then* certain (transcendental, *a priori*) conditions, which are coherent and in the light of which those knowledge claims would be validated, may, or must, be accepted as their presuppositions. In fact Kemp Smith does not regard this (as Kant refers to it) 'analytic' or 'regressive' method – which, it is often pointed out, leaves the sceptic

unanswered in the respect that the antecedent of the conditional has not been shown to be necessary – as exhausting the *Critique*'s stock of argument. The text is also seen by Kemp Smith (pp. 44–8) as exhibiting a ('synthetic' or 'progressive') form of argument that proceeds from a claim to knowledge that, though neither expressing a logical truth nor deducible from any other proposition, cannot be controverted. This form of argument – 'transcendental arguments', in the sense attributed to Kant by P. F. Strawson and many other interpreters – reaches conclusions that are, if the argument is sound, *unconditional*. The favoured candidate for the premise of Kant's transcendental argumentation, in the reconstructions of Strawson and many others, is some proposition that concerns the self – the claim that I have awareness of myself as a thinker or subject of mental states. Kemp Smith's view (reflecting his interest in Bergson's philosophy) is different: the ultimate premise of the transcendental argumentation that he locates in the *Critique* – most clearly visible in the Analytic of Principles – is mere consciousness of time (see pp. xli, 241–4). The objective validity of space and the categories is deduced as a condition for this ultimate, irrepudiable fact. Kemp Smith's view is therefore that the given 'factual experience' (pp. 238–9) from which the transcendental method sets out consists not of particular and determinate ordinary empirical or scientific cognitions but of a highly general and abstract claim arrived at through their analysis.

I have discussed Kemp Smith so far without mentioning the so-called 'patchwork' theory of the *Critique* (pp. xxviii–xxxiii), which is salient in his *Commentary* and with which his name – along with that of his German predecessor, Hans Vaihinger, whose monumental *Kommentar zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (2 vols, Stuttgart, 1882–92) Kemp Smith was profoundly influenced by and refers to frequently – is strongly associated. Because the patchwork theory has come to be rejected and Kemp Smith's adherence to it (which drew heavy criticism early on from his contemporary H. J. Paton) is not generally viewed as doing him any favours, it is important to emphasise how little difference rejection of the patchwork theory makes to the value of his *Commentary*.

The term 'patchwork theory' is used commonly to encompass three claims: one concerning the text as an articulation of a philosophical position, one that concerns its process of composition, and one that defines the proper method of its interpretation. The philosophical claim is that the *Critique of Pure Reason* contains deep inconsistencies which no amount of exegetical ingenuity can remove or palliate, and which need to be interpreted as reflecting directly two different and conflicting philosophical positions, as explained above. The compositional claim is that the co-existence of these two positions in the one work is to be explained in part by the circumstances of Kant's authorship: namely the rapidity with which Kant – responding to the urgings of friends and perhaps with a sense of urgency derived from awareness of his own numbered days – welded into a single document the numerous manu-

scripts and drafts of different sections which had been composed over a very long period – well over a decade – in the course of which his views had developed and altered substantially. The methodological claim is that one does best to read the *Critique* with a view to assigning different sections and passages within sections to different phases of composition, as a palimpsest.

The compositional claim is not convincing, if for no other reason than that the evidence of all Kant's other writings, including those of his final years, when the pressure of mortality was certainly on his mind, counts against imputing to Kant the literary disposition implied by Kemp Smith's conjecture. In addition, the fact that the long interval between the first and second editions of the *Critique* gave Kant the opportunity to straighten out its doctrines but did not do so – Kemp Smith regards the second edition as giving more prominence to the proper Critical view, but he does not align his subjectivist and phenomenalist Kants with the first and second editions respectively – speaks against the hypothesis. The basis for the third, methodological claim – which is in any case undermined by the difficulty, which is greater than Kemp Smith supposes, of assigning dates to passages – is thereby removed.

The philosophical claim, however, is the one that really matters for the lasting interest of Kemp Smith's *Commentary*, and it is independent of the compositional and methodological claims. Kemp Smith does not, after all, dispute that Kant did regard the *Critique* as expressing a unified philosophical whole, and he has, as we have seen, an explanation for why Kant was mistaken in thinking this which does not rely on his compositional conjecture. Kemp Smith's supposition is that the only way of according to Kant a position that improves significantly upon subjective idealism, yet which will not slide into absolute idealism, is by drawing a line within the text between an earlier and inferior, and a later and superior position; this partial truncation is the price to be paid for Kant's philosophical stability. To anyone who rejects Kemp Smith's policy, his dual-position reading of Kant stands as an open challenge: to provide an interpretation of Kant which shows the *Critique* to be a finished philosophical whole that is neither merely the closing chapter of the early modern philosophical story, nor merely the seed of late modern systems.[16]

SEBASTIAN GARDNER
LONDON

Notes

1. A good idea of the situation can be got from Peter Robbins, *The British Hegelians 1875–1925* (New York: Garland, 1982), and Peter Hylton, *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1990), Part I.
2. The early years of British Kant reception are documented in Guiseppe Micheli, 'The early reception of Kant's thought in England 1785–1805', in George MacDonald Ross and Tony McWalter eds, *Kant and His Influence* (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1990), and René Wellek, *Immanuel Kant in England 1793–1838* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1931). Wellek concludes (pp. 260–1): 'we cannot help noticing one common trait which seems to characterize the England of the early nineteenth century: all the thinkers who had a positive relation to Kant, somehow managed to put him back into the framework of English tradition and English orthodoxy. With none of them Kant succeeded in breaking or changing their traditional turn of mind'.

3. *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, 2 vols (Glasgow: Macleshose, 1889), vol. 2, pp. 640–1, 643.
4. *Kant and His English Critics: A Comparison of Critical and Empiricist Philosophy* (Glasgow: Macleshose, 1881), pp. 331, 337, 341. T. H. Green's 'Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant' (in *Works*, 3rd edn, ed. R. L. Nettleship (London: Longman, 1893), vol. 2, pp. 2–155) were published in 1886 but tend, like Caird and Watson, to a critical Hegelian view of Kant. William Wallace's *Kant* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1882) belongs also to the period but is mainly biographical, containing only two short chapters on the first *Critique*. One notable voice of dissent – a source of loosely Kantian criticism of Hegel – was A. S. Pringle-Pattison, Kemp Smith's predecessor at Edinburgh. Pringle-Pattison did not however clarify Kant's doctrines significantly.
5. The special relation of Scotland with Kant is attributable to, first, the earlier development of the Scottish universities than the English, and second, the two-way relation of influence between Scottish common sense realism and Germany from the mid-eighteenth century: see Manfred Kuehn, *Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768–1800: A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy* (Kingston: McGill–Queen's University Press, 1987), and 'Hamilton's reading of Kant: a chapter in the early Scottish reception of Kant's thought', in Ross and McWalter eds, *Kant and His Influence*.
6. 'The nature of universals', I, II and III, in *The Credibility of Divine Existence: The Collected Papers of Norman Kemp Smith*, ed. A. J. D. Porteous, R. D. MacLennon and G. E. Davie (London: Macmillan, 1967).
7. Kemp Smith did not publish a full statement of his own idealism. His *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge* (London: Macmillan, 1924) deals only with perception of the outer world. The papers collected in *The Credibility of Divine Existence* give indications of his more general position, sketched in the essay in that volume by G. E. Davie, 'The significance of the philosophical papers'. For whatever reason, Kemp Smith appears to have chosen overall to remain within the sphere scholarship: see A. J. D. Porteous, 'Biographical sketch', in op. cit., pp. 26–7.
8. Norman Kemp Smith, *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1902), *The Philosophy of Hume: A Critical Study of its Origins and Central Doctrines* (London: Macmillan, 1941), *New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes* (London: Macmillan, 1952), and 'John Locke', in *The Credibility of Divine Existence*.
9. See *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy*, esp. Chs 1, 7. Kemp Smith's historical view here bears a marked resemblance to John McDowell's diagnosis of the role played by science's 'disenchantment' of nature in forming our present epistemological predicament, in *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
10. See Norman Kemp Smith, 'The present situation in philosophy', Inaugural Lecture, University of Edinburgh 1919 (Edinburgh: James Thin, 1919).
11. Op. cit., pp. 19, 27–8.
12. See p. xxxix. Kemp Smith pursued this view with respect to other figures, arguing in the case of Hume that the key to his philosophy lies not in the empiricist tenets announced at the opening of the *Treatise* but in his Hutchesonian view of ethical consciousness as based on feeling, and that the true Locke, as opposed to the Locke refashioned by the French Enlightenment, gave epistemological priority to the absolute cognition of ethics and natural theology. Also note in this connection the

(neo-Kantian) claim, on pp. lix–lx, that, for Kant, philosophy as such deals with problems of value, the *Critique* being concerned specifically with 'the logical values'.

13. Alternative appellations considered by Kemp Smith are 'Critical idealism' and 'objective idealism' (p. 274).
14. Clarifying the issue which separates these two views of what transcendental philosophy must claim, see Mark Sacks, *Objectivity and Insight* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Ch. 6.
15. A. C. Ewing suggests as much in the Introduction to his *Idealisms: A Critical Survey* (London: Methuen, 1934). The same question arises regarding the position Kemp Smith takes on perception in his *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge*, where he seeks to incorporate into idealism the naturalistic idea of a causal relation due to an independently existing object. Kemp Smith is classified by some as a 'Critical realist', alongside Robert Adamson, his mentor at Glasgow.
16. As an illustration of how the issue with which Kemp Smith's reading of Kant is most intensely preoccupied remains central to Kant scholarship, and as an index of Kemp Smith's continuing relevance, see Frederick Beiser's recent, ground-breaking work, *German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1871–1801* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), Part I. Beiser discusses Kemp Smith on pp. 58–9, 164–5, 209.

Publisher's Note

In the main body of the text, page numbers in Roman numerals refer to those of the 1923 edition.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

I AM indebted to Baron von Hügel, Professor Joachim, and Professor Ward for a large number of corrections and criticisms. These have enabled me to make many needed revisions. Use has also been made of Professor Adickes' elaborate and valuable work, *Kants Opus Postumum dargestellt und beurteilt*, published in 1920. As it sets Kant's views during the period 1797–1803 in quite a new light, I have added an Appendix in which they are discussed in their bearing upon his teaching in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

NORMAN KEMP SMITH.

EDINBURGH, *June* 1923.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

THE *Critique of Pure Reason* is more obscure and difficult than even a metaphysical treatise has any right to be. The difficulties are not merely due to defects of exposition; they multiply rather than diminish upon detailed study; and, as I shall endeavour to show in this *Commentary*, are traceable to two main causes, the composite nature of the text, written at various dates throughout the period 1769–1780, and the conflicting tendencies of Kant's own thinking.

The *Commentary* is both expository and critical; and in exposition no less than in criticism I have sought to subordinate the treatment of textual questions and of minor issues to the systematic discussion of the central problems. Full use is made of the various selections from Kant's private papers that have appeared, at intervals, since the publication of his *Lectures on Metaphysics* in 1821. Their significance has not hitherto been generally recognised in English books upon Kant. They seem to me to be of capital importance for the right understanding of the *Critique*.

Some apology is perhaps required for publishing a work of this character at the present moment. It was completed, and arrangements made for its publication, shortly before the outbreak of war. The printers have, I understand, found in it a useful stop-gap to occupy them in the intervals of more pressing work; and now that the type must be released, I trust that in spite of, or even because of, the overwhelming preoccupations of the war, there may be some few readers to whom the volume may be not unwelcome. That even amidst the distractions of actual campaigning metaphysical speculation can serve as a refuge and a solace is shown by the memorable example of General Smuts. He has himself told us that on his raid into Cape Colony in the South African War he carried with him for evening reading the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Is it surprising that our British generals, pitted against so unconventional an opponent, should have been worsted in the battle of wits?

The *Critique of Pure Reason* is a philosophical classic which marks a turning-point in the history of philosophy, and no interpretation, even though now attempted after the lapse of a hundred years, can hope to be adequate or final. Some things are clearer to us than they were to Kant's contemporaries; in other essential ways our point of view has receded from his, and the historical record, that should determine our

judgments, is far from complete. But there is a further difficulty of an even more serious character. The *Critique* deals with issues which are still controversial, and their interpretation is possible only from a definite standpoint. The limitations of this standpoint and of the philosophical *milieu* in which it has been acquired unavoidably intervene to distort or obscure our apprehension of the text. Arbitrary and merely personal judgments I have, however, endeavoured to avoid. My sole aim has been to reach, as far as may prove feasible, an unbiased understanding of Kant's great work.

Among German commentators I owe most to Vaihinger, Adickes, B. Erdmann, Cohen, and Riehl, especially to the first named. The chief English writers upon Kant are Green, Caird, and Adamson. In so far as Green and Caird treat the Critical philosophy as a half-way stage to the Hegelian standpoint I find myself frequently in disagreement with them; but my indebtedness to their writings is much greater than my occasional criticisms of their views may seem to imply. With Robert Adamson I enjoyed the privilege of personal discussions at a time when his earlier view of Kant's teaching was undergoing revision in a more radical manner than is apparent even in his posthumously published University lectures. To the stimulus of his suggestions the writing of this *Commentary* is largely due.

My first study of the *Critique* was under the genial and inspiring guidance of Sir Henry Jones. With characteristic kindliness he has read through my manuscript and has disclosed to me many defects of exposition and argument. The same service has been rendered me by Professor G. Dawes Hicks, whose criticisms have been very valuable, particularly since they come from a student of Kant who on many fundamental points takes an opposite view from my own.

I have also to thank my colleague, Professor Oswald Veblen, for much helpful discussion of Kant's doctrines of space and time, and of mathematical reasoning.

Mr. H. H. Joachim has read the entire proofs, and I have made frequent modifications to meet his very searching criticisms. I have also gratefully adopted his revisions of my translations from the *Critique*. Similar acknowledgments are due to my colleague, Professor A. A. Bowman, and to my friend Dr. C. W. Hendel.

I have in preparation a translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and am responsible for the translations of all passages given in the present work. In quoting from Kant's other writings, I have made use of the renderings of Abbott, Bernard, and Mahaffy; but have occasionally allowed myself the liberty of introducing alterations.

Should readers who are already well acquainted with the *Critique* desire to use my *Commentary* for its systematic discussions of Kant's teaching, rather than as an accompaniment to their study of the text, I may refer them to those sections which receive italicised headings in the table of contents.

NORMAN KEMP SMITH.

LONDON, *January* 1918.

INTRODUCTION

I. TEXTUAL

KANT'S METHOD OF COMPOSING THE 'CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON'

SELDOM, in the history of literature, has a work been more conscientiously and deliberately thought out, or more hastily thrown together, than the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The following is the account which Kant in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn (August 16, 1783) has given of its composition:

"[Though the *Critique* is] the outcome of reflection which had occupied me for a period of at least twelve years, I brought it to completion in the greatest haste within some four to five months, giving the closest attention to the content, but with little thought of the exposition or of rendering it easy of comprehension by the reader—a decision which I have never regretted, since otherwise, had I any longer delayed, and sought to give it a more popular form, the work would probably never have been completed at all. This defect can, however, be gradually removed, now that the work exists in a rough form."[1]

These statements must be allowed the greater weight as Kant, in another letter (to Garve, August 7, 1783), has given them in almost the same words:

"I freely admit that I have not expected that my book should meet with an immediate favourable reception. The exposition of the materials which for more than twelve successive years I had been carefully maturing, was not composed in a sufficiently suitable manner for general comprehension. For the perfecting of its exposition several years would have been required, whereas I brought it to completion in some four to five months, in the fear that, on longer delay, so prolonged a labour might finally become burdensome, and that my increasing years (I am already in my sixtieth year) would perhaps incapacitate me, while I am still the sole possessor of my complete system."[2]

The twelve years here referred to are 1769–1780; the phrase "at least twelve years" indicates Kant's appreciation of the continuity of his mental development. Hume's first influence upon Kant is probably to

[1] *W.* x. p. 323.
[2] *W.* x. p. 316.

be dated prior to 1760. The choice, however, of the year 1769 is not arbitrary; it is the year of Kant's adoption of the semi-Critical position recorded in the *Inaugural Dissertation* (1770).[1] The "four to five months" may be dated in the latter half of 1780. The printing of the *Critique* was probably commenced in December or January 1780–1781.

But the *Critique* is not merely defective in clearness or popularity of exposition. That is a common failing of metaphysical treatises, especially when they are in the German language, and might pass without special remark. What is much more serious, is that Kant flatly contradicts himself in almost every chapter; and that there is hardly a technical term which is not employed by him in a variety of different and conflicting senses. As a writer, he is the least exact of all the great thinkers.

So obvious are these inconsistencies that every commentator has felt constrained to offer some explanation of their occurrence. Thus Caird has asserted that Kant opens his exposition from the non-Critical standpoint of ordinary consciousness, and that he discloses the final position, towards which he has all along been working, only through repeated modifications of his preliminary statements. Such a view, however, cannot account either for the specific manner of occurrence or for the actual character of the contradictions of which the *Critique* affords so many examples. These are by no means limited to the opening sections of its main divisions; and careful examination of the text shows that they have no such merely expository origin. The publication of Kant's *Reflexionen* and *Lose Blätter*, and the devoted labours of Benno Erdmann, Vaihinger, Adickes, Reicke and others, have, indeed, placed the issue upon an entirely new plane. It can now be proved that the *Critique* is not a unitary work, and that in the five months in which, as Kant tells us, it was "brought to completion" (*zu Stande gebrachf*), it was not actually written, but was pieced together by the combining of manuscripts written at various dates throughout the period 1769–1780.

Kant's correspondence in these years contains the repeated assertion that he expected to be able to complete the work within some three or six months. This implies that it was already in great part committed to writing. In 1780 Kant must therefore have had a large body of manuscript at his disposal. The recently published *Lose Blätter* are, indeed, part of it. And as we shall have constant occasion to observe, the *Critique* affords ample evidence of having been more or less mechanically constructed through the piecing together of older manuscript, supplemented, no doubt, by the insertion of connecting links, and modified by occasional alterations to suit the new context. Kant, it would almost seem, objected to nothing so much as the sacrifice of an argument once consecrated by committal to paper. If it could be inserted, no matter at what cost of repetition, or even confusion, he insisted upon its insertion. Thus the *Subjective* and *Objective Deductions* of the first edition can, as we shall find, be broken up into at least four distinct

[1] Cf. Kant's letter to Lambert, September 2, 1770: *W.* x. p. 93.

layers, which, like geological strata, remain to the bewilderment of the reader who naturally expects a unified system, but to the enlightenment of the student, once the clues that serve to identify and to date them have been detected. To cite another example: in the *Second Analogy*, as given in the first edition, the main thesis is demonstrated in no less than five distinct proofs, some of which are repetitions; and when Kant restated the argument in the second edition, he allowed the five proofs to remain, but superimposed still another upon them. Kant does, indeed, in the second edition omit some few passages from various parts of the *Critique*; but this is in the main owing to his desire to protect himself against serious misunderstanding to which, as he found, he had very unguardedly laid himself open. The alterations of the second edition are chiefly of the nature of additions.

Adickes' theory[1] that Kant in the "four to five months" composed a brief outline of his entire argument, and that it was upon the framework of this outline that the *Critique* was elaborated out of the older manuscript, may possibly be correct. It has certainly enabled Adickes to cast much light upon many textual problems. But his own supplementary hypothesis in regard to the section on the *Antinomies*, namely, that it formed an older and separate treatise, may very profitably be further extended. Surely it is unlikely that with the expectation, continued over many years, of completion within a few months, Kant did not possess, at least for *the Aesthetic, Dialectic,* and *Methodology*, a general outline, that dated further back than 1780. And doubtless this outline was itself altered, patched, and recast, in proportion as insight into the problems of the *Analytic*, the problems, that is to say, which caused publication to be so long deferred, deepened and took final form.

The composite character of the *Critique* is largely concealed by the highly elaborate, and extremely artificial, arrangement of its parts. To the general plan, based upon professedly logical principles, Kant has himself given the title, architectonic; and he carries it out with a thoroughness to which all other considerations, and even at times those of sound reasoning, are made to give way. Indeed, he clings to it with the unreasoning affection which not infrequently attaches to a favourite hobby. He lovingly elaborates even its minor detail, and is rewarded by a framework so extremely complicated that the most heterogeneous contents can be tidily arranged, side by side, in its many compartments. By its uniformity and rigour it gives the appearance of systematic order even when such order is wholly absent.

But we have still to consider the chief reason for the contradictory character of the contents of the *Critique*. It is inseparably bound up with what may perhaps be regarded as Kant's supreme merit as a philosophical thinker, especially as shown in the first *Critique*,—namely, his open-minded recognition of the complexity of his problems, and of the many difficulties which lie in the way of any solution which he is

[1] Embodied in his edition of the *Kritik* (1889).

himself able to propound. Kant's method of working seems to have consisted in alternating between the various possible solutions, developing each in turn, in the hope that some midway position, which would share in the merits of all, might finally disclose itself. When, as frequently happened, such a midway solution could not be found, he developed his thought along the parallel lines of the alternative views.

"You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. . . . Long experience has taught me that insight into a subject which I am seeking to master is not to be forced, or even hastened, by sheer effort, but demands a fairly prolonged period during which I return again and again to the same concepts, viewing them in all their aspects and in their widest possible connections, while in the intervals the sceptical spirit awakens, and makes trial whether my conclusions can withstand a searching criticism."[1] "In mental labour of so delicate a character nothing is more harmful than preoccupation with extraneous matters. The mind, though not constantly on the stretch, must still, alike in its idle and in its favourable moments, lie uninterruptedly open to any chance suggestion which may present itself. Relaxations and diversions must maintain its powers in freedom and mobility, so that it may be enabled to view the object afresh from every side, and so to enlarge its point of view from a microscopic to a universal outlook that it adopts in turn every conceivable standpoint, verifying the observations of each by means of all the others."[2] "I am not of the opinion of the well-meaning writer who has recommended us never to allow doubts in regard to a matter upon which we have once made up our minds. In pure philosophy that is not feasible. Indeed the understanding has in itself a natural objection to any such procedure. We must consider propositions in all their various applications; even when they may not seem to require a special proof, we must make trial of their opposites, and in this way fight for delay, until the truth becomes in all respects evident."[3]

That these are no mere pious expressions of good intention, but represent Kant's actual method of working, is amply proved by the contents of the *Critique*. We find Kant constantly alternating between opposed standpoints, to no one of which he quite definitely commits himself, and constantly restating his principles in the effort to remove the objections to which, as he recognises, they continue to lie open. The *Critique*, as already stated, is not the exposition of a single unified system, but is the record of Kant's manifold attempts to formulate and to solve his many-sided problems. Even those portions of the *Critique* which embody his latest views show that Kant is still unwilling to sacrifice insight to consistency. When he is guilty of special pleading—for he cannot be altogether absolved even from that charge—it is in the interests of his logical architectonic, for which, as I have said, he

[1] From letter to Marcus Herz, June 7, 1777: *W.* x. pp. 116–17.
[2] From letter to Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772: *W. x.* p. 127.
[3] *Reflexionen* ii. 5.

cherishes a quite unreasoning affection, and not of his central principles. So far from concealing difficulties, or unduly dwelling upon the favouring considerations, Kant himself emphasises the outstanding objections to which his conclusions remain subject. If his teaching is on certain points very definite, it is in other hardly less important respects largely tentative.

The value of Kant's *Critique* as an introduction to modern philosophy is greatly enhanced by this method of procedure. The student who has steeped himself in the atmosphere of the *Critique*, however dissatisfied he may perhaps be with many of its doctrines, has become familiar with the main requirements which a really adequate metaphysics must fulfil, or at least will have acquired a due sense of the complexity of the problems with which it deals.

Recognition of the composite nature of the text will safeguard us in two ways. In the first place, citation of single passages is quite inconclusive. Not only must all the relevant passages be collated; they must be interpreted in the light of an historical understanding of the various stages in Kant's development. We must also be prepared to find that on certain main questions Kant hesitates between opposed positions, and that he nowhere definitively commits himself to any quite final expression of view.

Secondly, we cannot proceed on the assumption that Kant's maturest teaching comes where, had the *Critique* been a unitary work, composed upon a definite and previously thought out plan, we should naturally expect to find it, namely, in its concluding portions. The teaching of much of the *Dialectic*, especially in its account of the nature of the phenomenal world and of its relation to the knowing mind, is only semi-Critical. This is also true of Kant's *Introduction* to the *Critique*. Introductions are usually written last; and probably Kant's *Introduction* was written after the completion of the *Aesthetic*, of the *Dialectic*, and of the *Analytic* in its earlier forms. But it bears all the signs of having been composed prior to the working out of several of his most characteristic doctrines in the central parts of the *Analytic*.

Thus both Kant's introductory statements of the aims and purposes of the *Critique*, and his application of his results in the solution of metaphysical problems, fail to represent in any adequate fashion the new and revolutionary principles to which he very gradually but successfully worked his way. The key to the *Critique* is given in the central portions of the *Analytic*, especially in the *Deduction of the Categories*. The other parts of the *Critique* reveal the Critical doctrines only as gradually emerging from the entangling influence of pre-Critical assumptions. Their teaching has to be radically remodelled before they can be made to harmonise with what, in view both of their intrinsic character and of the corresponding alterations in the second edition, must be regarded as Kant's maturest utterances.

This was a task which Kant never himself attempted. For no sooner had he attained to comparative clearness in regard to his new Critical

principles and briefly expounded them in the *Analytic* of the first edition, than he hastened to apply them in the spheres of morality, aesthetics, and teleology. When the *Critique* appeared in 1781 he was fifty-seven years of age; and he seems to have feared that if he allowed these purely theoretical problems, which had already occupied his main attention for "at least twelve years," to detain him longer, he would be debarred from developing and placing on permanent record the new metaphysics of ethics which, as the references in the first *Critique* show, had already begun to shape itself in his mind. To have expended further energy upon the perfecting of his theoretical philosophy would have endangered its own best fruits. Even the opportunity in 1787 of a second edition of the *Critique* he used very sparingly, altering or adding only where occasional current criticism—his puzzled contemporaries having still for the most part maintained a discreet silence—had clearly shown that his modes of exposition were incomplete or misleading.

II. HISTORICAL

KANT'S RELATION TO HUME AND TO LEIBNIZ

Kant's manner of formulating his fundamental problem—How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?—may well seem to the modern reader to imply an unduly scholastic and extremely rationalistic method of approach. Kant's reasons for adopting it have, unfortunately, been largely obscured, owing to the mistaken interpretation which has usually been given to certain of his personal utterances. They have been supposed to prove that the immediate occasion of the above formula was Hume's discussion of the problem of causality in the *Enquiry into the Human Understanding*. Kant, it is argued, could not have been acquainted with Hume's earlier and more elaborate *Treatise on Human Nature*, of which there was then no translation; and his references to Hume must therefore concern only the later work.

Vaihinger has done valuable service in disputing this reading of Kant's autobiographical statements. Kant does not himself make direct mention of the *Enquiry*, and the passages in the *Critique* and in the *Prolegomena*[1] in which Hume's teaching is under consideration seem rather to point to the wider argument of the *Treatise*. This is a matter of no small importance; for if Vaihinger's view can be established, it will enable us to appreciate, in a manner otherwise impossible, how Kant should have come to regard the problem of *a priori synthesis* as being the most pressing question in the entire field of speculative philosophy.

The essential difference between the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry*, from the standpoint of their bearing upon Critical issues, lies in the wider scope and more radical character of the earlier work. The *Enquiry*

[1] These passages are by no means unambiguous, and are commented upon below, p. 61 ff.

discusses the problem of causality only in the form in which it emerges in *particular* causal judgments, *i.e.* as to our grounds for asserting that this or that effect is due to this or that cause. In the *Treatise*, Hume raises the broader question as to our right to postulate that events must always be causally determined. In other words, he there questions the validity of the *universal* causal principle, that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence; and he does so on the explicit ground that it demands as necessary the connecting of two concepts, that of an event and that of an antecedent cause, between which *no connection of any kind* can be detected by the mind. The principle, that is to say, is not self-evident; it is synthetic. The concept of an event and the concept of a cause are quite separate and distinct ideas. Events can be conceived without our requiring to think antecedent events upon which they are dependent. Nor is the principle capable of demonstration. For if it be objected that in questioning its validity we are committing ourselves to the impossible assertion that events arise out of nothing, such argument is only applicable if the principle be previously granted. If events do not require a cause, it is as little necessary to seek their source in a generation out of nothing as in anything positive. Similarly, when it is argued that as all the parts of time and space are uniform, there must be a cause determining an event to happen at one moment and in one place rather than at some other time or place, the principle is again assumed. There is no greater difficulty in supposing the time and place to be fixed without a cause than in supposing the existence to be so determined. The principle, Hume concludes, is non-rational in character. It is an instrument useful for the organisation of experience; and for that reason nature has determined us to its formation and acceptance. Properly viewed, it expresses a merely instinctive belief, and is explicable only in the naturalistic manner of our other propensities, as necessary to the fulfilling of some practical need. "Nature has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel."

From this naturalistic position Hume makes a no less vigorous attack upon the empirical philosophies which profess to establish general principles by inductive inference from the facts of experience. If the principles which lie at the basis of our experience are non-rational in character, the same must be true of our empirical judgments. They may correctly describe the uniformities that have hitherto occurred in the sequences of our sensations, and may express the natural expectations to which they spontaneously give rise; but they must never be regarded as capable of serving as a basis for inference. In eliminating *a priori* principles, and appealing exclusively to sense-experience, the empiricist removes all grounds of distinction between inductive inference and custom-bred expectation. And since from this standpoint the possibility of universal or abstract concepts—so Hume argues—must also be denied, deductive inference must likewise be eliminated from among the possible instruments at the disposal of the mind. So-called inference is never the source of our beliefs; it is our fundamental natural beliefs,

as determined by the constitution of our nature in its reaction upon external influences, that generate those expectations which, however they may masquerade in logical costume, have as purely natural a source as our sensations and feelings. Such, briefly and dogmatically stated, is the sum and substance of Hume's teaching.[1]

Now it was these considerations that, as it would seem, awakened Kant to the problem of *a priori* synthesis. He was, and to the very last remained, in entire agreement with Hume's contention that the principle of causality is neither self-evident nor capable of logical demonstration, and he at once realised that what is true of this principle must also hold of all the other principles fundamental to science and philosophy. Kant further agreed that inductive inference from the data of experience is only possible upon the prior acceptance of rational principles independently established; and that we may not, therefore, look to experience for proof of their validity. Thus with the rejection of self-evidence as a feature of the *a priori*, and with the consequent admission of its synthetic character, Kant is compelled to acquiesce in the inevitableness of the dilemma which Hume propounds. Either Hume's sceptical conclusions must be accepted, or we must be able to point to some criterion which is not subject to the defects of the rationalist and empirical methods of proof, and which is adequate to determine the validity or invalidity of general principles. Is there any such alternative ? Such is Kant's problem as expressed in the formula: How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?

It is a very remarkable historical fact that notwithstanding the clearness and cogency of Hume's argument, and the appearance of such competent thinkers as Thomas Reid in Scotland, Lambert and Crusius in Germany, no less than thirty years should have elapsed before Hume found a single reader capable of appreciating the teaching of the *Treatise* at its true value.[2] Even Kant himself was not able from his reading of the *Enquiry* in 1756–1762 to realise the importance and bearing of the main problem.[3] Though in the *Enquiry* the wider issue regarding the general principle of causality is not raised, the bearing of Hume's discussion, when interpreted in the light of Kant's own teaching, is sufficiently clear; and accordingly we cannot be absolutely certain that it was not a re-reading of the *Enquiry* or a recalling of its argument[1] that

[1] For justification of this interpretation of Hume I must refer the reader to my articles on "The Naturalism of Hume" in *Mind*, vol. xiv. N.S. pp. 149–73, 335–47.

[2] To this fact Kant himself draws attention: "But the perpetual hard fate of metaphysics would not allow Hume to be understood. We cannot without a certain sense of pain consider how utterly his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and even Priestley, missed the point of the problem. For while they were ever assuming as conceded what he doubted, and demonstrating with eagerness and often with arrogance what he never thought of disputing, they so overlooked his inclination towards a better state of things, that everything remained undisturbed in its old condition."—*Prolegomena*, p. 6; Mahaffy and Bernard's trans, p. 5.

[3] Sulzer's translation of Hume's *Essays* (including the *Enquiries*) appeared in 1754–56.

suggested to Kant the central problem of his Critical philosophy. The probability, however, is rather that this awakening took place only indirectly through his becoming acquainted with the wider argument of the *Treatise* as revealed in James Beattie's extremely crude and unsympathetic criticism of Hume's philosophy.[2] Beattie had great natural ability, and considerable literary power. His prose writings have a lucidity, a crispness, and a felicity of illustration which go far to explain their widespread popularity in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Their literary quality is, however, more than counterbalanced by the absence of any genuine appreciation of the deeper, speculative implications and consequences of the problems discussed. And this being so, he is naturally at his worst in criticising Hume. In insisting, as he does, upon the absurd practical results[3] that would follow from the adoption of Hume's sceptical conclusions, he is merely exploiting popular prejudice in the philosophical arena. That, however, may be forgiven him, if, as would seem to be the case, the quotations which he gives verbatim from Hume's *Treatise* really first revealed to Kant the scope and innermost meaning of Hume's analysis of the causal problem.

The evidence in support of this contention is entirely circumstantial. The German translation of Beattie's *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth* was published at Easter 1772, *i.e.* in the year in which Kant, in the process of his own independent development, came, as is shown by his famous letter to Herz,[4] to realise the mysterious, problematic character of *a priori* knowledge *of the independently real*. He was then, however, still entirely unconscious of the deeper problem which at once emerges upon recognition that *a priori* principles, quite apart from all question of their objective validity, are synthetic in form. We know that Kant was acquainted with Beattie's work; for he twice refers to Beattie's

[1] The word which Kant uses is *Erinnerung* (cf. below, p. xxix, *n.* 4). There are two main reasons for believing that Kant had not himself read the *Treatise*. He was imperfectly acquainted with the English language, and there was no existing German translation. (Jakob's translation did not appear till 1790–91. On Kant's knowledge of English, cf. Erdmann: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Bd. i. (1888) pp. 62 ff., 216 ff.; and K. Groos: *Kant-Studien*, Bd. v. (1900) p. 177 ff.: and below, p. 156.) And, secondly, Kant's statements reveal his entire ignorance of Hume's view of mathematical science as given in the *Treatise*.

[2] Cf. Vaihinger, *Commentary*, i. p. 344 ff. Beattie does, indeed, refer to Hume's view of mathematical science as given in the *Treatise*, but in so indirect and casual a manner that Kant could not possibly gather from the reference any notion of what that treatment was. Cf. Beattie's *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth* (sixth edition), pp. 138, 142, 269.

[3] These Hume had himself pointed out both in the *Treatise* and in the *Enquiry*, and because of them he rejects scepticism as a feasible philosophy of life. Kant's statement above quoted that Hume's critics (among whom Beattie is cited) "were ever assuming what Hume doubted, and demonstrating with eagerness and *often with arrogance* what he never thought of disputing," undoubtedly refer in a quite especial degree to Beattie.

[4] *Werke*, x. p. 123 ff. It is dated February 21, 1772. Cf. below, pp. 219–20.

criticism of Hume.[1] What more probable than that he read the translation in the year of its publication, or at least at some time not very long subsequent to the date of the letter to Herz? The passages which Beattie quotes from the *Treatise* are exactly those that were necessary to reveal the full scope of Hume's revolutionary teaching in respect to the general principle of causality. There seems, indeed, little doubt that this must have been the channel through which Hume's influence chiefly acted. Thus at last, by a circuitous path, through the quotations of an adversary, Hume awakened philosophy from its dogmatic slumber,[2] and won for his argument that appreciation which despite its cogency it had for thirty years so vainly demanded.

Let us now turn our attention to the rationalist philosophy in which Kant was educated. Hume's contention that experience cannot by itself justify any inductive inference forms the natural bridge over which we can best pass to the contrasting standpoint of Leibniz. Hume and Leibniz find common ground in denouncing empiricism. Both agree in regarding it as the mongrel offspring of conflicting principles. If rationalism cannot hold its own, the alternative is not the finding of firm foothold in concrete experience, but only such consolation as a sceptical philosophy may afford.[3] The overthrow of rationalism means the destruction of metaphysics in every form. Even mathematics and the natural sciences will have to be viewed as fulfilling a practical end, not as satisfying a theoretical need. But though Leibniz's criticism of empiricism is, in its main contention, identical with that of Hume, it is profoundly different both in its orientation and in the conclusions to which it leads. While Hume maintains that induction must be regarded as a non-rational process of merely instinctive anticipation, Leibniz argues to the self-legislative character of pure thought. Sense-experience reveals reality only in proportion as it embodies principles derived from the inherent character of thought itself. Experience conforms to *a priori* principles, and so can afford an adequate basis for scientific induction.

There is a passage in Hume's *Enquiry* which may be employed to illustrate the boldly speculative character of Leibniz's interpretation of the nature and function of human thought. "Nothing . . . [seems] more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all human

[1] In *Prolegomena*, p. 6 (above quoted, p. xxviii, *n.* I), and p. 8 (trans, p. 6): "I should think Hume might fairly have laid as much claim to sound sense as Beattie, and besides to a critical understanding (such as the latter did not possess)."

[2] Cf. *Prolegomena*, p. 8: "I honestly confess that my recollection of David Hume's teaching (*die Erinnerung des David Hume*) was the very thing which many years ago [Kant is writing in 1783] first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction." Kant's employment of the term *Erinnerung* may perhaps be interpreted in view of the indirect source of his knowledge of Hume's main position. He would bring to his reading of Beattie's quotations the memory of Hume's other sceptical doctrines as expounded in the *Enquiry*.

[3] Kant, it should be noted, classifies philosophies as either dogmatic (= rationalistic) or sceptical. Empiricism he regards as a form of scepticism.

power and authority, but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. . . . While the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty, the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe. . . . What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is anything beyond the power of thought, except what implies an absolute contradiction." This passage in which Hume means to depict a false belief, already sufficiently condemned by the absurdity of its claims, expresses for Leibniz the wonderful but literal truth. Thought is the revealer of an eternal unchanging reality, and its validity is in no way dependent upon its verification through sense. When Voltaire in his *Ignorant Philosopher* remarks that "it would be very singular that all nature, all the planets, should obey eternal laws, and that there should be a little animal, five feet high, who, in contempt of these laws, could act as he pleased, solely according to his caprice,"[1] he is forgetting that this same animal of five feet can contain the stellar universe in thought within himself, and has therefore a dignity which is not expressible in any such terms as his size may seem, for vulgar estimation, to imply. Man, though dependent upon the body and confined to one planet, has the sun and stars as the playthings of his mind. Though finite in his mortal conditions, he is divinely infinite in his powers.

Leibniz thus boldly challenges the sceptical view of the function of reason. Instead of limiting thought to the translating of sense-data into conceptual forms, he claims for it a creative power which enables it out of its own resources to discover for itself, not only the actual constitution of the material world, but also the immensely wider realm of possible entities. The real, he maintains, is only one of the many kingdoms which thought discovers for itself in the universe of truth. It is the most comprehensive and the most perfect, but still only one out of innumerable others which unfold themselves to the mind in pure thought. Truth *is* not the abstracting of the universal aspects in things, not a copy of reality, dependent upon it for meaning and significance. Truth is wider than reality, is logically prior to it, and instead of being dependent upon the actual, legislates for it. Leibniz thus starts from the possible, as discovered by pure thought, to determine in an *a priori* manner the nature of the real.

This Leibnizian view of thought may seem, at first sight, to be merely the re-emergence of the romantic, rationalistic ideal of Descartes and Malebranche. So to regard it would, however, be a serious injustice. It was held with full consciousness of its grounds and implications, and reality was metaphysically reinterpreted so as to afford it a genuine basis. There was nothing merely mystical and nothing undefined in its main tenets. Leibniz differs from Malebranche in being himself a profound mathe-

[1] Quoted by Beattie (*op. cit.*, sixth edition, p. 295), who, however incapable of appreciating the force of Hume's arguments, was at least awake to certain of their ultimate consequences.

matician, the co-discoverer with Newton of the differential calculus. He also differs from Descartes in possessing an absorbing interest in the purely logical aspects of the problem of method; and was therefore equipped in a supreme degree for determining in genuinely scientific fashion the philosophical significance and value of the mathematical disciplines.

Hume and Leibniz are thus the two protagonists that dwarf all others. They realised as neither Malebranche, Locke, nor Berkeley, neither Reid, Lambert, Crusius, nor Mendelssohn ever did, the really crucial issues which must ultimately decide between the competing possibilities. Each maintained, in the manner prescribed by his general philosophy, one of what then appeared to be the only two possible views of the function of thought. The alternatives were these: (*a*) Thought is merely a practical instrument for the convenient interpretation of our human experience; it has no objective or metaphysical validity of any kind; (*b*) Thought legislates universally; it reveals the wider universe of the eternally possible; and prior to all experience can determine the fundamental conditions to which that experience must conform. Or to interpret this opposition in logical terms: (*a*) The fundamental principles of experience are synthetic judgments in which no relation is discoverable between subject and predicate, and which for that reason can be justified neither *a priori* nor by experience; (*b*) all principles are analytic, and can therefore be justified by pure thought.

The problem of Kant's *Critique*, broadly stated, consists in the examination and critical estimate of these two opposed views. There is no problem, scientific, moral, or religious, which is not vitally affected by the decision which of these alternatives we are to adopt, or what reconciliation of their conflicting claims we hope to achieve. Since Kant's day, largely owing to the establishment of the evolution theory, this problem has become only the more pressing. The naturalistic, instrumental view of thought seems to be immensely reinforced by biological authority. Thought would seem to be reduced to the level of sense - affection, and to be an instrument developed through natural processes for the practical purposes of adaptation. Yet the counter-view has been no less powerfully strengthened by the victorious march of the mathematical sciences. They have advanced beyond the limits of Euclidean space, defining possibilities such as no experience reveals to us. The Leibnizian view has also been reinforced by the successes of physical science in determining what would seem to be the actual, objective character of the independently real. Kant was a rationalist by education, temperament, and conviction. Consequently his problem was to reconcile Leibniz's view of the function of thought with Hume's proof of the synthetic character of the causal principle. He strives to determine how much of Leibniz's belief in the legislative power of pure reason can be retained after full justice has been done to Hume's damaging criticisms. The fundamental principles upon which all experience and all knowledge ultimately rest are *synthetic* in nature:

how is it possible that they should also be *a priori*? Such is the problem that was Kant's troublous inheritance from his philosophical progenitors, Hume and Leibniz.[1]

III. GENERAL

In indicating some of the main features of Kant's general teaching, I shall limit myself to those points which seem most helpful in preliminary orientation, or which are necessary for guarding against the misunderstandings likely to result from the very radical changes in terminology and in outlook that have occurred in the hundred and thirty years since the publication of the *Critique*. Statements which thus attempt to present in outline, and in modern terms, the more general features of Kant's philosophical teaching will doubtless seem to many of my readers dogmatic in form and highly questionable in content. They must stand or fall by the results obtained through detailed examination of Kant's *ipsissima verba*. Such justification as I can give for them will be found in the body of the *Commentary*.

I. THE NATURE OF THE *A PRIORI*

The fundamental presupposition upon which Kant's argument rests—a presupposition never itself investigated but always assumed—is that universality and necessity cannot be reached by any process that is empirical in character. By way of this initial assumption Kant arrives at the conclusion that the *a priori*, the distinguishing characteristics of which are universality and necessity, is not given in sense but is imposed by the mind; or in other less ambiguous terms, is not part of the matter of experience but constitutes its form. The matter of experience is here taken as equivalent to sensation; while sensation, in turn, is regarded as being the non-relational.

The explanation of Kant's failure either to investigate or to prove this assumption has already been indicated. Leibniz proceeds upon the assumption of its truth no less confidently than Hume, and as Kant's main task consisted in reconciling what he regarded as being the elements of truth in their opposed philosophies, he very naturally felt secure in rearing his system upon the one fundamental presupposition on which they were able to agree. It lay outside the field of controversy, and possessed for Kant, as it had possessed for Hume and for Leibniz, that authoritative and axiomatic character which an unchallenged preconception tends always to acquire.

[1] For a more detailed statement of Kant's relation to his philosophical predecessors, cf. below, Appendix B, p. 583 ff.

The general thesis, that the universal and necessary elements in experience constitute its form, Kant specifies in the following determinate manner. The form is fixed for all experience, that is to say, it is one and the same in each and every experience, however simple or however complex. It is to be detected in consciousness of duration no less than in consciousness of objects or in consciousness of self. For, as Kant argues, consciousness of duration involves the capacity to distinguish between subjective and objective succession, and likewise involves recognition[1] with its necessary component self-consciousness. Or to state the same point of view in another way, human experience is a temporal process and yet is always a consciousness of meaning. As temporal, its states are ordered successively, that is, externally to one another; but the consciousness which they constitute is at each and every moment the awareness of some single unitary meaning by reference to which the contents of the successive experiences are organised. The problem of knowledge may therefore be described as being the analysis of the consciousness of duration, of objectivity, and of self-consciousness, or alternatively as the analysis of our awareness of meaning. Kant arrives at the conclusion that the conditions of all four are one and the same.[2]

Kant thus teaches that experience in all its embodiments and in each of its momentary states can be analysed into an endlessly variable material and a fixed set of relational elements. And as no one of the relational factors can be absent without at once nullifying all the others, they together constitute what must be regarded as the determining form and structure of every mental process that is cognitive in character. Awareness, that is to say, is identical with the act of judgment, and therefore involves everything that a judgment, in its distinction from any mere association of ideas, demands for its possibility.

Kant's position, when thus stated, differs from that of Leibniz only in its clearer grasp of the issues and difficulties involved, and consequently in the more subtle, pertinacious, and thoroughgoing character of the argument by which it is established. Its revolutionary character first appears when Kant further argues, in extension of the teaching of Hume, that the formal, relational elements are of a *synthetic* nature. The significance and scope of this conclusion can hardly be exaggerated. No other Kantian tenet is of more fundamental importance.[3] With it the main consequences of Kant's Critical teaching are indissolubly bound up.

[1] The term "recognition" is employed by Kant in its widest sense, as covering, for instance, recognition of the past as past, or of an object as being a certain kind of object.

[2] Consciousness of time, consciousness of objects in space, consciousness of self, are the three modes of experience which Kant seeks to analyse. They are found to be inseparable from one another and in their union to constitute a form of conscious experience that is equivalent to an act of judgment—*i.e.* to be a form of awareness that involves relational categories and universal concepts.

[3] As we have noted (above, pp. xxvi–xxvii), it was Hume's insistence upon the synthetic, non-self-evident character of the causal axiom that awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber. Cf. below, pp. 61 ff., 593 ff.

As the principles which lie at the basis of our knowledge are synthetic, they have no intrinsic necessity, and cannot possess the absolute authority ascribed to them by the rationalists. They are prescribed to human reason, but cannot be shown to be inherently rational in any usual sense of that highly ambiguous term. They can be established only as brute conditions, verifiable in fact though not demonstrable in pure theory (if there be any such thing), of our actual experience. They are conditions of *sense-experience*, and that means of our knowledge of appearances, never legitimately applicable in the deciphering of ultimate reality. They are valid within the realm of experience, useless for the construction of a metaphysical theory of things in themselves. This conclusion is reinforced when we recognise that human experience, even in its fundamental features *(e.g.* the temporal and the spatial), might conceivably be altogether different from what it actually is, and that its presuppositions are always, therefore, of the same contingent character. Even the universality and necessity which Kant claims to have established for his *a priori* principles are of this nature. Their necessity is always for us extrinsic; they can be postulated only if, and so long as, we are assuming the occurrence of human sense-experience.

Thus Kant is a rationalist of a new and unique type. He believes in, and emphasises the importance of, the *a priori*. With it alone, he contends, is the *Critique* competent to deal. But it is an *a priori* which cannot be shown to be more than relative. It does, indeed, enable us to conceive the known as relative, and to entertain in thought the possibility of an Absolute; but this it can do without itself possessing independent validity. For though the proof of the *a priori* is not empirical in the sense of being inductive, neither is it logical in the sense of being deduced from necessities of thought. Its "transcendental" proof can be executed only so long as experience is granted as actual; and so long as the fundamental characteristics of this experience are kept in view.

Lastly, the *a priori* factors are purely relational. They have no inherent content from which clues bearing on the supersensible can be obtained. Their sole function is to serve in the interpretation of contents otherwise supplied.

The *a priori*, then, is merely relational, without inherent content; it is synthetic, and therefore incapable of independent or metaphysical proof; it is relative to an experience which is only capable of yielding appearances. The *a priori* is as strictly factual as the experience which it conditions.

Even in the field of morality Kant held fast to this conviction. Morality, no less than knowledge, presupposes *a priori* principles. These, however, are never self-evident, and cannot be established by any appeal to intuition. They have authority only to the extent to which they can be shown to be the indispensable presuppositions of a moral consciousness that is undeniably actual.[1]

[1] Cf. below, pp. lvi, 571 ff.

That the *a priori* is of this character must be clearly understood. Otherwise the reader will be pursued by a feeling of the unreality, of the merely historical or antiquarian significance, of the entire discussion. He may, if he pleases, substitute the term formal or relational for *a priori*. And if he bears in mind that by the relational Kant is here intending those elements in knowledge which render possible the relations constitutive of *meaning*, he will recognise that the Critical discussion is by no means antiquated, but still remains one of the most important issues in the entire field of philosophical enquiry.

2. KANT'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC

The above conclusions have an important bearing upon logical doctrine. Just as modern geometry originates in a sceptical treatment of the axiom of parallels, so modern, idealist logic rests upon Kant's demonstration of the revolutionary consequences of Hume's sceptical teaching. If principles are never self-evident, and yet are not arrived at by induction from experience, by what alternative method can they be established? In answer to this question, Kant outlines the position which is now usually entitled the *Coherence* theory of truth.[1] That theory, though frequently ascribed to Hegel, has its real sources in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It expresses that modification in the Leibnizian rationalism which is demanded by Hume's discovery of the synthetic character of the causal axiom. Neither the deductive methods of the Cartesian systems nor the inductive methods of the English philosophies can any longer be regarded as correctly describing the actual processes of scientific proof.

General principles are either presuppositions or postulates. If *a priori*, they are presupposed in all conscious awareness; as above indicated, they have a *de facto* validity within the experience which they thus make possible. If more special in nature, they are the postulates to which we find ourselves committed in the process of solving specific problems; and they are therefore discovered by the method of trial and failure.[2] They are valid in proportion as they enable us to harmonise appearances, and to adjudicate to each a kind of reality consistent with that assigned to every other.

Proof of fact is similar in general character. The term fact is eulogistic, not merely descriptive; it marks the possession of cognitive significance in regard to some body of knowledge, actual or possible. It can be applied to particular appearances only in so far as we can determine their conditions, and can show that as thus conditioned the mode of their existence is relevant to the enquiry that is being pursued. The convergence of parallel lines is fact from the standpoint of psychological

[1] Cf. below, pp. 36–7.
[2] Cf. below, p. 543 ff.

investigation; from the point of view of their physical existence it is merely appearance. Ultimately, of course, everything is real, including what we entitle appearance;[1] but in the articulation of human experience such distinctions are indispensable, and the criteria that define them are prescribed by the context in which they are being employed.

Thus facts cannot be established apart from principles, nor principles apart from facts. The proof of a principle is its adequacy to the interpretation of all those appearances that can be shown to be in any respect relevant to it, while the test of an asserted fact, *i.e.* of our description of a given appearance, is its conformity to the principles that make insight possible.

Though the method employed in the *Critique* is entitled by Kant the "transcendental method," it is really identical in general character with the hypothetical method of the natural sciences. It proceeds by enquiring what conditions must be postulated in order that the admittedly given may be explained and accounted for.[2] Starting from the given, it also submits its conclusions to confirmation by the given. Considered as a method, there is nothing metaphysical or high-flying about it save the name. None the less, Kant is in some degree justified in adopting the special title. In view of the unique character of the problem to be dealt with, the method calls for very careful statement, and has to be defended against the charge of inapplicability in the philosophical field.

The fundamental thesis of the Coherence theory finds explicit formulation in Kant's doctrine of the judgment: the doctrine, that awareness is identical with the act of judging, and that judgment is always complex, involving both factual and interpretative elements. Synthetic, relational factors are present in *all* knowledge, even in knowledge that may seem, on superficial study, to be purely analytic or to consist merely of sense-impressions. Not contents alone, but contents interpreted in terms of some specific setting, are the sole possible objects of human thought. Even when, by forced abstraction, particulars and universals are held mentally apart, they are still being apprehended through judgments, and therefore through mental processes that involve both. They stand in relations of mutual implication within a *de facto* system; and together they constitute it.

This is the reason why in modern logic, as in Kant's *Critique*, the theory of the judgment receives so much more attention than the theory of reasoning. For once the above view of the judgment has been established, all the main points in the doctrine of reasoning follow of themselves as so many corollaries. Knowledge starts neither from sense-data nor from general principles, but from the complex situation in which the human race finds itself at the dawn of self-consciousness. That situation is organised in terms of our mental equipment; and this

[1] Cf. below, pp. liii–iv.

[2] Cf. below, pp. 45, 238–43.

already existing, rudimentary system is what has made practicable further advance; to create a system *ab initio* is altogether impossible. The starting-point does not, however, by itself alone determine our conclusions. Owing to the creative activities of the mind, regulative principles are active in all consciousness; and under their guidance the experienced order, largely practical in satisfaction of the instinctive desires, is transformed into a comprehended order, controlled in view of Ideal ends. Logic is the science of the processes whereby this transformation is brought about. An essentially metaphysical discipline, it cannot be isolated from the general body of philosophical teaching; it is not formal, but transcendental; in defining the factors and processes that constitute knowledge, its chief preoccupation is with ultimate issues.

In calling his new logic "transcendental" Kant, it is true, also intends to signify that it is supplementary to, not a substitute for, the older logic, which he professes to accept.[1] Moreover his intuitional theory of mathematical science, his doctrine of the "pure concept," his attributive view of the judgment—all of them survivals from his pre-Critical period[2]—frequently set him at cross-purposes with himself. His preoccupation, too, with the problem of the *a priori* leads him to underestimate the part played in knowledge by the strictly empirical. But despite all inconsistencies, and notwithstanding his perverse preference for outlandish modes of expression, he succeeds in enforcing with sufficient clearness the really fundamental tenets of the Coherence view.

3. THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

I shall now approach Kant's central position from another direction, namely, as an answer to the problem of the nature of consciousness. We are justified, I think, in saying that Kant was the first in modern times to raise the problem of the nature of awareness, and of the conditions of its possibility. Though Descartes is constantly speaking of consciousness, he defines it in merely negative terms, through its opposition to matter; and when he propounds the question how material bodies can be known by the immaterial mind, his mode of dealing with it shows that his real interest lies not in the nature of consciousness but in the character of the existences which it reveals. His answer, formulated in terms of the doctrine of representative perception, and based on the supposed teaching of physics and physiology, is that material bodies through their action on the sense-organs and brain generate images or duplicates of themselves. These images, existing not in outer space but only in consciousness, are, he asserts, mental in nature; and being mental they are, he would seem to conclude, immediately and necessarily apprehended by the mind. Thus Descartes gives us, not an analysis

[1] Cf. below, pp. 33–6, 181, 183–6.
[2] Cf. below, pp. 33–42, 394–5, 398.

of the knowing process, but only a subjectivist interpretation of the nature of the *objects* upon which it is directed.

Quite apart, then, from the question as to whether Descartes' doctrine of representative perception rests on a correct interpretation of the teaching of the natural sciences—Kant was ultimately led to reject the doctrine—it is obvious that the main epistemological problem, *i.e.* the problem how awareness is possible, and in what it consists, has so far not so much as even been raised. Descartes and his successors virtually assume that consciousness is an ultimate, unanalysable form of awareness, and that all that can reasonably be demanded of the philosopher is that he explain what objects are actually presented to it, and under what conditions their presentation can occur. On Descartes' view they are conditioned by antecedent physical and physiological processes; according to Berkeley they are due to the creative activity of a Divine Being; according to Hume nothing whatsoever can be determined as to their originating causes. But all three fail to recognise that even granting the objects to be of the character asserted, namely, mental, the further problem still remains for consideration, how they come to be consciously apprehended, and in what such awareness consists.

Certain interpretations of the nature of the knowing process are, of course, to be found in the writings of Descartes and his successors. But they are so much a matter of un-examined presupposition that they never receive exact formulation, and alternate with one another in quite a haphazard fashion. We may consider three typical views.

1. There is, Descartes frequently seems to imply—the same assumption is evident throughout Locke's *Essay*—a self that stands behind all mental states, observing and apprehending them. Consciousness is the power which this self has of contemplating both itself and its ideas. Obviously this is a mere ignoring of the issue. If we assume an observer, we *ipso facto* postulate a process of observation, but we have not explained or even defined it.

2. There is also in Descartes a second, very different, view of consciousness, namely, as a diaphanous medium analogous to light. Just as light is popularly conceived as revealing the objects upon which it falls, so consciousness is regarded as revealing to us our inner states. This view of consciousness, for reasons which I shall indicate shortly, is entirely inadequate to the facts for which we have to account. It is no more tenable than the corresponding view of light.

3. In Hume we find this latter theory propounded in what may at first sight seem a more satisfactory form, but is even less satisfactory. Sensations, images, feelings, he argues, are *states* of consciousness, one might almost say *pieces* of consciousness, *i.e.* they are conceived as carrying their own consciousness with them. Red, for instance, is spoken of as a sensation, and is consequently viewed both as being a sense-content, *i.e.* something sensed or apprehended, and also at the same time as the sensing or awareness of it. This view is unable to withstand criticism. There is really no more ground for asserting that red colour

carries with it consciousness of itself than for saying that a table does. The illegitimacy of the assertion is concealed from us by the fact that tables appear to exist when there is no consciousness present, whereas redness cannot be proved to exist independently of consciousness—it may or may not do so. Many present-day thinkers, continuing the tradition of the English associationists, hold to this pre-Kantian view. Sensations, feelings, etc., are, it is implied, pieces of consciousness, forms of awareness; through their varying combinations they constitute the complex experiences of the animal and human mind.

Kant's teaching is developed in direct opposition to all such views. If we discard his antiquated terminology, and state his position in current terms, we find that it amounts to the assertion that *consciousness is in all cases awareness of meaning*. There is no awareness, however rudimentary or primitive, that does not involve the apprehension of meaning. Meaning and awareness are correlative terms; each must be studied in its relation to the other. And inasmuch as meaning is a highly complex object of apprehension, awareness cannot be regarded as ultimate or as unanalysable. It can be shown to rest upon a complexity of generative conditions and to involve a variety of distinct factors.

There are thus, from the Kantian standpoint, two all-sufficient reasons why the diaphanous view of consciousness, *i.e.* any view which treats consciousness merely as a medium whereby the existent gets itself reported, must be regarded as untenable. In the first place, as already remarked, it is based on the false assumption that consciousness is an ultimate, and that we are therefore dispensed from all further investigation of its nature. Kant claims to have distinguished successfully the many components which go to constitute it; and he also professes to have shown that until such analysis has been made, there can be no sufficient basis for a philosophical treatment either of the problems of sense-perception or of the logical problems of judgment and inference. The diaphanous view, with its mirror-like mode of representation, might allow of the side-by-sideness of associated contents; it can never account for the processes whereby the associated contents come to be apprehended.

Secondly, the diaphanous view ignores the fundamental distinction between meaning and existence. Existences rest, so to speak, on their own bottom; they are self-centred even at the very moment of their reaction to external influences. Meaning, on the other hand, always involves the interpretation of what is given in the light of wider considerations that lend it significance. In the awareness of meaning the given, the actually presented, is in some way transcended, and this transcendence is what has chiefly to be reckoned with in any attempt to explain the conscious process. Kant is giving expression to this thesis when he contends that all awareness, no matter how rudimentary or apparently simple, is an act of judgment, and therefore involves the relational categories. *Not passive contemplation but active judgment, not mere conception but synthetic interpretation, is the fundamental form, and*

the only form, in which our consciousness exists. This, of course, commits Kant to the assertion that there is no mode of cognition that can be described as immediate or un-reflective. There is an immediate *element* in all knowledge, but our consciousness of it is always conditioned and accompanied by interpretative processes, and in their absence there can be no awareness of any kind.

By way of this primary distinction between existence and meaning Kant advances to all those other distinctions which characterise our human experience, between appearance and reality, between the real and the Ideal, between that which is judged and the criteria which control and direct the judging process. Just because all awareness is awareness of meaning, our human experience becomes intelligible as a purposive activity that directs itself according to Ideal standards.

The contrast between the Kantian and the Cartesian views of consciousness can be defined in reference to another important issue. The diaphanous view commits its adherents to a very definite interpretation of the nature of relations. Since they regard consciousness as passive and receptive, they have to maintain that relations can be known only in so far as they are apprehended in a manner analogous to the contents themselves. I do not, of course, wish to imply that this view of relational knowledge is in all cases and in all respects illegitimate. Kant, as we shall find, has carried the opposite view to an impossible extreme, assuming without further argument that what has been shown to be true of certain types of relation (for instance, of the causal and substance-attribute relations) must be true of all relations, even of those that constitute space and time. It cannot be denied that, as William James and others have very rightly insisted, such relations as the space-relations are *in some degree or manner* presentational. This does not, however, justify James in concluding, as he at times seems inclined to do, that all relations are directly experienced. Such procedure lays him open to the same charge of illegitimate reasoning. But even if we could grant James's thesis in its widest form, the all-important Critical question would still remain: in what does awareness, whether of presented contents or of presented relations, consist, and how is it possible? In answering this question Kant is led to the conclusion that consciousness must be regarded as an activity, and as determining certain of the conditions of its own possibility. Its contribution is of a uniform and constant nature; it consists, as already noted, of certain relational factors whose presence can be detected in each and every act of awareness.

There is one other respect in which Kant's view of consciousness differs from that of his Cartesian predecessors.[1] Consciousness, he maintains, does not reveal itself, but only its objects. In other words, there is no awareness of awareness. So far as our mental states and processes can be known at all, they are known in the same objective manner in which

[1] With the sole exception of Malebranche, who on this point anticipated Kant.

we apprehend existences in space.[1] Now if this be so, a very important consequence follows. If there is no awareness of awareness, but only of meanings all of which are objective, there can be no consciousness of the generative, synthetic processes that constitute consciousness *on its subjective side.* For consciousness, being an *act* of awareness in which *meaning* is apprehended, has a twofold nature, and must be very differently described according to the aspect which at any one time we may have in view. When we regard it on its *objective* side as awareness of *meaning*, we are chiefly concerned with the various factors that are necessary to meaning and that enter into its constitution. That is to say, our analysis is essentially logical. When, on the other hand, we consider consciousness as an *act* of awareness, our problem is ontological or as it may be entitled (though the term is in this reference somewhat misleading, since the enquiry as defined by Kant is essentially metaphysical) psychological in character. Between these two aspects there is this very important difference. The logical factors constitutive of meaning can be exhaustively known; they are elements in the meanings which consciousness reveals; whereas the synthetic processes are postulated solely in view of these constituent factors, and in order to account for them. The processes, that is to say, are known only through that which they condition, and on Kant's teaching we are entirely ruled out from attempting to comprehend even their possibility.[2] They must be thought as occurring, but they cannot be known, *i.e.* their nature cannot be definitely specified. The postulating of them marks a gap in our knowledge, and extends our insight only in the degree that it discloses our ignorance. As consciousness rests upon, and is made possible by, these processes, it can never be explained in terms of the objective world to which our sense-experience, and therefore, as Kant argues, our specific knowledge, is exclusively limited. The mind can unfold its contents in the sunshine of consciousness, only because its roots strike deep into a soil that the light does not penetrate. These processes, thus postulated, Kant regards as the source of the *a priori* elements, and as the agency through which the synthetic connections necessary to all consciousness are brought about.

According to Kant's Critical teaching, therefore, consciousness, though analysable, is not such as can ever be rendered completely comprehensible. When all is said, it remains for us a strictly *de facto* form of

[1] This is the position that Kant endeavours to expound in the very unsatisfactory form of a doctrine of "inner sense." Cf. below, pp. i–ii, 291 ff.

[2] This was Kant's chief reason for omitting the so-called "subjective deduction of the categories" from the second edition. The teaching of the subjective deduction is, however, preserved in almost unmodified form throughout the *Critique* as a whole, and its "transcendental psychology" forms, as I shall try to show, an essential part of Kant's central teaching. In this matter I find myself in agreement with Vaihinger, and in complete disagreement with Riehl and the majority of the neo-Kantians. The neo-Kantian attempt to treat epistemology in independence of all psychological considerations is bound to lead to very different conclusions from those which Kant himself reached. Cf. below, pp. 237 ff., 263–70.

existence, and has to be taken just for what it presents itself as being. It is actually such as to make possible the logical processes of judgment and inference. It is actually such as to render possible a satisfactory proof of the scientific validity, within the field of sense-experience, of the principle of causality, and of such other principles as are required in the development of the positive sciences. It is also such as to render comprehensible the controlling influence of Ideal standards. But when we come to the question, how is consciousness of this type and form possible, that is, to the question of its metaphysical significance and of the generative conditions upon which it rests, we find, Kant maintains, that we have no data sufficient to justify any decisive answer.

The ontological, creative, or dynamical aspect of consciousness, I may further insist, must be constantly borne in mind if the Critical standpoint is to be properly viewed. The logical analysis is, indeed, for the purposes of the central portions of the *Critique* much the more important, and alone allows of detailed, exhaustive development; but the other is no less essential for an appreciation of Kant's attitude towards the more strictly metaphysical problems of the *Dialectic*.

Hegel and his disciples have been the chief culprits in subordinating, or rather in entirely eliminating, this aspect of Kant's teaching. Many of the inconsistencies of which they accuse Kant exist only if Kant's teaching be first reduced to a part of itself. To eliminate the ontological implications of his theory of consciousness is, by anticipation, to render many of his main conclusions entirely untenable, and in particular to destroy the force of his fundamental distinction between appearance and reality. If consciousness knows itself in its ultimate nature—and such is Hegel's contention—one half of reality is taken out of the obscurity in which, on Kant's reading of the situation, it is condemned to lie hidden. Man is more knowable than nature, and is the key to nature; such is Hegel's position, crudely stated. Contrast therewith the teaching of Kant. We can know nature more completely (though still very incompletely) than we can ever hope to comprehend the conditions which make possible and actual man's spiritual life. The moral consciousness is an autonomously acting source of independent values, and though a standing miracle, must be taken for all that on independent and separate enquiry it is found to be. Hegel, in his endeavour to establish an intellectual monism, does violence to some of the highest interests which he professes to be safeguarding. Kant, while outlining in Idea a Kingdom of Ends, remains satisfied with a pluralistic distinction between the intellectual and the moral categories. The antithesis of the two philosophies is in some degree the ancient opposition between Aristotle and Plato, restated in modern terms.

4. PHENOMENALISM, KANT'S SUBSTITUTE FOR SUBJECTIVISM

The revolutionary character of the above conclusions is shown by the difficulty which Kant himself found in breaking away from many of the

presuppositions that underlie the views which he was renouncing; and this is nowhere more evident than in his constant alternation throughout the *Critique* between a *subjectivism*[1] that is thoroughly Cartesian—we might almost, allowing for his rationalism, say Berkeleian—in character, and a radically different position which may be entitled *phenomenalism.* The latter is alone genuinely Critical, and presents Kant's teaching in its maturest form. For though first formulated only in those portions of the *Analytic* that are late in date of writing, and in those passages of the second edition which supplement them, it would seem to be the logical outcome of Kant's other main doctrines.

I have especially in mind Kant's fundamental distinction between appearance and reality; it has an all-important bearing upon the Cartesian opposition between the mental and the material, and especially upon the question as to what view ought to be taken of our so-called *subjective* experiences. The objective is for the Cartesians the independently real; the subjective is asserted to have an altogether different kind of existence in what is named the field of consciousness. Kant's phenomenalist restatement of this distinction is too complex and subtle to be made intelligible in the brief space available in this *Introduction*—it is expounded in the body of the *Commentary*[2]—but its general character I may indicate in a few sentences. All subjectivist modes of stating the problem of knowledge, such as we find in Hume and in Leibniz no less than in Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley, are, Kant finally concluded, illegitimate and question-begging. Our so-called subjective states, whether they be sensations, feelings, or desires, are *objective* in the sense that they are *objects* for consciousness.[3] Our mental states do not run parallel with the system of natural existences; nor are they additional to it. They do not constitute our consciousness of nature; they are themselves part of the natural order which consciousness reveals. They compose the empirical self which is an objective existence, integrally connected with the material environment in terms of which alone it can be understood. The subjective is not opposite in nature to the objective, but a sub-species within it. While, however, the psychical is thus to be regarded as a class of known appearances, and as forming together with the physical a single system of nature, this entire order is, in Kant's view, conditioned by an underlying realm of noumenal existence; and when the question of the possibility of the *knowing*, that is, of the *experiencing* of such a comprehensive natural system, is raised, it is to this noumenal sphere that we are referred. Everything experienced, even a sensation or feeling, is an event, but the experiencing of

[1] This subjectivism finds expression in Kant's doctrine of the "transcendental object" which, as I shall try to prove, is a doctrine of early date and only semi-Critical. That doctrine is especially prominent in the section on the Antinomies. See below p. 204 ff.

[2] Cf. pp. 270 ff., 298 ff., 308–21, 373–4, 414–17.

[3] That this statement holds of feelings and desires, and therefore of all the emotions, as well as of our sense-contents, is emphasised by Kant in the *Critique of Practical Reason.* Cf. below, pp. 276, 279–80, 312, 384–5.

it is an act of awareness, and calls for an explanation of an altogether different kind.

Thus the problem of knowledge, stated in adequate Critical terms, is not how we can advance from the merely subjective to knowledge of the independently real,[1] but how, if everything known forms part of a comprehensive natural system, consciousness and the complex factors which contribute to its possibility are to be interpreted. On this latter question, as already indicated, Kant, though debarring both subjectivism and materialism, otherwise adopts a non-committal attitude. So long as we continue within the purely theoretical domain, there are a number of alternatives between which there are no sufficient data for deciding. To debar subjectivism is not to maintain the illusory or phenomenal character of the individual self; and to rule out materialism is not to assert that the unconscious may not generate and account for the conscious. In other words, they are ruled out not for any ulterior reasons derived from their supposed metaphysical consequences, but solely because they are based on palpable misinterpretations of the cognitive situation that generates those very problems to which they profess to be an answer.

5. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HUMAN AND ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE

The inwardness of Kant's Critical standpoint may perhaps be made clearer by a brief consideration of his view of animal intelligence. We are accustomed nowadays to test a psychology of human consciousness by its capacity to render conceivable an evolution from lower forms. How does Kant's teaching emerge from such a test?

It may at once be admitted that Kant has made no special study of animal behaviour, and was by no means competent to speak with authority in regard to its conditions. Indeed it is evident that anything which he may have to say upon this question is entirely of the nature of a deduction from results obtained in the human sphere. But when this has been admitted, and we are therefore prepared to find the problems approached from the point of view of the difference rather than of the kinship between man and the animals, we can recognise that, so far as the independent study of human consciousness is concerned, there is a certain compensating advantage in Kant's pre-Darwinian standpoint. For it leaves him free from that desire which exercises so constant, and frequently so deleterious an influence, upon many workers in the field of psychology, namely, to maintain at all costs,

[1] The connection of this teaching with Kant's theory of consciousness may be noted. If consciousness in all its forms, however primitive, is *already* awareness of meaning, its only possible task is to define, modify, reconstruct, and develop such meaning, never to obtain for bare contents or existences objective or other significance. Cf. above, pp. xli–ii, xliv.

in anticipation of conclusions not yet by any means established, the fundamental identity of animal and human intelligence. This besetting desire all too easily tends to the minimising of differences that may perhaps with fuller insight be found to involve no breach of continuity, but which in the present state of our knowledge cannot profitably be interpreted save in terms of their differentiating peculiarities.

The current controversy between mechanism and vitalism enforces the point which I desire to make. Biological problems, as many biologists are now urging, can be most profitably discussed in comparative independence of ultimate issues, entirely in view of their own domestic circumstances. For only when the actual constitution of organic compounds has been more completely determined than has hitherto been possible can the broader questions be adequately dealt with. In other words, the differences must be known before the exact nature and degree of the continuity can be defined. They cannot be anticipated by any mere deduction from general principles.

The value of Kant's analysis of human consciousness is thus closely bound up with his frank recognition of its inherent complexity. Not simplification, but specification, down to the bedrock of an irreducible minimum of correlated factors, is the governing motive of his Critical enquiries. His results have therefore the great advantage of being inspired by no considerations save such as are prescribed by the actual subject-matter under investigation. As already noted, Kant maintains that human consciousness is always an awareness of meaning, and that consequently it can find expression only in judgments which involve together with their other factors the element of recognition or self-consciousness.

This decides for Kant the character of the distinction to be drawn between animal and human intelligence. As animals, in his view, cannot be regarded as possessing a capacity of self-consciousness, they must also be denied all awareness of meaning. However complicated the associative organisation of their ideas may be, it never rises to the higher level of logical judgment. For the same reason, though their ideas may be schematic in outline, and in their bearing on behaviour may therefore have the same efficiency as general concepts, they cannot become universal in the logical sense. "Animals have apprehensions, but not apperceptions, and cannot, therefore, make their representations universal."[1] In support of this position Kant might have pointed to the significant fact that animals are so teachable up to a certain point, and so unteachable beyond it. They can be carried as far as associative suggestion will allow, but not a step further. To this day it remains true—at least I venture the assertion—that no animal has ever been conclusively shown to be capable of apprehending a sign as a sign. Animals may seem to do so owing to the influence of associated ideas, but are, as it would appear, debarred from crossing the boundary line

[1] *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie*, 207.

which so sharply distinguishes associative suggestion from reflective knowledge.

But Kant is committed to a further assertion. If animals are devoid of all awareness of meaning, they must also be denied anything analogous to what we must signify by the term consciousness. Their experience must fall apart into events, that may, perhaps, be described as mental, but cannot be taken as equivalent to an act of awareness. "*Apprehensio bruta* without consciousness,"[1] such is Kant's view of the animal mind. Its mental states, like all other natural existences, are events in time, explicable in the same naturalistic fashion as the bodily processes by which they are conditioned; they can not be equated with that human consciousness which enables us to reflect upon them, and to determine the conditions of their temporal happening.

The distinction which Kant desires to draw is ultimately that between events and consciousness of events. Even if events are psychical in character, consisting of sensations and feelings, there will still remain as fundamental the distinction between what is simply a member of the causal series of natural events and the consciousness through which the series is apprehended. Kant's most explicit statements occur in a letter to Herz.[2] He is referring to data of the senses which cannot be self-consciously apprehended:

> "I should not be able to know that I have them, and they would therefore be for me, as a cognitive being, absolutely nothing.
>
> They might still (if I conceive myself as an animal) exist in me (a being unconscious of my own existence) as representations . . . , connected according to an empirical law of association, exercising influence upon feeling and desire, and so always disporting themselves with regularity, without my thereby acquiring the least cognition of anything, not even of these my own states."[3]

As to whether Kant is justified in maintaining that the distinction between animal and human consciousness coincides with the distinction between associative and logical or reflective thinking, I am not concerned to maintain. This digression has been introduced solely for the purpose of defining more precisely the central tenets of Kant's Critical teaching.

6. THE NATURE AND CONDITIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

We have still to consider what is perhaps the most serious of all the misunderstandings to which Kant has laid himself open, and which is in large part responsible for the widespread belief that his Critical

[1] In sketch of a letter (summer 1792) to Fürst von Beloselsky (*W.* xi. p. 331).

[2] May 26, 1789 (*W.* xi. p. 52).

[3] That Kant has not developed a terminology really adequate to the statement of his meaning, is shown by a parenthesis which I have omitted from the above quotation.

principles, when consistently developed, must finally eventuate in some such metaphysics as that of Fichte and Hegel. I refer to the view that Kant in postulating synthetic processes as conditioning consciousness is postulating a noumenal self as exercising these activities, and is therefore propounding a *metaphysical explanation* of the synthetic, *a priori* factors in human experience.[1]

Kant's language is frequently ambiguous. The Leibnizian spiritualism, to which in his pre-Critical period he had un-questioningly held, continued to influence his terminology, and so to prevent his Critical principles from obtaining consistent expression. This much can be said in support of the above interpretation of Kant's position. But in all other respects such a reading of his philosophy is little better than a parody of his actual teaching. For Kant is very well aware that the problem of knowledge is not to be solved in any such easy and high-handed fashion. In the *Critique* he teaches quite explicitly that to profess to explain the presence of *a priori* factors in human experience by means of a self assumed for that very purpose would be a flagrant violation, not only of Critical principles, but even of the elementary maxims of scientific reasoning. In the first place, explanation by reference to the activities of such a self would be explanation by faculties, by the unknown; it is a cause that will explain anything and everything equally well or badly.[2] Self-consciousness has, indeed, to be admitted as a fact;[3] and from its occurrence Kant draws important conclusions in regard to the conditions which make experience possible. But, in so doing, Kant never intends to maintain that we are justified in postulating as part of those conditions, or as condition of those conditions, a noumenal self. The

[1] This interpretation of Kant appears in a very crude form in James's references to Kant in his *Principles of Psychology*. It appears in a more subtle form in Lotze and Green. Caird and Watson, on the other hand, have carefully guarded themselves against this view of Kant's teaching, and as I have maintained (pp. xliii–v), lie open to criticism only in so far as they tend to ignore those aspects of Kant's teaching which cannot be stated in terms of logical-implication.

[2] It may be objected that this is virtually what Kant is doing when he postulates synthetic activities as the source of the categories. Kant would probably have replied that he has not attempted to define these activities save to the extent that is absolutely demanded by the known character of their products, and that he is willing to admit that many different explanations of their nature are possible. They *may* be due to some kind of personal or spiritual agency, but also they may not. On the whole question of the legitimacy of Kant's general method of procedure, cf. below, pp. 235–9, 263 ff., 273–4, 277 ff., 461–2, 473–7.

[3] Cf. *Concerning the Advances made by Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff* (*Werke* (Hartenstein), viii. 530–1): "I am conscious to myself of myself—this is a thought which contains a twofold I, the I as subject and the I as object. How it should be possible that I, the I that thinks, should be an object ... to myself, and so should be able to distinguish myself from myself, it is altogether beyond our powers to explain. It is, however, an undoubted fact . . . and has as a consequence the complete distinguishing of us off from the whole animal kingdom, since we have no ground for ascribing to animals the power to say I to themselves."

conditions which make experience possible, whatever they may be, are also the conditions which make self-consciousness possible. Since the self is known only as appearance, it cannot be asserted to be the conditioning ground of appearance.

This first objection is not explicitly stated by Kant, but it is implied in a second argument which finds expression both in the *Deduction of the Categories* and in the chapter on the *Paralogisms*. The only self that we know to exist is the *conscious* self. Now, as Kant claims to have proved, the self can be thus conscious, even of itself, only in so far as it is conscious of objects. Consequently we have no right to assume that the self can precede such consciousness as its generating cause. That would be to regard the self as existing prior to its own conditions, working in darkness to create itself as a source of light.

But there is also a third reason why Kant's Critical solution of the problem of knowledge must not be stated in spiritualist terms. Self-consciousness, as he shows, is itself *relational* in character. It is a fundamental factor in human experience, not because the self can be shown to be the agency to which relations are due, but solely because, itself a case of recognition, it is at the same time a necessary condition of recognition, and recognition is indispensably presupposed in all consciousness of meaning.[1] Awareness of meaning is the fundamental mystery, and retains its profoundly mysterious character even when self-consciousness has been thus detected as an essential constituent. For self-consciousness does not explain the possibility of meaning; it is itself, as I have just remarked, only one case of recognition, and so is itself only an instance, though indeed the supreme and most important instance, of what we must intend by the term meaning. All awareness, not excepting that of the knowing self, rests upon noumenal conditions whose specific nature it does not itself reveal. Only on moral grounds, never through any purely theoretical analysis of cognitive experience, can it be proved that the self is an abiding personality, and that in conscious, personal form it belongs to the order of noumenal reality.

7. KANT'S THREEFOLD DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSIBILITY, UNDERSTANDING, AND REASON

Even so summary a statement of Critical teaching as I am attempting in this *Introduction* would be very incomplete without some reference to Kant's threefold distinction between the forms of sensibility, the categories of the understanding, and the Ideas of Reason.

On investigating space and time Kant discovers that they cannot be classed either with the data of the bodily senses or with the concepts of the understanding. They are sensuous (*i.e.* are not abstract but concrete, not ways of thinking but modes of existence), yet at the same time are

[1] Cf. above, p. xxxiv; below, pp. 250–3, 260–3, 285–6.

a priori. They thus stand apart by themselves. Each is unique in its kind, is single, and is an infinite existence. To describe them is to combine predicates seemingly contradictory. Viewed as characterising things in themselves, they are, in Kant's own phrase, monstrosities (*Undinge*). To them, primarily, are due those problems which have been a standing challenge to philosophy since the time of Zeno the Eleatic, and which Kant has entitled "antinomies of Reason."

In contrast to sensibility Kant sets the intellectual faculties, understanding and Reason. In the understanding originate certain pure concepts, or as he more usually names them, categories. The chief of these are the categories of "relation "—substance, causality and reciprocity. They combine with the forms of sensibility and the manifold of sense to yield the consciousness of an empirical order, interpretable in accordance with universal laws.

To the faculty of Reason Kant ascribes what he entitles Ideas. The Ideas differ from space, time, and the categories in being not "constitutive" but "regulative." They demand an *unconditionedness* of existence and a *completeness* of explanation which can never be found in actual experience. Their function is threefold. In the first place, they render the mind dissatisfied with the haphazard collocations of ordinary experience, and define the goal for its scientific endeavours. Secondly, they determine for us the criteria that distinguish between truth and falsity.[1] And thirdly, in so doing, they likewise make possible the distinction between appearance and reality, revealing to us an irreconcilable conflict between the ultimate aims of science and the human conditions, especially the spatial and temporal conditions under which these aims are realised. The Ideas of Reason are the second main factor in the "antinomies."

The problem of the *Critique*, the analysis of our awareness of meaning, is a single problem, and each of the above elements involves all the others. Kant, however, for reasons into which I need not here enter, has assigned part of the problem to what he entitles the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, and another part to the *Transcendental Dialectic*. Only what remains is dealt with in what is really the most important of the three divisions, the *Transcendental Analytic*, But as the problem is one and indivisible, the discussions in all three sections are condemned to incompleteness save in so far as Kant, by happy inconsistency, transgresses the limits imposed by his method of treatment. The *Aesthetic* really does no more than prepare the ground for the more adequate analysis of space and time given in the *Analytic* and *Dialectic*, while the problem of the *Analytic* is itself incompletely stated until the more comprehensive argument of the *Dialectic* is taken into account.[2] Thus the

[1] Cf. A 651 = B 679: "The law of Reason, which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary law, as without it we should have no Reason at all, and without Reason no coherent employment of the understanding, and in the absence of this no sufficient criterion of empirical truth." Cf. also below, pp. 390–1, 414–17, 429–31, 519–21. 558–61.

[2] Regarding a further complication, due to the fact that the *Dialectic* was written before the teaching of the *Analytic* was properly matured, cf. above, p. xxiv.

statement in the *Aesthetic* that space and time are *given* to the mind by the sensuous faculty of receptivity is modified in the *Analytic* through recognition of the part which the syntheses and concepts of the understanding must play in the construction of these forms; and in the *Dialectic* their apprehension is further found to involve an Idea of Reason. Similarly, in the concluding chapter of the *Analytic*, in discussing the grounds for distinguishing between appearance and reality, Kant omits all reference to certain important considerations which first emerge into view in the course of the *Dialectic*. Yet, though no question is more vital to Critical teaching, the reader is left under the impression that the treatment given in the *Analytic* is complete and final.

Partly as a consequence of this, partly owing to Kant's inconsistent retention of earlier modes of thinking, there are traceable throughout the *Critique* two opposed views of the nature of the distinction between appearance and reality. On the one view, this distinction is mediated by the relational categories of the understanding, especially by that of causality; on the other view, it is grounded in the Ideas of Reason. The former sets appearance in opposition to reality; the latter regards the distinction in a more tenable fashion, as being between realities less and more comprehensively conceived.[1]

A similar defect is caused by Kant's isolation of immanent from transcendent metaphysics.[2] The former is dealt with only in the *Analytic*, the latter only in the *Dialectic*. The former, Kant asserts, is made possible by the forms of sensibility and the categories of the understanding; the latter he traces to an illegitimate employment of the Ideas of Reason. Such a mode of statement itself reveals the impossibility of any sharp distinction between the immanent and the transcendent. If science is conditioned by Ideals which arouse the mind to further acquisitions, and at the same time reveal the limitations to which our knowledge is for ever condemned to remain subject; if, in other words, everything known, in being correctly known, must be apprehended as appearance (*i.e.* as a subordinate existence within a more comprehensive reality), the distinction between the immanent and the transcendent falls within and not beyond the domain of our total experience. The meaning which our consciousness discloses in each of its judgments is an essentially metaphysical one. It involves the thought, though not the knowledge, of something more than what the experienced can ever itself be found to be. The metaphysical is immanent in our knowledge; the transcendent is merely a name for this immanent factor when it is falsely viewed as capable of isolation and of independent treatment. By Kant's own showing, the task of the *Dialectic* is not merely to refute the pretensions of transcendent metaphysics, but to develop the above general thesis, in confirmation of the positive conclusions established in the *Analytic*. The *Critique* will then supply the remedy for certain evils to which the human mind has hitherto been subject.

[1] Cf. below, pp. 331, 390–1, 414–17.

[2] Cf. below, pp. 22, 33, 56, 66 ff.

"*The Critique of Pure Reason* is a preservative against a malady which has its source in our rational nature. This malady is the opposite of the love of home (the home-sickness) which binds us to our fatherland. It is a longing to pass out beyond our immediate confines and to relate ourselves to other worlds."[1]

8. THE PLACE OF THE *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON* IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM

The positive character of Kant's conclusions cannot be properly appreciated save in the wider perspectives that open to view in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and in the *Critique of Judgment*. Though in the *Critique of Pure Reason* a distinction is drawn between theoretical and moral belief, it is introduced in a somewhat casual manner, and there is no clear indication of the far-reaching consequences that follow in its train. Unfortunately also, even in his later writings, Kant is very unfair to himself in his methods of formulating the distinction. His real intention is to show that scientific knowledge is not coextensive with human insight; but he employs a misleading terminology, contrasting knowledge with faith, scientific demonstration with practical belief.

As already indicated, the term knowledge has, in the Critical philosophy, a much narrower connotation than in current speech. It is limited to *sense-experience*, and to such inferences therefrom as can be obtained by the only methods that Kant is willing to recognise, namely, the mathematico-physical. Aesthetic, moral and religious experience, and even organic phenomena, are excluded from the field of possible knowledge.

In holding to this position, Kant is, of course, the child of his time. The absolute sufficiency of the Newtonian physics is a presupposition of all his utterances on this theme. Newton, he believes, has determined in a quite final manner the principles, methods and limits of scientific investigation. For though Kant himself imposes upon science a further limitation, namely, to appearances, he conceives himself, in so doing, not as weakening Newton's natural philosophy, but as securing it against all possible objections. And to balance the narrow connotation thus assigned to the term knowledge, he has to give a correspondingly wide meaning to the terms faith, moral belief, subjective principles of interpretation. If this be not kept constantly in mind, the reader is certain to misconstrue the character and tendencies of Kant's actual teaching.

But though the advances made by the sciences since Kant's time have rendered this mode of delimiting the field of knowledge altogether untenable, his method of defining the sources of *philosophical insight* has proved very fruitful, and has many adherents at the present day. What Kant does—stated in broad outline—is to distinguish between the problems of *existence* and the problems of *value*, assigning the former to

[1] *Reflexionen* (B. Erdmann's edition) ii. 204.

science and the latter to philosophy.[1] Theoretical philosophy, represented in his system by the *Critique of Pure Reason*, takes as its province the logical values, that is, the distinction of truth and falsity, and defining their criteria determines the nature and limits of our theoretical insight. Kant finds that these criteria enable us to distinguish between truth and falsity only on the empirical plane. Beyond making possible a distinction between appearance and reality, they have no applicability in the metaphysical sphere.

The *Critique of Practical Reason* deals with values of a very different character. The faculty of Reason, which, as already noted,[2] renders our consciousness a purposive agency controlled by Ideal standards, is also, Kant maintains, the source of the moral sanctions. But whereas in the theoretical field it subdues our minds to the discipline of experience, and restrains our intellectual ambitions within the limits of the empirical order, it here summons us to sacrifice every natural impulse and every secular advantage to the furtherance of an end that has absolute value. In imposing duties, it raises our life from the "pragmatic "[3] level of a calculating expediency to the higher plane of a categorical imperative.

The categorical imperative at once humbles and exalts; it discloses our limitations, but does so through the greatness of the vocation to which it calls us.

"This principle of morality, just on account of the universality of the legislation which makes it the formal supreme determining principle of our will, without regard to any subjective differences, is declared by the Reason to be a law for all rational beings. . . . It is, therefore, not limited to men only, but applies to all finite beings that possess Reason and Will; nay, it even includes the Infinite Being as the Supreme Intelligence."[4]

Consequently, in employing moral ends in the interpretation of the Universe, we are not picturing the Divine under human limitations, but are discounting these limitations in the light of the one form of value that is known to us as absolute.

"Duty! . . . What origin is worthy of thee and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent . . . a root to be derived from which is the indispensable condition of the only worth that men can give themselves."[5]

In his earlier years Kant had accepted the current, Leibnizian view that human excellence consists in intellectual enlightenment, and that it is therefore reserved for an *élite*, privileged with the leisure and endowed with the special abilities required for its enjoyment. From this arid intellectualism he was delivered through the influence of Rousseau.

[1] For an alternative and perhaps more adequate method of describing Kant's general position, cf. below, p. 571 ff.

[2] Above, pp. xxxviii–ix, xlii, xliv.

[3] Cf. below, p. 577.

[4] *Critique of Practical Reason*, *W.* v. p. 32; Abbott's trans, pp. 120–1.

[5] *Op. cit.* p. 86; Abbott's trans, p. 180.

"I am by disposition an enquirer. I feel the consuming thirst for knowledge, the eager unrest to advance ever further, and the delights of discovery. There was a time when I believed that this is what confers real dignity upon human life, and I despised the common people who know nothing. Rousseau has set me right. This imagined advantage vanishes. I learn to honour men, and should regard myself as of much less use than the common labourer, if I did not believe that my philosophy will restore to all men the common rights of humanity."[1]

These common rights Kant formulates in a purely individualist manner. For here also, in his lack of historic sense and in his distrust alike of priests and of statesmen, he is the child of his time. In the education and discipline of the soul he looks to nothing so artificial and humanly limited—Kant so regards them—as religious tradition and social institutions. Human rights, he believes, do not vary with time and place; and for their enjoyment man requires no initiation and no equipment beyond what is supplied by Nature herself. It is from this standpoint that Kant adduces, as the twofold and sufficient inspiration to the rigours and sublimities of the spiritual life, the starry heavens above us and the moral law within. They are ever-present influences on the life of man. The naked eye reveals the former; of the latter all men are immediately aware. In their universal appeal they are of the very substance of human existence. Philosophy may avail to counteract certain of the hindrances which prevent them from exercising their native influence; it cannot be a substitute for the inspiration which they alone can yield.

Thus the categorical imperative, in endowing the human soul with an intrinsic value, singles it out from all other natural existences, and strengthens it to face, with equanimity, the cold immensities of the cosmic system. For though the heavens arouse in us a painful feeling of our insignificance as animal existences, they intensify our consciousness of a sublime destiny, as bearers of a rival, and indeed a superior, dignity.

In one fundamental respect Kant broke with the teaching of Rousseau, namely, in questioning his doctrine of the natural goodness and indefinite perfectibility of human nature.[2] Nothing, Kant maintains, is

[1] *Fragmente aus item Nachlasse* (*Werke* (Hartenstein), viii. p. 624). Cf. below, pp. 577–8. Kant claims for all men equality of political rights, and in his treatise on *Perpetual Peace* maintains that wars are not likely to cease until the republican form of government is universally adopted. He distinguishes, however, between republicanism and democracy. By the former he means a genuinely representative system; the latter he interprets as being the (in principle) unlimited despotism of majority rule. Kant accordingly contends that the smaller the staff of the executive, and the more effective the representation of minorities, the more complete will be the approximation to the ideal constitution. In other words, the less government we can get along with, the better.

[2] *On the Radical Evil in Human Nature*, *W*, vi. p. 20; Abbott's trans, p. 326. "This opinion [that the world is constantly advancing from worse to better] is certainly not founded on experience if what is meant is *moral* good or evil (not civilisation), for the history of all times speaks too powerfully against it. Probably it is merely a good-natured hypothesis . . . designed to encourage us in the unwearied cultivation of the germ of good that perhaps lies in us. . . ."

good without qualification except the good will; and even that, perhaps, is never completely attained in any single instance. The exercise of duty demands a perpetual vigilance, under the ever-present consciousness of continuing demerit.

"I am willing to admit out of love of humanity that most of our actions are indeed correct, but if we examine them more closely we everywhere come upon the dear self which is always prominent. . . ."[1] "Nothing but moral fanaticism and exaggerated self-conceit is infused into the mind by exhortation to actions as noble, sublime and magnanimous. Thereby men are led into the delusion that it is not duty, that is, respect for the law, whose yoke . . . they *must* bear, whether they like it or not, that constitutes the determining principle of their actions, and which always humbles them while they *obey* it. They then fancy that those actions are expected from them, not from duty, but as pure merit. . . . In this way they engender a vain high-flying fantastic way of thinking, flattering themselves with a spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor bridle, nor any command. . . ."[2]

In asserting the goodness and self-sufficiency of our natural impulses Rousseau is the spokesman of a philosophy which has dominated social and political theory since his day, and which is still prevalent. This philosophy, in Kant's view, is disastrous in its consequences. As a reading of human nature and of our moral vocation, it is hardly less false than the Epicurean teaching, which finds in the pursuit of pleasure the motive of all our actions. A naturalistic ethics, in either form, is incapacitated, by the very nature of its controlling assumptions, from appreciating the distinguishing features of the moral consciousness. Neither the successes nor the failures of man's spiritual endeavour can be rightly understood from any such standpoint. The human race, in its endurance and tenacity, in its dauntless courage and in its soaring spirit, reveals the presence of a *prevenient* influence, *non-natural* in character; and only if human nature be taken as including this higher, directive power, can it assume to itself the eulogy which Rousseau so mistakenly passes upon the natural and undisciplined tendencies of the human heart. For as history demonstrates, while *men* are weak, *humanity* is marvellous.

"There is one thing in our soul which, when we take a right view of it, we cannot cease to regard with the highest astonishment, and in regard to which admiration is right and indeed elevating, and that is our original moral capacity in general. . . . Even the incomprehensibility of this capacity,[3] a capacity which proclaims a Divine origin, must rouse man's spirit to enthusiasm and strengthen it for any sacrifices which respect for his duty may impose on him."[4]

[1] *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, *W.* iv. p. 407; Abbott's trans, p. 24.

[2] *Critique of Practical Reason*, *W.* v. pp. 84–5; Abbott's trans, pp. 178–9.

[3] Cf. *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, *W.* iv. p, 463; Abbott's trans, p. 84: "While we do not comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet comprehend its *incomprehensibility*, and this is all that can be fairly demanded of a philosophy which strives to carry its principles up to the very limit of human reason."

[4] *On the Radical Evil in Human Nature*, *W.* vi. pp. 49–50; Abbott's trans, pp. 357–8.

We are not here concerned with the detail of Kant's ethical teaching, or with the manner in which he establishes the freedom of the will, and justifies belief in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. In many respects his argument lies open to criticism. There is an unhappy contrast between the largeness of his fundamental thesis and the formal, doctrinaire manner in which it is developed. Indeed, in the *Critique of Practical Reason* the individualist, deistic, rationalistic modes of thinking of his time are much more in evidence than in any other of his chief writings; and incidentally he also displays a curious insensibility—again characteristic of his period—to all that is specific in the religious attitude. But when due allowances have been made, we can still maintain that in resting his constructive views upon the supreme value of the moral personality Kant has influenced subsequent philosophy in hardly less degree than by his teaching in the *Critique of Pure Reason.*[1]

The two *Critiques*, in method of exposition and argument, in general outcome, and indeed in the total impression they leave upon the mind, are extraordinarily different. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant is meticulously scrupulous in testing the validity of each link in his argument. Constantly he retraces his steps; and in many of his chief problems he halts between competing solutions. Kant's sceptical spirit is awake, and it refuses to cease from its questionings. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, on the other hand, there is an austere simplicity of argument, which advances, without looking to right or left, from a few simple principles direct to their ultimate consequences. The impressiveness of the first *Critique* consists in its appreciation of the *complexity* of the problems, and in the care with which their various, conflicting aspects are separately dealt with. The second *Critique* derives its force from the fundamental conviction upon which it is based.

Such, then, stated in the most general terms, is the manner in which Kant conceives the *Critique of Pure Reason* as contributing to the establishment of a humanistic philosophy. It clears the ground for the practical Reason, and secures it in the autonomous control of its own domain. While preserving to the intellect and to science certain definitely prescribed rights, Kant places in the forefront of his system the moral values; and he does so under the conviction that in living up to the opportunities, in whatever rank of life, of our common heritage, we obtain a truer and deeper insight into ultimate issues than can be acquired through the abstruse subtleties of metaphysical speculation.

I may again draw attention to the consequences which follow from Kant's habitual method of isolating his problems. Truth is a value of universal jurisdiction, and from its criteria the judgments of moral and other values can claim no exemption. Existences and values do not constitute independent orders. They interpenetrate, and neither can be adequately dealt with apart from the considerations appropriate to the

[1] Cf. Pringle-Pattison: *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*, p. 25 ff.

other. In failing to co-ordinate his problems, Kant has over-emphasised the negative aspects of his logical enquiries and has formulated his ethical doctrines in a needlessly dogmatic form.

These defects are, however, in some degree remedied in the last of his chief works, the *Critique of Judgment*. In certain respects it is the most interesting of all Kant's writings. The qualities of both the earlier *Critiques* here appear in happy combination, while in addition his concrete interests are more in evidence, to the great enrichment of his abstract argument. Many of the doctrines of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, especially those that bear on the problems of teleology, are restated in a less negative manner, and in their connection with the kindred problems of natural beauty and the fine arts. For though the final decision in all metaphysical questions is still reserved to moral considerations, Kant now takes a more catholic view of the field of philosophy. He allows, though with characteristic reservations, that the *empirical* evidence obtainable through examination of the broader features of our total experience is of genuinely philosophical value, and that it can safely be employed to amplify and confirm the independent convictions of the moral consciousness. The embargo which in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in matters metaphysical, is placed upon all tentative and probable reasoning is thus tacitly removed; and the term knowledge again acquires the wider meaning very properly ascribed to it in ordinary speech.